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
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BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY

BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY

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To
H. C.
MY BEST

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A PREFACE TO METHODS

The following pages have been written as a result of dissatisfaction with the attitude prevailing among sociologists that, at least, in so far as society is pre-eminently an arena for the exercise of Practical Reason, the application of that method which has made for social progress, *viz.*, the scientific, will make Sociology the fittest instrument for planning and controlling social relationship. The wonderful growth of natural sciences and technological discoveries, and their far-reaching effects upon society lead them all, sociologists and the public alike, to think of science as a Social Force that *will* work itself out. Hence a study of the Basic Concepts in Sociology is bound up with the enquiry into the nature and limitations of what is conveniently summed up as the scientific method.

There is no one scientific method. As a distinguished psychologist (Spranger, quoted in *Pre-suppositions in the Social Sciences* by Landheer, *Am. J. of Soc.*, Jan., 1932) writes, "The objectivity resulting from the desire to understand, the subjectivity of the individual perspective and the absoluteness of the critical approach are all mysteriously woven. Direct attention to the object and subjective evaluation may participate in unequal measure." Even rigorous thinking on a topic, not merely a desire to understand, involves a combination of disinterested and interested reasoning processes, in which the speculative ones with laws of their own are hardly to be distinguished from the pragmatic ones. Strictly speaking, scientific method would mean (1) a limitation of the field of enquiry, mainly

by the dominant practical interest, (2) a close observation of facts and events within it, (3) correlations of groups of facts and events by studying their similarities and uniformities, (4) the establishment of generalisations on their typicality; and then on a more abstract plane of disinterestedness, (5) the construction of concepts, and (6) the reduction of such generalisations and typicalities to numerical forms, better still into formulas, for further enquiry on more economic lines and better control for the prediction of future events. The above numbering is no positive indication of the actual stages of the scientist's mental operations. Yet, the ascent from the interested, the pragmatic, and the empirical plane into the disinterested, the speculative and the conceptual, is a fact. "As science advances, theory tends more and more to become the central feature of investigation." To those who may object to the valuation insinuated in the term ascent, it may be replied, (as Fritz Lens has done in the section on Methodology in *Human Heredity*, p. 498) that 'pure speculation can furnish knowledge, but pure experience can never do so.' The scientific enquiry, however, is not exhausted in the above points. There is a constant subjection of generalisations, in whichever shape they may emerge, mathematical, statistical or otherwise, to the test of new facts, events, concepts, and other generalisations. Now, a modern Sociologist, not interested in the evolution of knowledge as such, or in the wholeness of a real event, usually identifies the first four steps with the entire scientific method, and only succeeds in equating the inductive method with the scientific. The result is 'logical suicide,' or at least a self-denying ordinance that has as much to do with understanding as asceticism with living. When he uses statistics

and mathematics he gives away his case without knowing it.

Such monistic habits of mind are anathema to an honest enquirer who is otherwise convinced that, taking singly, no better tool than the scientific method has yet been invented, and that for an Indian, at the present moment, salvation lies through its application to every sphere of knowledge and life. But this conviction is not by reason, though it may be whole-hearted. For after all, what is a method? It starts as a tool, but in its heyday, it will have to be 'more than effective for its limited purpose,' it will have 'to offer a variety of contrasts' within itself, and throw suggestions for further enquiry into regions where the immediate interests are not aggressively dominant. But the history of sciences tells us a different tale. We find fictions and hypotheses following the scientist like Nemesis. We find them being exorcised by instruments and numbers, and the will-to-be-objective. The last is called 'sceptical attitude,' which leads its most brilliant exponent, Russell, to a kind of 'a physiological solipsism' that assumes that all the findings of modern Physics are valid in order that a neutral monist may conclude that what we know are private sense-data. Apart from this putting of the scientific cart before the philosophical horse, scepticism very often reduces the scientific outlook to a survey of private joys and virtues. In essence, it is not different from Coueism with willing substituted for imagination. It is a modern surrogate of primitive willing, not its overthrow by reason. The very latest chapter in the history of scientific thought relates how the numerous forms of 'As If's' have re-entered by the back-door and spoiled the logic of Millikan and Comptons', Eddington and Jeans', Lloyd Morgan and

J. S. Haldanes' pronouncements on the nature of Reality. Still, it will have to be admitted that the philosophical speculations of modern scientists are preceded by periods of patient research, including their own, and that in those periods and stages, when knowledge is tied to mere facts, the method now criticised by them is above reproach.

But knowledge cannot remain perpetually wedded to mere matter-of-factness. There are wants of a different order which have to be satisfied. The knower of the twentieth century is not a bond-slave to his immediate environment, his interests are not finished by the immediate and the empirical. Neither the knower nor knowledge conforms to one chalked line to a predicated end. If the mental operations of a scientist in the process of discovering a new relation were to be described, we would probably end by comparing them to a mosaic. The fact is that when we select any thread or pattern out of it, we do so on *a priori* grounds for the sake of convenience in understanding, and flatter ourselves with the belief that we are doing so on *a posteriori* grounds alone. Yet, the moment we succumb to convenience, the reality of the experience is missed and understanding becomes twisted. A suspension of the temporal course of events is against reality; and the psychology of understanding is *not* the associationistic process of first isolating different mental processes and then summing them up. Understanding requires a study of the whole, the structural unity of a more or less completed process. But, as we know, the scientific method excludes evidence from outside its scope, and breaks up succession from sheer necessity of intensive study, if not for anything else. Therefore, the pure scientist is seldom to be trusted with matters of judgment or

evaluation which require consideration of matters beyond his immediate field of interest and study. "Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology. Ulysses has no use for Plato, and the bones of his companions are strewn on many a reef and many an isle." (A. N. Whitehead—The Function of Reason, p. 8).

Ordinarily, Philosophy is pitted against Science. Nothing is so easy as a clear-cut antithesis. In reaction to scientific method, one must needs discover the philosophic. Thus, there has been an 'idealistic reaction against science,' much of which is nonsense. It has only made the scientist humble and cautious in his statements, for science was being given to over-statement. Beyond this, I am not sure whether the recent outburst of the Professor-Philosopher has effected anything momentous. The scientist has become more of a scientist. He has been compelled to refine his method, but not to reject it. The caravan passes on. The outburst has not helped the cause of Idealism as a school of Philosophy either. In Philosophy, the idealistic reaction has thrown up certain beliefs long forgotten. On the other hand, Science even when it is equated to the physico-chemical method is deemed to have affected Philosophy vitally. Pure Idealism is no longer popular, Ethics, and particularly Axiology, is being sought to be based on securer foundations of physiology and psychology. If one wants to prove that man is moral, one generally adopts the concept of Psycho-analysis, *viz.*, the Super-Ego. Pavlov and Sherrington claim to be physiologists only, even when their researches are considered to be revolutionising all previous notions of thinking, learning, and conduct. The Introspectionists have also been compelled to

refine their methods in the light of experiments.

At least, we can say that 'the cultural compulsive of the age' is against Philosophy which it identifies with the deductive method alone, (though mathematical equations, the supreme achievement of deductive method, are being increasingly used in every department of science, including Eugenics, *vide* Fisher and Haldane), and strongly supports Science which it confuses with the inductive method, (though most of the present day philosophers base their systems on the findings of Science). This probably explains why in the case-book of 'Methods in Social Sciences,' edited by Prof. Stuart A. Rice, the method of philosophical enquiry was not included in the terms of reference by the distinguished committee. This characteristic omission has been brought to our notice by Prof. Ellwood (p. 20. Social Forces, Oct., 1931), and Prof. Mannheim in the Am. J. of Soc. (pp. 273-282, Sept., 1932). Out of fifty-two studies, only one, the thirty-second, by the Editor himself, may be said to skirt the periphery of philosophical enquiry. There too, the method is called 'psychological,' as was claimed by Prof. J. M. Williams, whose methodology in the book 'Our Rural Heritage' is analysed. "The work may be regarded as a fragment of psychological history of a still unique type. In the growing area of social science such a study, employing so largely intuitive methods, serves a useful role in opening up hypotheses for refined testing by other methods"—(Soc. Forces, Oct., 1931, p. 46), *viz.*, the scientific and what it includes, probably. A very grudging concession to the merits of Williams' method, and a cautious statement in tune with the terms of reference and the 'temper of the age.' The caution is justified by the attendant dangers of

intuition (' introspection ' would be better), of subjectivism and idealism, of moralising, theorising and word-polishing, *i.e.*, of arm-chair studies. It is also in accordance with the spirit of the founder of Sociology, Comte. Is it necessary to point out, incidentally, that Comte's Law of Three States is, in fact, a law of Four States, the fourth, *viz.*, the ethical following the third, *viz.*, the Positive or the Scientific, and has a qualifying adjective, ' theoretical ' to the substantive ' states ' ?

To what extent a more refined testing adopted in the sub or cross-sciences is favourable to a better understanding of the totality of the phenomena studied may be a legitimate subject for argument. It is held that frontiers and borderlands of highly specialised sciences are being reclaimed by Bio-Chemistry, Ecology, Geography, etc., till at last the whole problem of human experience is yielding its secret before the onslaught of the physico-chemical method (*vide*, Hogben—The Nature of Living Matter, J. B. S. Haldane—Causes of Evolution). For aught I know, these new borderland sciences make greater use of hypotheses than either Physics or Chemistry; their chief apparatus is statistical, which, as everybody knows, is good enough for the average, but may be wholly untrue of individual cases, whereas the mathematical laws of Physics and Chemistry are true of the average and the individual alike, (if we exclude Bose's laws of statistical mechanics applicable to certain highly complex phenomena). And this is not so much due to the stages of infancy of these sciences, which will be over in no time, as to the peculiar borderland scope of the enquiry. There is not the slightest doubt that a new science with a novel grouping of interests does adopt a methodology which is not exactly on all fours with the old one.

This is logical too. Frontier raids do not obey the tactics of the plain. The elements of the unknown and the contingent will always be there; in truth, they are as 'given matters of fact.' The surest methods *will not* explain them. As Prof. Hocking says: (Types of Philosophy, Ch. VI, Naturalism Examined—p. 105) "If you explain an event by a law, that leaves the law unexplained. I see a steel rail buckled in the sun; and this is explained to me by the law that heat expands metals. But why does heat expand metals? This is explained by reference to a more general law of the collision of particles in motion. This law may in turn be explained by a wider law: but the last law in the series, while it explains all the others, is left unexplained." Yet the aim of science is to establish this final law through the help of the wider laws of the frontier-sciences. In other words, in these sciences, the element of the unknown and the sense of inexplicability will play a greater part than in the settled and respectable sciences. They will continue to do so till the need of a new borderland science is felt, and is satisfied, temporarily, by another science.

So the task of a supreme co-ordination of an ever-growing series of systematic knowledge built on scientific method to the unity of a completed experience remains unfulfilled unless it is taken up by Philosophy. There is always the need for *explaining*, as distinguished from *formulating*, and *understanding*, as different from *analysing* the penultimate law which the subtlest of sub-sciences may yield. Explanation of a thing may be, logically, held to be outside the thing. When Philosophy ceases to be a permanent essay in deductive reasoning, as it is ceasing to be under the stress of science, there is no reason why the new Philosophy should

not perform its task of explanation by co-ordination of different interest-groups into a whole to the satisfaction of one who wants to understand the totality of experience. And in this, it will be true to its tradition. Philosophy, not the creed of the man to whom Philosophy is a vested interest, has been a sentinel on the watch-tower guarding against disruptive specialisation in knowledge. There never was a time when Philosophy had not offered criticisms of the foundations of natural sciences, questioned their methods, and sifted their implications. But there was a time when Science would not be allowed to question the methods of Philosophy. But that time is no more. The nineteenth century witnessed a phenomenal progress in Science in nearly all its branches and occupied the attention of the people by the glamour of its material success. Now Science is well-established and its encroachments upon Philosophy are far-reaching. As we have seen, it offers Philosophy certain raw materials, it informs Philosophy with a certain spirit—a spirit that is not its own monopoly, but which it has annexed to itself by right of conquest and usufruct. Philosophy is now compelled to set its own house in order. Realism is the order of the day, even a Hocking has to qualify his Mysticism by the word Critical. This does not mean, however, that the scope of Philosophy is being circumscribed and its usefulness in any way diminished. The cure for that disease, called Scientific Philosophy, is more and better Philosophy, just as the cure for the other disease, called Philosophical Science was more and better Science. By better Philosophy is meant the leavening of Philosophy by both Practical and Speculative Reason, and not a change of method. The new developments of Logic are a more heartening sign for Philosophy and

Science than any single one known. Yet, the statement that Philosophy is only Logic and nothing more, though a finer Logic, does not take us to the heart of the problem, *viz.*, understanding, though it undoubtedly takes us very far. Reason is superior to Logic, as new Logic is superior to the old, because Reason is more than any method. It is the continuum that motivates whatever methods are involved in Science and Philosophy. All logical methods are comprehended in it, all logical methods spring from it. A method is a tool for understanding, and Logic is the way of refining the tool.

What is Reason then? Reason, too, has to be understood as a tool, but not of understanding merely, but of the development of Personality. The fact is that every method is ultimately rooted in life; as such, it has a life-cycle. From being 'a dodge to live,' it goes on to secure measures for good living through the 'novel contrasts within itself.' Without these contrasts and variations, every method tends to degenerate, then it has to accommodate itself to better living, a condition-precedent to which is living dangerously. The dangerous life has its correspondence to frontier-problems in knowledge. Every methodology is thus, ultimately, a means to an end, which is inherent in the roots of living, living well, and yet living better. In other words, it is a step and a means to living better. As living better is always with reference to the human scale of values, reason is 'the self-discipline of the originaive element of history' (A. N. Whitehead—The Function of Reason). Thus understood, Reason as a means of self-discipline finds its place in Science and Philosophy. In Philosophy, the different schools following particular methods of culture are so many tools and stages towards the same end. Of course, the

end that lends value to a particular method cannot be the terminus of a linear series. If living better, which is involved in the development of Personality, (there is no such thing as abstract living, pace Bergson) is the sole source and measure of valuation, then the vendor of particular methodology requires to be flapped occasionally for remembering the existence of wider problems, the necessity of the co-ordination of his particular interests with the general ones, and for appreciating the dangers of a self-defeating pre-occupation with the method at the sacrifice of understanding the reality of complete experience and becoming a person by the exercise of Reason.

3' Similarly with concepts, which usually belong to a plane where reasoning is speculative, where it begins to follow its own laws preferably, and becomes comparatively disinterested. The history of Science is a history of the evolution of concepts. Mr. Herbert Blumer in an Address before the Ninth Annual Institute of Social Research 1930 (The Am. J. of Soc., January, 1931, Vol. xxxvi, No. 4) thus analyses the functions and character of concepts in Science. "The scientific concept, as a way of conceiving, enables one to circumvent problems of perceptual experience; the content of the scientific concept consists of an abstract relation which becomes the subject of separate and intensive study; the concept, because of its verbal character, may be shared, and so it merits concerted activity in scientific procedure; scientific concepts in their inter-relation make possible the structure of science. . . . As I see it, the concept more specifically considered serves three functions: (1) it introduces a new orientation or point of view; (2) it serves as a tool, or as a means of transacting business with one's environment; (3) it

makes possible deductive reasoning and so the anticipation of new experience." In other words, the character of a scientific concept is instrumental and never absolute. As a method must have at least one concept, this instrumental character the concept shares with every and any methodology. The new orientation carries the conceiver a step forward, not away from the life of the individual, though apparently from the social life at the first instance, but ultimately towards it through the possibility of remote benefit by communication and application of Practical Reason thereto, *i.e.*, towards better living. The fatigue begotten of the inertia of methodological purism is to be overcome by the new point of view. The deductive method, which the new concept makes possible at later stages, is highly critical of the assumptions and bearings of the concept itself. It is not therefore a premium on laziness, which is a quality associated with philosophers in general. It is in reality a feature of that speculative reasoning which gives a fresh lease of life to the decadent concepts, and what is more important, starts the scientist on the discovery of another more efficient tool of adjustment to his physical and social environment, and of a more comprehensive point of view of life. These aspects of concepts which make deductive reasoning and acquisition of new experience possible are sure means of living better by the person. They are the best assurance against fatigue and inertia which every individual must needs conquer to develop into a person.

The bewildering variety of concepts and of viewpoints should not frighten anybody who wants to be a person. As Spranger says (Quoted by Landheer—Presuppositions in the Social Sciences—*Am. J. of Soc.*, January, 1932), "Just as all legislative efforts may

be reduced to and derive a common meaning from the concept of Justice, even though the specific ideals may differ, so the concept of Science is based upon the supposition that it is possible to arrive at a common understanding through reasonable explanation.... Perhaps the assumption of a static, a pure or transcendental reason is a remnant of an unhistorical way of thinking that must yet be overcome. For it is obvious that the investigator, as a living, historical individuality, never proceeds from zero as the normal point of departure in his investigations, but that he must or should continue his thought with logical consistency and according to an external law from the point where he stands, which is the spark coming from truth itself. But this law, too, is never completely discovered, but is always sought after. Even in its implicit, binding force, however, it is the tie by means of which the idea of genuine knowledge lives on. Thus,—the moment they argue in terms of reasonable explanation, they place themselves under the authority of the same basic law which permits of their arriving at an understanding."

Now Sociology, as a Science, is comparatively new in the field. It is quite clear that methods (utopian, dialectic, historical, intuitive) and concepts (Progress, Equality, Social Force, Social Control), which were suited to its preliminary stages, have entered into a period of senescence and 'exhausted the novelties within their scope.' They have reached the saturation-point of usefulness as such, and begun to act like toxins to bring about fatigue. There is thus the demand for a new methodology and new concepts which will take into account the 'novel situations' arising out of new accretions to knowledge and new modes of living and what is most disturbing, all proceeding at different tempos. The new

methodology has not yet been given a name; it is as yet 'concealed in the welter of miscellaneous experience beyond the scope of the old dominant way.' It is for professional logicians to label it. A sociologist should be satisfied provided that (1) it avoid the monistic habit of mind that sticks, like a Hindu widow to the memory of her husband, to one line of attack, at the expense of understanding the problem by its totality; (2) that it suit itself according to the exigencies and stages of enquiry; (3) that it avoid the chief defects of the deductive method, *viz.*, laziness and abstraction, and those of the inductive, *viz.*, (a) a lack of sense of relatedness to the perspective of the milieu, (b) a rejection of speculative ratiocination by which new points of view are acquired and new incursions into knowledge are made possible, (c) the confusion of the mass of details with the totality of reality; (4) and that it do not lose its instrumental character and potential functioning while confining itself to the study of the subject well-defined in its scope and clearly distinguished from other cognate studies. That is, if Sociology is to deal with such matters as values and judgments, meaning and understanding, it should be a refinement of the methods of impression, no less used in Physics or Physiology, as in heat and colour, than in Psychology, especially by the existentialist: and if it is to deal with measurable entities, it should rigorously apply as far as possible the latest methods, experimental, statistical and mathematical as are used in Physics and such other advanced natural sciences. General Sociology being 'a study of those traits and relationships which are common to all social phenomena,' *i.e.*, of 'the repeated uniformities and relationships, as those of constancy and typicality' (Social Forces, 1931, Vol. X, No. 1, Sociology as a Science—by Pitrim A.

Sorokin, *vide* also his *Urban and Rural Sociology*, pp. 3—8), the method adopted should also partake of the common elements and the synthesis of the different dominant methodologies adopted in various sub-classes of social phenomena from which General Sociology generalises. If there are 'n' sciences of social relationships, like Politics, Jurisprudence, etc., then, there must be a $n+1$ science, which is Sociology proper, as Biology is the third science arising from Botany and Zoology. It is only natural that the method which is proper to such a generalising system, as Sociology is, should have a method which would do justice to the uniformity and typicality of the recurring phenomena studied. The new technique need not be absolutely novel, but it will have to be a generalised method of methods fulfilling all the above conditions at one and the same time, which is, to use a popular metaphor, an emergent method, new, for all practical purposes, at least. Is it opportunism? One need not be ashamed of it, if it is, for it helps living in society. Does it viciously lean towards Philosophy? One cannot help it, generalisation calls unto generalisation.

The position taken in this volume is this. Logicity is the only test of validity in sociological studies, scientific or philosophical. But no logical argument should identify knowledge with the rational element involved in knowing. Knowledge is bigger than the logical processes of knowing, and living in this Universe is bigger than knowledge itself, in the sense that the former is not exhausted by the latter. Still rationality is the only 'stable pole in the stream of new phenomena.' Is it tantamount to a naive faith in some mystic faculty called Reason? I think not. For the naivete is already cured by a conscious recognition of the rôle of Reason, *viz.*, the develop-

ment of Personality, and not the construction of a system. It is also corrected by the knowledge that a self-criticism of the basic assumptions in the light of relative cultural perspective and historical situations is the rationale of Science and Philosophy. It may be urged against the above point of view that every systematic body of knowledge assumes all these. But when we assume, we forget. Thus it is that the Scientist and the Philosopher are equally removed from reality when they are more interested in the game than in the goal. It should be the duty of some function more closely related to 'better living' than logic or method is, to bring back the assumptions from the limbo of the unconscious into the daylight of the conscious. The function is that of Reason, which is most intimately related to better living as the Greeks realised, and others forgot. Reason is the best means for the achievement of the goal, *viz.*, the development of Personality. And Sociology being the most generalised body of knowledge about the uniformity and typicalities of living, living well, and living better in and through the ecological balance between plant, animal, and human communities, it offers the best arena among social sciences for the display of 'that self-discipline for the originaive experience,' *viz.* Reason. As Morris Cohen says, "Our reason may be a pitiful candle light in the dark and boundless seas of being, we have nothing better, and woe to those who wilfully try to put it out." The only justification of these pages is to help to the best of one's ability in this installation of Reason in the heart of the subject. The ceremony has many a master, Whitehead and Cohen in Philosophy (The Function of Reason, Reason and Nature), MacIver (Elements of Social Science, Pub. of the Am. Soc. Sociology XXV, 1931), Ellwood (Scientific method in Sociology, Social

Forces, Oct. 1931, Vol. X, No. 1) in Sociology, Laski in Political Philosophy (Liberty in the Modern State), and William Stern (in Murphy—Historical Int. to Modern Psych. and in Murchison—A Hist. of Psych. in Autobiography) and Spranger (Murphy—*ibid.*) in Psychology. Theirs is to make Reason burn incandescent; mine is to offer impediments, in the shape of old concepts and current misconceptions on Progress, Equality, Social Forces and Social Control, for its consumption in order that Reason may burn brighter. More often than not, Sociology is a study of errors in methodology.

Which brings me to the sense of my indebtedness. I hope, my reader will not misunderstand me when I say that I have developed independently. I had come to realise the abiding rôle of Personality in Sociology as early as 1923. In 1924, I published my book on Personality and the Social Sciences to which the attention of the reader is drawn for my views on Personality. Yet in a more important sense I am indebted to numerous authors whom I have consulted. They have guided my steps and warned me against the vanity of originality. At one time their help was over-generous. Still, the way in which I have utilised them is mine. And the purpose is mine, too. The books were there, but the order of reading them could not be anybody else's. This is the only originality that I claim.

More particularly, I am obliged to Prof. P. C. Mahalanobis, the Editor of Vishwabharati Quarterly, Santiniketan, for his valuable suggestions in the first chapter of this book which he published in his magazine. He also published an Essay on Equality, but the form in which it appears here is different. The two other chapters are for the first time incorporated here, though I have been writing in the same strain

in different journals. I am thankful to my friend Mr. Amal Home, the Editor of the *Calcutta Municipal Gazette*, for kindly correcting the proofs of the first two, to my brother Mr. Bimala Prasad Mukerji for revising the entire copy, and to my student Sibti Hyder, B.A. (Hons.) for typing my notes. Professor Radhakamal Mukerji's encouragement in my study of the Concepts of Sociology has been a valuable support in the midst of the quotidian duties of a lecturer in an Indian University. Other assistance is of too personal a nature to be mentioned in public.

D. P. M.

LUCKNOW,
September, 1932.

PROGRESS AND PERSONALITY

I

Chit said to Mr. Blettsworthy, " Part of your madness, Lunatic, is to be for ever talking of this Progress of yours. Are there no Megatheria in your world?—that world of yours that keeps going on and on. Does nothing in your world refuse either to breed or die?"

A student of sociology perplexed by various ideas of Progress may very well reply:—

" There are too many ideas in our world; they breed, but they refuse to die. They are the catch-words of other days. Equality, Fraternity, Liberty, General Will are notable examples from the eighteenth century ideology. Group-mind and Progress are typical examples of the nineteenth. With us, Progress is an article of faith. In league with other faithful communities, we have established a group-equilibrium of mental patterns which is sacrosanct. Scientists had postulated the continuity and immutability of natural laws, the uniformity of nature, and the conservation of energy. Politicians had posited the continuity of authority, and sung the virtues of the representative system or of Democracy. Philosophers had spun out their systems round free-will and necessity. The theologians had placed the divine order high above the world of change. Even the economists had their theory of laissez-faire, and believed in the inherent virtues of competition and self-interest. Our ideas of Progress are no less fixed than any of these hypotheses. That every day and in every way every thing is becoming better and better is the cult of our order."

PROGRESS AND PERSONALITY

In such a mental climate all individual questionings are quashed. (The individual, to escape his own awkward queries, resigns himself to Bergson's elan vital, Spengler's *Cyclic History*, Croce's *Unfolding of the Spirit*, or Niceforo's statistical aggregates, indices and averages; for peace is best preserved by the surrender of intelligence to mystic symbols.) The truth about progress has become clouded in a maze of theories most of which agree in completely ignoring the life of the individual in the concrete.

Progress, according to the sociologist, is either a fact to be measured in terms of numbers and indices, or a theory to be described in terms of spirals, cycles, or evolutionary concepts. But common sense tells us that it is neither a master-idea, nor a myth, neither a fact, nor a fiction. The nature of progress is a challenge to our intellect, and, therefore, a problem.

Generally speaking, a problem can arise only when a new fact is discovered, and must be related to the known series of facts, or when it is felt that the old ordering of facts is not adequate, and it is desirable to attempt a new organization of facts.

Neither facts nor generalizations are isolated. They have meaning only with reference to life in the concrete, primarily that of an individual, living in association with other individuals, in a region, at a particular time, in the line of certain beliefs, customs and traditions. In other words, both facts and ideas can be events. Before events fall in order, there must be an effort to order them. The consciousness of this effort varies in different individuals in different stages of civilization, and according to different degrees of organization of facts and ideas. The urge for making this effort varies from a vague feeling of tension to a detached scientific curiosity.

PROGRESS AND PERSONALITY

At first, there is a sort of logical ambivalence in which A may be both A and not-A at one and the same time, a state of mind generally observed, both in primitive and modern societies, when potentialities are held in balance. Even when the relationship between two groups of facts is causal, the common idea of cause as a force and a compelling agency introduces a sense of conflict. Another type of relationship may be called mutuality. Logically, mutuality is the settlement of a problem, rather than its *denouement*. Yet even mutuality becomes a problem when the settlement has to be adjusted to a previous result. The need for adjustment signifies the presence of tension. Thus, the problem of progress can be understood only as a succession of tensions, in other words, as a problem of the co-ordination of events, of facts and ideas in the life of the individual.¹

In the nineteenth century, faith in Progress received a tremendous impetus from Darwinism.² The political and economic optimists of the period seized upon the concept of evolution to support their own theories. It was applied indiscriminately to every form of organization which was suspected to have any analogy to an organism. In the heyday of Darwinism, the validity of the analogy was never seriously questioned (except by Butler in England); instances of regression and futile evolution were ignored; the fallacy of formulating a universal law by generalization from one limited series of facts was not noticed; the part played by conscious selection as a modifying factor was not taken into account; and the importance of personality was not properly appreciated. The utmost that the theory of evolution could teach the sociologist was that changes took place and happened in course of time, and that such

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changes could probably be interpreted as a movement with a direction.

With the evolutionary sociologist, progress was not a problem to be tackled, but a natural phenomenon to be described accurately. Soon there was a change initiated by Ward.³ His emphasis was on man, *i.e.*, on man's ability (and duty) to modify nature in the light of human purpose. From Ward to Hobhouse, we notice an attempt to emphasize the importance of social selection, social choice, and social purpose. But when Ward writes, 'progress is in proportion to the opportunities and facilities for exercising the faculties and satisfying desire,' he is primarily concerned with the means of attaining progress (and only indirectly concerned with the question of values), that is, with the problem of determining which faculties are to be fostered by exercise and education, which are to be allowed to die of disuse, which desires are to be cultivated, and which are to be socially controlled and inhibited. When Hobhouse writes,⁴ 'there is progress just where the factor of social tradition comes into play and just so far as its influence extends,' he is primarily concerned with the psychological aspect of progress, and leaves undiscussed the valuation of particular social traditions by individual judgments.

Dewey recognizes the problematic nature of progress.⁵ He writes, 'it is a problem of discovering the needs and capacities of collective human nature as we find it aggregated in racial or national groups on the surface of the globe, and of inventing social machinery which will set available powers operating for the satisfaction of these needs.' Dewey rightly mentions the needs and capacities which form the framework of values. Be it noted, however, that the

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needs and capacities are not values; they have to be translated into terms of values. When Dewey refers to the invention of a social machinery to utilize the capacities for the satisfaction of these needs, he obfuscates the real issue by his pragmatist leanings and a sentimental attachment for Demos 'made in U. S. A.' Besides, when Dewey writes on the 'collective human nature aggregated in racial or national groups,' he is artificially limiting the extent of collectivity, and inviting a new series of conflicts the only virtue of which is their gigantic scale. If progress is national or racial, it is easy for a powerful nation or race to justify the exploitation of less powerful groups on the ground that such exploitation advances the cause of progress. (To enact anti-immigration laws becomes, incidentally, a moral duty). Progress is certainly a problem; it involves the attempt to erect social machinery for the elimination of losses and conflicts, but it is not *merely* a national, or a racial problem.

The recent tendency among evolutionist-philosophers is to substitute new words for old. Thus, 'elan vital', 'the Will to Live,' 'the Life-force' have taken the place of natural selection. The first two were made current by two philosophers, and the third, by a dramatist who himself has been a most merciless critic of catch-phrases. The great literary gifts of these three writers have been responsible for the wide currency of their phrases, and the phrasemongers of universities have borrowed these phrases in order to make up for their own lack of style and original thinking. In reality, these phrases do not meet the challenge at all.

Bernard Shaw and Bergson both believe in progress. In describing the modes of progress, both of

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them make use of evolution. Beneath the shifting exterior of adaptation, there is a Life-Force which is essentially purposive. The function of man is to make this purpose conscious. Here is an instance of drawing right conclusions from wrong premise. We are unable to trace the reforming spirit of Mr. Shaw 'to a tapeworm,' for despite natural and nurtural differences, our vanity makes us remember that Mr. Shaw and ourselves are born of human germ-plasms. Amending D'Israeli's statement, we might say, as sociologists, we are on the side of human beings. When our insufficient knowledge of genetics prevents us from accepting the transmission of acquired characters as a fact, the primitive purpose of the tapeworm can only escheat to the *elan vital*—the rightful owner of such mystic properties. As Shaw's Life-Force is 'Lamarckism in caricature,' so is Bergson's '*elan vital*' nothing but 'orthogenesis translated into vitalistic terms,' 'a mere metaphor.' As has been shown by Prof. Hogben, the chief defect of vitalism is its uselessness as a working hypothesis. Elementary physio-chemical and biological processes, reproduction with its tendency towards overpopulation, and factors of selective mortality are sufficient to account for what is sought to be explained by the vitalist in terms of a highly mystical and poetic, and often brilliant language. In spite of M. Bergson's half-hearted denial, this *elan vital* is purposive on his own showing, for 'unassisted by such material considerations as the struggle for existence and the elimination of the less fit by natural selection, it makes tactfully, but firmly, for movement onward and on the whole upward in Evolution.'⁶

Bergson might be wrong, like Bernard Shaw, in his biology. The element of purposiveness that both

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have laid stress on, might be totally absent from the processes of natural evolution, but it is a useful concept for the study of social changes. Variation and selection might be random and purposeless in the non-social world; 'the prevision of an end and a determination to reach that end' which are implied in purpose might not have become manifest in the non-human species; and yet it must be admitted that purposiveness has emerged as a factor of importance in the case of human beings. It is a more efficient method than that of trial and error, and is likely, not only to accelerate the process of human evolution, but also to open out new possibilities of human progress.

The conclusion I want to draw is that in so far as progress involves an element of purpose we can think of it with reference to human beings only. 'Angels, animals, and vegetables,' are out of court. Evolution, as a scientific theory, has no connexion with moral or social values, while the concept of progress involves the determination of values.' Only in so far as valuation has reference to adjustments with non-social nature is it necessary to take cognisance of purely scientific aspects of the theory of evolution. In the philosophical interpretations of the theory, however, no clear distinction is made between progress and mere change as a process in time. In other words, development is not distinguished from growth. The emergence of values and their dynamic character are not given due consideration in discussions of progress by the evolutionary sociologists.

The idea of ceaseless change, first brought into fashion by evolutionists, has gained a further accession of strength from the Time-Philosophers of the twentieth century.⁸ A new cult with an esoteric doctrine of a transcendental *cum* immanent Time-God

has found favour among historians, sociologists, and philosophers, with the result that there is hardly any branch of recent thought which has remained unaffected by it. Spengler furnishes a typical example of this outbreak of a new religion. According to this writer, history is 'becoming' in strict accordance with certain laws, which operate in temporal cycles. With the help of these laws he comes to the conclusion that the modern West has entered into the declining phase. However alluring the picture of a declining West might be to the vanity of an Oriental, accustomed as he is, on the one hand, to theories of predetermination and cycles of *Kalpas*, and embittered, on the other, by a scientifically efficient exploitation by the West, a more careful examination of the theory shows that it has little reference to reality. In the hands of Spengler, 'becoming' has become inexorable and acquired a 'fatality with which no becoming, as such, is ever charged.' Inexorability is extraneous to change, and is generally imposed on it by interested motives. The only value of such an idea seems to be that it might help the West in getting rid of its easy self-complacence. But the practical result has been a reaction against the East and what it stands for. From more than one point in view, Massis is a consequence of Spengler. In India, Spenglerism is feeding fat the ancient grudge against England. It has pandered to the culture-chauvinists to the detriment of the East and the West alike.

But in recent years the mystic philosophy of Time has gained a tremendous prestige, and has clouded the critical spirit of the intellectuals. It has found particular favour with the sociologist who is now snobbishly trying to rise into the superior caste of scientists by denying his own mind and cultivating

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the twentieth century spirit in an attitude indiscriminately reverential to all esoteric doctrines. We are anxiously waiting for a sociologist of Time who, in the name of the eternal flux, or of social morphology, would tell us that Time, (with a capital T), moves society, and teach us to possess our soul in patience until the days of Final Social Resurrection. So long as he does not emerge on the scene, the concept of time is to be understood only as a means, a mechanism of social adjustment.⁹ The extent to which a balance between public time and private time is struck is a measure of the direction, the purpose, and the sense of values of the individual. For it is quite clear that an individual who has no private time of his own, who does not lend meaning to the public time to which he is expected to conform, is no better than a social butterfly.

There are yet other sociologists,¹⁰ with a more rigorous discipline, who would discover indices of progress. Figures for optimum population and increase in the average expectation of life are for them measures of social progress. They seek to establish an equitable distribution of opportunities by a survey of abilities, and try to measure the advance of material comforts by investigating whether a happy adjustment has been effected between resources and human needs. Another series of statistical tests would include 'lower death rates, higher wages, better balanced family budgets, more years of schooling, extension of the life-period, increase of reading, higher productivity of machines and workers.' Prof. Hertzler has drawn up a series of multiple tests of progress in five closely written pages under the following headings:—moral, economic, political, biological, educational, religious, domestic,

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aesthetic, intellectual, recreational, and racial. These tests number nearly two hundred, and yet they are not complete.¹¹ The very attempt shows the futility of any series of tests, single or multiple. 'The infinite possibilities of life cannot be exhausted by counting.'

Yet, in one sense, figures are more assuring than ideas. For such social phenomena as lend themselves to quantitative measurement, these indices are more reliable than vague generalities. Not that these indices are fixed and eternal. Even the optimum population varies from time to time, and from region to region. Besides, no test is to be trusted by itself. If a raising of the status of women is adopted as a test, even a modern American girl would find it hard to compete with a Khasi or an Iroquois matron. Divorce-rates may only indicate laxity of marriage-laws; lower crime-rates stricter police control; homogeneity dead levelism and stagnation. We all know the limitations of the statistical method.¹² Le Play, the initiator of social survey, had no toleration for 'the disdainful method of invention.' He did not want to leave anything to 'the imagination, presupposition or prejudices of the observer'; he was all for scientific exactitude. By a study of different family-systems he had come to the conclusion that a family-group on the model of the Chinese or the English type was the best solution of the evils of individualism. He was so convinced of the merits of this particular type that he offered a 'reward to anyone who could show him a single happy family except under conditions of this kind.' 'But,' he adds, naively, 'all my efforts proved fruitless.' In fact, the prejudices of the statistician, chiefly his temperamental optimism or pessimism, are too deeply entrenched in the subconscious to be driven out by equations. For what

are these tests after all? In the first instance, they are nothing but numerical representations of certain general features drawn from an enthusiastic study of a favoured country in a favoured epoch. Almost invariably, the favoured country is the fatherland of the statistician, and the favoured epoch, the period adorned by him. It is Athens, Rome, Florence, Geneva, London, Berlin, Paris, Boston or Philadelphia. The scientific detachment is offset by a natural egotism, by personal, class, and national bias. On such insecure bases, comparisons cannot be just, especially, when all the cultures are changing and changing differently.

The fundamental difficulty is that the social events or behaviours which are compared are on different levels. Some are on the level of instincts where survival-value is the dominating consideration. Some others are only on the hedonistic level where value is governed by the greatest good of the greatest number. Yet other behaviours are there which are of the 'non-advantageous type.' Different groups of people lay different emphasis on different patterns of behaviour at different times. No one series of tests will be valid for all peoples, or for the same people for all time. Tests or indices are, therefore, in the second instance, symbols of value; as values differ, the significance of tests also must vary. Possibly, it is this limitation of the statistical method which sometimes gives rise to contradictions between different tests. For example, although homogeneity is a great asset, the diffusion of culture is more possible when a nation is racially heterogeneous than otherwise. Again, the cultural productivity of a people, or the birth of creative geniuses is not always a function of universal literacy.¹³ I do not know whether 'the

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paradoxical symptoms of superiority in progress,' which H. Ellis calls 'ambivalent,' like the growth of population and the decline in the birth and death-rates, are due to this inherent defect of the statistical method, or to the very nature of civilization itself, which, as Niceforo was forced to concede, 'is never an exclusive mass of benefits, showing an upward tendency, but a mass of values, positive and negative.'

Thus it is clear that the evolutionary sociologist and the statistician have equally failed to solve the problem of progress.

II

Progress can be best understood as a problem covering the whole field of human endeavour. It has a direction in time. It has various means or tactics of development. Fundamentally, it is a problem of the balancing of values.

The scope of the problem is as wide as human society, and as deep as human personality. In so far as human values arise only in contact with human consciousness at its different levels, the problem of progress has unique reference to the changing individual living in a particular region at a particular time in association with other individuals who share with him certain common customs, beliefs, traditions, and possibly, a common temperament. The dynamic unit is the individual. Social progress, in the sense of a mere movement of the milieu of folk, place, and time, becomes an abstraction, a process without values, if we exclude the individual. Such exclusion may be convenient for preserving the sanctity of an *a priori* and dogmatic theory of society, but is bound to give rise to misleading conclusions. It is not suggested that factors other than the individual do not change, but the study of such changes properly forms the subject-matter of other sciences like Ecology, and Human Geography. Such changes are not charged with meaning or purpose; for values, meanings, and purposes arise only in connexion with human beings. Social change (including changes of the environment) is only the means for the attainment of the social objective, namely, the development of individual

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personality. The term social progress may in this sense be used to denote the attempt to make social conditions—a set of indispensable means—congenial to the growth of individual personality. It is assumed that the individual personality changes under the given social conditions, but the conditions do not change of their own accord. They can be changed only by the effort of individuals, consciously or unconsciously, acting in the light of their own inheritance, biological, social, or temperamental, and in accordance with their needs, desires and values. When conditions are adjusted to individual needs, desires and values, the stage is set for the development of personality. In this drama, the scenes change, but only with reference to the hero of the piece, and prompted by his necessities and initiative. The action of the drama is the adaptation of events to the individual.

Certain superstitions have clustered round the word 'adaptation.' In a strictly scientific sense the differences between individuals constitute variation. Variation is the mark of individuality. The given environment does not suit all individuals equally. Individuals for whom the environmental conditions are not suitable die. The survivors necessarily possess qualities better suited to the environmental conditions. Such qualities are handed down to succeeding generations through the mechanism of biological heredity. This process of natural selection (or survival) is in operation all the time. The individual qualities which persist are called adaptations, later on. The process of adaptation is not stressed in Biology; what is emphasized is the selective accumulation and propagation of variations through a particular mechanism.¹⁴ Adaptations are merely individual

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differences which have survived, and are good examples of the adage, 'nothing succeeds like success.'

Let us enquire a little more closely into the mechanism of natural selection and adaptation. When a stag grows huge antlers, or when a sun-fish grows out of its relative diodon, 'it is not in the least necessary that each part of the body should be separately moulded by natural selection. The development of one very active growth-centre near the hind end of the body will automatically bring about the bulk of the changes, and selection need only polish, so to speak, and modify detail'—this is with reference to the sun-fish. With reference to the stag with big antlers, 'a mere change in the amount of growth in one region or in one direction can wholly transform an animal.' There are simultaneous and automatic adjustments of other parts if one part is changed by the call of the environment. A most important point is that these adjustments take place within the life-cycle of the individuals as a result of a particular small change. 'The adaptations are made to build themselves anew in each generation; they are not fixed by heredity, and so mutation and selection are never called upon to help produce them.' A vast amount of the detailed adjustment of the body of this sort depends not on racial adaptation but on the functional adaptation of the individual, and the existence of all this functional adaptation means that there is 'so much less for mutation and natural selection to do.'¹⁵

What is the result of the process of natural selection? It is a temporary balance or a state of relatively good adjustment due to structural adaptation of the organism as a whole. Any change in the environment upsets this balance, and the process of sifting of

variations begins again. What happens or may happen ultimately, the biologist is not concerned with. But in the main, natural selection works for stability. There are of course meteorological or biological cataclysms that Huntington and De Vries speak of.¹⁶ But such changes are rare. In this humdrum life, natural selection is like *Vishnu*, the Preserver, (and unlike *Mahakal*, the Time-God) all for conservation, and the Wheel is plied against the out-of-the-ordinary who may be suspected of any intention to upset the balance. Mutations are not easily tolerated. On the whole, they are rejected from the germ-plasm of the species; 'the reduced vigour which they entail leads to their automatic elimination.' Usually, natural selection is very much against extreme novelties. It may be safely concluded from the above generalization that there is an inertia of the environmental adjustment. It might mean, (if environments are comparatively stable) at first, an increasing specialization, and finally, a perpetuation of such specialization. But owing to constant changes in the environment what actually happens is this—'the result of Evolution and Natural selection is a constant increase in fitness. But there are limitations to the perfection of fit attained. Trial and Error is a rough and ready method. What it produces is something that will work, by no means necessarily something that will work perfectly. The creatures that exist are those that happen to have survived; taken together they represent an equilibrium which manages to be more or less stable, rather than life's best possible way of utilising and sharing the resources of earth.'¹⁷

Natural selection is thus merely the description of a process, and a rough and ready process at that. It is not a force, it is not a cause, it does not pro-

duce anything new. It is only a 'non-energetic factor' of evolution, 'simply a passive stop or release of what others had produced.' 'It is a filter; it is a sieve; it is a balance to reject or accept.' It has no purpose. Yet, it must be admitted that 'on the average, the upper level of biological attainment has been continuously raised.' We can even say that it is likely to go on raising the level, and that it is our duty 'not to oppose, but to crown the natural order; to transform it to a better, not by taking a new direction, but by accelerating and intensifying the old.'¹⁸

Many sociologists use the word social selection as an active force operating on social norms or "human beings living together."¹⁹ They tacitly assume that social selection is an active force. We have seen that its model, natural selection itself, is not a force; it is merely a process which serves mainly to conserve the existing order through a rough selection of random variations. It allows occasional mutations. Social selection is on a different footing altogether, inasmuch as social evolution is on another level. It starts with human invention and proceeds through the interaction of human minds. Human inventions are not simply chance combinations, but rational reconstructions of past experiences having a cumulative effect on the whole.²⁰ Rational inventions, as opposed to random variations and mutations, are stimulated by wants which, with the march of time, cease to be primary and instinctive, and begin to be secondary and creative. Besides these wants and propensities, there are other occasions which stimulate invention or creation. 'Instinctive activities, and after the beginning of social evolution, the habits that are built up about instincts and supplement them with conduct almost as automatic as the functioning of instincts and

involving only a minimum of attention, flow on unchanged until an occasion arises in which this instinctive and habitual conduct does not satisfy the wants, so that the propensities are unusually stimulated and attention unusually excited; then inventions may occur.' Natural selection is blind. Social change is not, and if there are intelligent people in society, *i.e.*, if knowledge and reason are spread in the community, and facilities for imitation and rational conduct are present, social change can very well afford to have both eyes wide open. The non-immediate, the non-instinctive, the non-necessary, the non-hedonistic, and the non-blind urges of human beings living together and communicating with one another break up the linear unity of nature into two main gradients. The emergence of human purpose is a fact of supreme importance in sociology. It may itself be the outcome of natural selection, but its distinction from natural selection is clear and decisive for social evolution.

A study of psychological adjustment between man and his social environment is therefore of greater importance to sociology than a mere study of biological selection. The social environment lengthens and weakens the chain that binds man with nature. The word 'environment' must be used with great caution with reference to society. There is something of 'givenness' in its concept, but in fact the social environment which creates the stimuli for human beings to respond to is essentially artificial in the sense of being man-made. The environment is more or less given for any particular individual. But considering the environment as a whole it consists of nothing but a series of inventions, not all of the highest order, but nevertheless inventions.

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Mr. Bernard has given a valuable analysis of the different types of environments.²¹ The social environments are divided into three main categories, (1) the physico-social, like machines, tools, communications, etc., including all mechanical and scientific inventions. In this category are 'the products of the human reaction upon the physical environments, and by means of which cosmic processes, chemical factors in the soil, other inorganic resources, such as the metals and the natural fuels, and natural dynamic agencies, such as falling water, winds, tides, etc., are so transformed as better to meet the needs of man'; (2) the bio-social, consisting of domesticated plants and animals and in some cases human beings used as tools; the inventions transform 'the organic world in such a way as to render it more serviceable to man as a means to his adjustment to nature and to other men than it is in its natural form.' It must be admitted that inventions under these two heads, even when accidental, have some element of conscious adaptation of means to ends and some sort of purposiveness. There is yet another type of environment, itself a by-product of the previous two types, but having such a unique element of its own that it exercises a most potent influence on man. This is (3) the psycho-social environment, consisting of the inner behaviours of individuals, such as attitudes and ideas, of the 'uniformities of inner behaviour occurring in collective units and perceived as customs, folk-ways, conventions, traditions, beliefs, mores, etc., and language-symbols, requiring a new type of invention, and necessarily a new type of communicable content, *viz.*, science.'

In so far as the purposive element distinguishes human beings from the purely organic individuals, and

the necessity for co-ordinating and directing different purposes always exists, social institutions emerge mainly as a result of the interaction of the derivative environments for social control. The distinguishing feature of the psycho-social control is the predominance of the psychic element in the inventions. Says Prof. Bernard, 'the psychic element is even more marked in the recent inventions which are made projectively and abstractly rather than empirically. The more complex modern inventions are made not as step by step improvements of existing instruments or compounds of the same class or kind, but as new synthetic creations which utilise the formulas of science for the building of wholly new objects. Such inventions are created first in the imagination, perhaps by the use of mathematical or other symbolic formulas and are later transformed into visible material structures. Such a process of invention is in the highest degree Psychic.' In other words, with written language, a new gradient of social environment is discovered. Once man learns to respond to words and their meanings, the reproduction of responses and behaviours is made possible and communicable.²² The possibility of this type of human behaviour marks the highest gradient of the series of adjustments for controlling nature. Language has put man on a different level altogether.

Such is the picture of the history of social adjustment in gradients. The main direction of change is indicated by the history of mental development and inventions. The direction, however, is not linear. Social evolution has passed through many phases, and it is not possible to trace a uniform tempo or tendency everywhere. It will be probably better to call the tendency a directivity, rather than a direction.

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This directivity is not a force or a cause. Primarily, it is the description of movement, an interpretation of changes or transformation taking place in time. In the process of adjustment between man and his social environment, directivity is posited in the transition from the levels in which controls of the automatic nervous system (concerned with nutrition, reproduction, protection and well-being) are dominant, to the stage in which cortical controls, through the integration of past experience, establish new modes of development.²³ Through repression and sublimation, symbols are created by which previous modes of action and thought-patterns are either rejected, reformed, or reinstated. These symbolic psycho-social controls in their turn begin to dominate the cortical and the automatic processes. This transition from the dominance of automatic controls to the dominance of storage symbols is the true significance of the element of directivity involved in social progress.

III

It is all right to stress the true significance, but, at the same time, it is equally necessary to understand why the true significance is so easily missed. In sociology, a study of errors is as fruitful as that of abnormalities.²⁴ I believe, there are three chief reasons for the misunderstanding. The first is that the symbolic controls, *i.e.*, words and ideas, become stereotyped in course of time. Thus, the ideas of progress, of equality, liberty lose their meaning after a certain period when they no longer 'serve as suggestion stimuli for the release of conditioned responses.' A reconstruction of their original significance is next to impossible. The second reason is that the tempo of social change or movement is wrongly supposed to be of a 'uniform quality'. This error is the corollary to a mistaken application of a later theory of evolution which compromised with the earlier one of fixed species by assuming that the tempo of natural selection working through variation was unchanging. But 'even more striking than the survival of the fittest is the belatedness of the fitting.' This is with reference to Nature, the evolution of which may 'either become a graceless drift towards a dead end or a triumphant procession towards perfection,' with the choice governed by chance or Providence.²⁵ In social evolution, however, there are different tempos. For example, human beings often show a surprising degree of adjustment to misfits. According to Dr. Radhakamal Mukherji, in certain exremely congested areas, the hopelessly low standard of living has made Indian peasants per-

fectly contented.²⁵ Prof. Hocking says, 'no being is so domiciled in mutilations, as man. . . . His fitness for the unfit must have its scope.' If it is so in the case of the ordinary man, for the genius who works out the gradients by initiative and invention, the temporal maladjustment is tragic. The tears of the hungry man of genius drown all the philosophy of the struggle for existence, and no sermonizing on his lack of character, *i.e.*, his incapacity for achieving success in this world of social selection, is adequate compensation for the loss sustained in the meanwhile. The third reason for the misunderstanding is that social change is often mistaken to be a rectilinear and unilinear advance in time. In the second and third sources of misunderstanding the mystic concept of Time plays mischief. Optimists fondly believe that just because a certain number of years have been added to the first year after the death of Christ, everything is for good, and all is right with the world. They find virtue in mere quantity and accumulation. They are the liberal reformers who must do good. There are also the pessimists who, for the very same reason, condemn whatever has happened. They are the conservatives and historians of ancient times who would reconstruct the present in the light of the past. In the one case, anticipation, and in the other, memory, governs the attitude towards change. As anticipation and memory are extensions of the specious present forward and backward in time, they have no intrinsic quality of their own except their appeal to sentiment. We must know something more about time, for the crux of the problem is whether time moves the universe, or time is only a feature of the unceasing flux of events, whether time is superior to man, or man is out to conquer time.

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Religion, Mathematics, Physics, and the Philosophy of Evolution have all tried to comprehend the nature of time. I shall not attempt to describe what religion has achieved, for the reason that religion, being the tactics of a particular line of development, cannot have any disinterested understanding of the problem of development itself. When there is a hiatus between individual death and general final resurrection, the soul can only hope, and hope in the faith it was born in.²⁶ The nature of time involved in such notions is often nothing but a compound of faith and hope mixed indifferent proportions by the priest. Any other attitude towards the problem of time, which is more reasonable than the above, is philosophical rather than religious. Yet the private experience of time enjoyed by the religious man is, possibly, more valuable than the various philosophical conceptions of public time which cancel one another and leave little residue. I know nothing about Mathematics and Physics. But this is what I am told by eminent scientists in their lucid intervals.²⁷ 'Before Einstein, it was considered that all purposes would be served in all circumstances if there were a single physical space and a single public time unrelated to each other, but correlated to the private space and time of any individual'. 'Now Einstein denies the sufficiency for *all* purposes of this construct, a single physical space and a single public time, independent of each other, as affording the basis of a system of spatial and temporal measurements which will completely accord with the spatio-temporal experiences of all observers under all circumstances.' There is this much of truth in the new metrics that different individuals in different situation may have different rhythms of time which need not necessarily coincide; in other

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words, the flow of time is not necessarily uniform, the lapse of time of which alone men can be ordinarily conscious is not simply the 'difference of two numbers of a simply ordered manifold, the arithmetic continuum, which is the sole element of temporal intuition allowed by Newton.' On the other hand, the new notion of space-time, based as it is on a new geometry and a new kinematics, reduces every item of our experience to 'a system of singularities in the metric system' and leaves us more or less in the air. The disciples of Einstein are humble enough to admit however that it is not their business to prove that space-time is real. For them the question of reality does not arise.²⁸ If physical events and entities can be suitably represented in the new geometry (4, 5, or more dimensional) they are satisfied. We, therefore, bid adieu to Mathematics and Physics, for we as laymen refuse to read more in Einstein than Profs. Whitehead, Hobson, or Eddington can do. We appreciate their humility and pass on with the remark that their admirable views of space-time cannot serve as the basis of a new conception of Reality or of Progress. Their philosophical speculations do not seem to have enriched either our knowledge or experience of Reality. But their endeavours mean more for Progress than their speculations.

As an ordinary individual is not a Crusoe, he must co-ordinate his life with other individuals living in association with him. The individual has got a private time of his own determined by his own memory and anticipation, *i.e.*, the ensemblage of his mental patterns. As he lives in society he is obliged to adjust his private time in terms of conventional time, which is divisible into units of the same length and quality but distinguishable by numbers. Apart

from these two aspects there is a universal aspect of time, for societies are related to one another, and we must think of the world as an integral whole. As adjustments are made between the private and social aspects of time in terms of a single time-order, so do we relate social events to world-history in the same unique series. (But in reality the series is broken). A further generalization yields time as a mystic, abstract entity flowing eternally in a set measure but divisible into past and future according to the dictates of memory and purpose. Beyond these three, there is yet another aspect, timelessness, a state in which there is no sequence, no change, no movement, no direction, no division of attention. Mystics claim to have reached this state and conquered time. But it is a Pyrrhic victory, for at the moment of triumph (called *nirvikalpa samadhi*) movement, direction and all dynamic experiences vanish. A glimpse of this state may perhaps be had in dreamland or '*sushupti*,' in the world of the Unconscious, where there is no time or only a different order of time, as Dunne has recorded, because of its sheltered existence from the world of change.

For our purpose, it is therefore best to understand time as 'a concept constructed by each individual under the influence of society in which he lives.'²⁹ It is a part, a mechanism of social adjustment. Psychologically speaking, time has no other separate structure. Metaphysically, if it is made prior to the universe, it becomes nonsense. 'It cannot be made an independent terminus of knowledge,' as Prof. Whitehead himself has pointed out. We can experience duration only through our senses. The specious present is the 'vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation. This vividness lights up the dis-

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criminated field within duration.'³⁰ In other words, time is, because events happen. Events happen to individuals who lend them meanings. Events happen to groups of men also, in which case they are invested with social significance. Social organization of time, as Mary Burt has shown, is centred in the content of time. But this content is purely mental. Mental organization differs from individual to individual, and even in the same individual in different situations. As soon as the individual succeeds in relating events, he can be said to have partially transcended the colourless, meaningless and barren uniformity of conventional time. When he relates them to his own changing experiences he establishes meanings. This mental act of giving meanings endows conventional time with values. With the endowment of values time ceases to be an extraneous entity thrust upon the individual from outside. The investment of conventional time with values may, therefore, be considered to be a defensive process in which the individual attains freedom from the necessity of conforming to an external series of temporal occurrence.

Progress, so far as time-adjustment is concerned, is, therefore, a movement of freedom. I have noted how this freedom is incompatible with any theory of 'History as Becoming.' One confession of M. Bergson is highly significant in this connexion. 'An inner life with well-distinguished moments and with clearly characterised states will answer better the requirements of social life.'³¹ How far this inner life is intuitive or not is not important here. What is of vital significance is that our time-adjustments should be made in such a way that we should be free from the necessity of remaining in social contact for every

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moment of our life. This is an important condition of progress. In leisure alone can man conquer the tyranny of time, by investing it with a meaning, a direction, a memory and a purpose.³² Obstacles to leisure, including the demands of a hectic social life, often mistaken for progress, must be removed in order that the inner personality of man may get the opportunity for development. This is why the Hindu philosopher wisely insists on the daily hour of contemplation, and after a certain age, a well-marked period of retirement from the turmoil of life. The bustle of modern civilization is growing apace and the need for retirement is becoming greater. A novel like Morgan's "Fountain" is a significant indicator of the need.

IV

So, Natural Selection and Time do not furnish men with the motive-power of progress, for they are not forces at all. The real motive-power is the individual's sense of values. When this sense is creative, the process of directive and purposive adjustment to the different levels of environment is transformed into progress. The choice of values, of course, has its own background of natural environment in so far as it is conditioned by the region to which the individual belongs. It has also the background of social environment which is chiefly the recruiting ground of acquired traits. These two environments supply the appetites and needs which must be satisfied. If they remain unsatisfied, the individual's freedom to guide his conduct, private and social, and thus control his environment, becomes limited. It is a matter of common knowledge that maladjustments are often drags on progress. The sense of values, *i.e.*, the capacity for judgment and selection is a result of experience. Once experience in one sphere is gathered, the sense of values of that gradient may become the starting point of another set of experiences leading to a new gradient. (The new gradient may be called 'higher' or 'lower'; this point is not important.)

The sense of values is not simply intellectual discrimination. It includes instinctive attractions and repulsions, tropisms and reflexes, as well as cognitive, affective and conative elements. The sense of values is not stationary. It changes with the life of the individual, and at any given instant may be considered

to be a resultant of the whole body of his past experience, conscious and unconscious. In other words, the perception of values has a history, but a history not in the sense of Spengler or Croce, as becoming, or unfolding in accordance with its own secret laws, obliterating all marks and periods and closing with a flourish in the present, *i.e.*, the moment when the author is composing his grandiose sentences. The sense of values is historical in the sense of being cumulative, for the past behaviours leave their trace. A cumulative sense cannot but have a direction and a richness of purpose. This purpose must not have its origin referred only to the present moment, either to make us feel infinitely superior to all that had preceded, or to make us abjectly humble before the potentialities which are in the lap of the future. A sense of superiority or inferiority has nothing to do with the values themselves. The element of purpose in the sense of values is again not to be understood as purely teleological. This purpose is primarily the satisfaction of needs and appetites. But as has been noted already, with increasing cortical dominance, new needs and appetites are created which have no basis in the mere preservation of life. From this point of view, valuation can be disinterested. Each need or appetite is a store of energy. Its energy is liberated by the opposition of another need which demands immediate attention. The need creates a behaviour-pattern which is more stable and real than the need itself, which, it must be admitted, never works singly, but always in alliance with other subsidiary needs and is coloured by emotions.³³ The instability of a behaviour-pattern is the only index available to the urge of the appetite. This behaviouristic explanation goes a great way

towards explaining the process of valuation.

In the needs created by biological environment the behaviouristic explanation may suffice. In the social, the unifying element is supplied by the homogeneity of common customs, beliefs, traditions and folkways. There is no need to postulate the third device of intuition for the explanation of spiritual appetites. Intuition is a consequence of the further development of individuality, very often an 'accident lost in the statistics of the local life of the brain.'³⁴

But there is a point about the behaviourist explanation of values regarding which I am not clear. Meaning generally presupposes the relation of needs to a human being. Einstein's theory (or explanation, whatever it may be), may appear useless to an ordinary man, or to a composer, or to an architect, but it is certainly full of meaning for Einstein himself, and also to his disciples. Yet, the behaviourists assert that value is self-generated. I can never persuade myself to think that behaviourism is the complete explanation of values. It can not explain historical values, yet history is human behaviour.³⁵

There is something residing somewhere which eludes the grasp of the behaviourist. That residual something need not be god, need not be soul, nor any other such mystic substance. Let us give it any name we like, the fact remains that it is there, and that it exercises potent influence on the acts of valuation. Let us provisionally call it Personality.³⁶ There is some justification for doing so. It has been observed that beneath or behind the different behaviours of different 'personalities' of the same individual, there is one ultimate personality which is undissociable.³⁷ We know little that is definite regarding this unanalysed element. There cannot be, however, any

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doubt that it has an important function in our lives. It may as well be equated to that guiding force which co-ordinates and binds together different patterns of behaviour, and in the act of co-ordination gives rise to meanings and values. That unanalysable element is a fact noted by the experimentalist. It is not a fallacious projection of our ignorance, or a mere wish-fulfilment.

The fact is that change, purposiveness, directivity, or meaning all fail to give a completely satisfactory solution of the problem of progress. The very nature of the human mind is such as to seek a basic foundation. All the better if the basis is there. This foundation is called Reality by the philosophers. It has been sought to be described in many ways and with the help of many names. One out of these is usually conceived as the active principle in terms of which the remaining elements are explained. The choice of the particular principle, which is thus seized upon for the purpose of explanation, depends entirely on the personal predilections of the individual philosopher. It is ultimately a matter of individual choice.

Probably, a better way of comprehending Reality is to look at it as the ensemble or the whole system of reals (known and unknown) possessing an independent value of its own which embraces the separate values of the individual reals. On this view, however, it is still necessary to construct the system of reals. The system may receive some assistance from the fact that all individuals have a core of reality. And here the difficulty of personal choice again crops up. This difficulty, however, is inherent in the problem itself, for in a question of values we can never completely eliminate the personal factor.

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An impersonal value is a 'bloodless category', but a scheme of purely personal values is too private to be mentioned in public.

The description of Reality given by the Upanishads has an irresistible appeal for the Indian mind: Shantam, Shivam, Advaitam. The first is the principle of harmony which sustains the universe amidst all its incessant changes, movements, and conflicts. The second is the principle of co-ordination in the social environment. The third gives expression to the Unity which transcends all the diverse forms of states, behaviours, and conflicts, and permeates thought and action with ineffable joy. We thus reach three ultimate values: Peace, Welfare, and Unity. The motive power of progress is the urge towards Joy in Harmony, Welfare, and Unity. There are different levels at which this urge operates, but it is only when the individual begins consciously to realize the three-fold principle that life becomes fully charged with meaning. In and through such realization the life of the individual attains its personality. On this view, progress ultimately depends on the development of personality by a conscious realization of the principles of Harmony, Welfare, and Unity.

How far existing social agencies help the growth of personality is a different question. In modern times, Science probably fulfils this purpose better than anything else. But Science by itself is futile unless it is related to the co-ordinating principle in the life of the individual, namely, the personality of man.³⁸

EQUALITY & PERSONALITY

I

Men have held different notions of equality, each of which has been tested in practice, analysed in theory, and found wanting. Such notions have arisen on account of different conditions of living prevailing in different countries at different times. But they have all sprung as reactions against inequalities which were considered by sufferers therefrom as historical anomalies. Thus, at one period, the clerical tyranny, at another, the military, at a different period, the exclusive political privileges, yet at another the economic exploitation of one class by another would become galling. The exploited class would be discontented, the conscience of some members of the exploiting class would be aroused. Between the self-denying ordinance of the benevolent despot or his enlightened self-interest, on the one hand, and the seething discontent of the governed and the exploited, on the other, the social equilibrium would be perturbed, and the forces of revolution would rally round the idea of equality. Thus it is that the idea of equality has had a long and varied career. It has varied with the varying vicissitudes of group-suffering. A short historical survey will bring out the real significance of the idea of equality.

Equality among the members of the ruling race, *i.e.*, hereditary equality is the first historical step in the evolution of the State. Thus, in the Greek democracies, in the Roman Republic and Empire, among the Germanic tribal federations of Central Europe (no less than in India, China and Japan),

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the descendants of the conquerors were the only citizens in possession of civic rights. Racial solidarity was the basis of all communities in the earliest period of civilization. The ancient State was a pyramid, the apex of which was the conquering race and the base of which formed by the conquered tribes. This is why the earliest political philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 'very nearly taught a doctrine of spiritual inequality.' The Stoics were really the first people in Europe to believe in and preach the spiritual equality of mankind. Their faith in the intrinsic rationality of human beings was strong. Yet Stoicism remained 'an aristocratic creed of cosmopolitanism' in that world of city states. It never appealed to the masses, though 'good was conceived hedonistically,' and 'rationality was granted to all men.' For, with the Stoics, the faith in equality and unity of mankind was an intellectual and impersonal abstraction. As Dr. Willoughby observes, 'It was not a unity based upon a mutual charity, sympathy and love, following from a conscious recognition that all men and women are moral beings, all the objects of a single divine and loving will.'¹ Men as ethical potentialities, as persons who are ends by themselves, were not understood by the early philosophers of Europe as a rule. The social good was appreciated. But the city-state resembled a lion's den into which individuals went, but from which they seldom returned.

I do not think that even in the best period of pre-Christian civilization, an individual was evaluated, solely, by the light of his conscience. The emphasis was on civic virtues and duties as opposed to individual merits. So when the Apostles preached equality before God in fellowship with Jesus Christ,

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the unenfranchised poor found a ray of hope in the message. The patrician was responsible for the greatness of Rome, and the poor foreigner was debarred from enjoying the privileges of greatness. In principle, the Roman republic was an extension of the city-state of Rome, itself modelled on the aristocratic city-states of Greece. Those debarred from enjoying the rights and performing the duties of the *Jus Civile* on an equal status flocked to the catacombs, where all were equal in Faith, Hope, and Charity. But their hopes of millennial equality in other spheres were not to bear fruit so soon. Even in religious matters, the ideas of the early Christian Fathers were not realised, for such realisation depended on the intervention of a third party of men who drew their power from one man holding the key to the ultramundane kingdom. The chief authority ruled in apostolic succession, and by virtue of his possession of the key became the arch-mediator between God and His children. It was he who laid down and interpreted the conditions of fellowship in Christ for the faithful.

In the meantime, the Republic had changed into an Empire. Rome had now become the centre of the world's trade and commerce. Foreigners were settling in great numbers in Rome. Their presence increased the wealth of the city. The task of colonial government and the problem of the alien introduced the principles of equity in Roman jurisprudence. The growth of equity succeeded in throwing open to all the inhabitants of the Empire the rights and duties of being governed by the *Jus Civile* of Rome. The Emperor Caracalla 'satisfied a long-felt want,' and the year 211 A.D. must be recognised as a landmark in the annals of democracy inasmuch as the

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first formal recognition was then made of the principle of equality before law. What has happened in Europe since then in the matter of legal equality is either an extension or a variation of this principle. This idea of equality in the eyes of law, however historically important an achievement it might be, was, and is neither universal in its scope, nor practicable in administration. Even when legal equality is recognised as a source of individual rights, the exercise of such rights always connotes a capacity to exercise them. But capacities are various among various individuals and groups of individuals. There are the minors and the dependents, women, imbeciles and dementes, the morons, the insane; the whole brood of the feeble-minded who have to be protected. And there are the 'backward races' 'unfit for self-government,' and the administrative officials triable in administrative courts for 'reasons of state.' Over and above that, there is class legislation. The semi-judicial orders by the Executive are daily increasing. Law is also defined as a positive science and is unconnected with ethical considerations of personality. This is very far from legal equality being actually taken as a universal criterion of justice.

Historically, the idea of legal equality could not be carried to its logical conclusion in the Imperial Rome of later days, mainly for the reason that the Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire. The loyalty to the church displaced the loyalty to the city in the following centuries and created a division between the laity and the clergy. Naturally, the object of popular opposition was not so much the legal inequalities that prevailed as the clerical supremacy in theological and intellectual matters and the clerical tyranny in the moral affairs of men.

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St. Paul's sentence—' There is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, bond nor free,' and Tertullian, the Christian writer's dictum—' The world is a republic, the common land of the human race ' became a meaningless array of dead phrases. Numerous sects arose all over Europe, in England, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, and began to reinterpret the doctrines of the Church in the original spirit of Christ and Paul. They were the precursors of the Reformation. A parallel movement was started in education to free young minds from the bondage of theology and the domination of the clergy. Between the Reformation on the one hand, and the discovery of the classics, on the other, a new life was forged. The idea of moral and economic equality preached and to a great extent practised by the leaders of early Christianity had become so old as to come to fashion again. Martin Luther denied the authority of the Pope and his clergy. The German peasants denied the claims of the princes, though Luther was not conscious of the parallelism. Men were the same before God and had equal rights in His gifts. Therefore, men were entitled to attain the same status before the Father, and no priests were needed to put them on the same level.

The idea of economic equality did not develop so soon, in fact, it had to wait patiently throughout the whole period during which agriculture was being supplanted by industrialism. The agricultural type of civilization was not congenial to the growth of economic equality.² But the seeds of the Industrial Revolution were sown by the Protestant movement.³ The movement did something more than protest, it was a real movement with its active principle of moral equality supplied by the expansion of life and

knowledge during the earlier and contemporary Humanistic Renaissance. But the movement, as such, was lost in the midst of religious wars. The treaty of Westphalia finally put a stop to the wars conducted, apparently, for other-worldly interests, but essentially, for the interests of the Roman church. The Humanist movement, the Renaissance and the folly of religious wars secularised men's thoughts so effectively that Luther's magnificent effort to teach men to depend on their respective selves, and the logical conclusion of his teaching, *viz.*, moral equality of men in the light of their respective conscience, came to naught. Society became organised into states, and royal autocracy flourished, because the feudal inequalities were disappearing and political equality was as yet undreamt of. In the Catholic states, the clergy followed a new policy and invested the king with a measure of divine authority proportional to his military and bargaining powers. In the Protestant states, the king became the Defender of the Faith. If he was powerful, he seized the powers and privileges, even the property of the clergy. In the meanwhile, the representatives of the people, *i.e.*, the upper classes, were slowly nurturing their strength in parliaments and general assemblies. When the king became the head of the church and the state alike, he could afford to ignore the nobles and the higher clergy by flattering their political vanities and meanwhile increase his powers by ruling in the name of the people. Very often, the king would enter into conspiracy with the nobles and the clergy in an orgy of exploitation. Thus were sown the seeds of the French Revolution.

The nineteenth century was predominantly an era of political equality, not in the sense that it was achieved once for all in that period, but in the sense

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that collective human endeavour in Europe, for the first time, expressed itself, *generally*, in asserting and consolidating the political and civic rights of the people. The initiative of that collective endeavour was taken during the French Revolution. On the negative side, the importance of the French Revolution consisted in destroying certain old world conventions. The feudal nobles formally gave up their privileges, and it was no longer paying either to be a noble or an abbot. Religious squabbles were declared unmannerly by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The new religion of Nationalism based itself upon the right of every nation to pursue its own course of political and civic development. In social affairs, careers were opened to talents. On the positive side, the three catchwords of liberty, equality and fraternity were the chief contribution of the Revolution to the making of subsequent history. In creating these ideologies, the theorists of the French Revolution sought to pool the various ideas behind the liberating movements of past ages; in fact, gave them names and focussed the attention of all men of subsequent ages to the grievances of suffering humanity. So far as the idea under discussion was concerned, it may be said that the equality of post-revolutionary Europe was essentially political equality, inasmuch as the extension of the franchise, with its consequent rights and responsibilities, was the most important condition-precedent to all other types of reform in the nineteenth century. England extended her franchise, consolidated her rule of law, engaged herself in free trade with every country of the world, and allowed the largest measure of freedom to her citizens. England became the model country for politics and commerce. In England at least,

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'the judgments rendered were to be determined wholly by the facts and law involved, and hence irrespective of the social, economic, political, or even moral standing of the parties litigant.' Politically, England profited most by the French Revolution. Yet, the Trade-Unions of England of the nineteenth century did not succeed in annexing more than the legal right of association. The labourers were, as yet, unrepresented.

The new constitutions built upon different traditions, but on the model of England, were seriously assailed by new ideas, new catchwords, and had to face new circumstances. The Industrial Revolution, begun in England, and followed in other countries, had wrought enormous changes in the means of production, and necessarily, in the stratification of society.⁴ Labour came into the arena, but with wages which would scarcely buy the necessities of life. In the early days, society was synonymous with the conquering race and its progeny; then it was supposed to be mainly composed of landlords and bishops; now society meant the capitalists. When their 'natural' aristocracy degenerated into cliques for selfish ends, the exploited labourers, whose only capital was unorganised skill and brawn, rose in revolt. A theory was enunciated to justify this spirit of unrest and show its implications. Karl Marx gave a materialistic interpretation of history, basing it chiefly upon his study of the history of England; and though he recognised the role of moral, religious and other ideas, he sought to banish non-economic sentiments and actions from the list of the main driving forces of history. The 'rock-bottom of the question,' in his opinion, was the conflict of interests between the 'have's' and the 'have-not's, the rich and the poor.

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Socially necessary collective labour alone determined the value of the commodity, and the surplus value exploited from the unorganised labourers went to swell the profits of the capitalist. So, as on the one hand, the labourer was getting poorer, on the other, the capitalist was securing a superfluity of material goods. A revolution was therefore inevitable and future history would be shaped by the creative forces of this revolution.⁵

This theory to explain the present iniquities of distribution of wealth and inequalities in the opportunities for development, co-terminous with the possession of material goods in the present age, contains a few abiding elements of truth. In the first place, the insistence on the social aspect of labour in the determination of value, secondly, the necessity for the organisation of labour, thirdly, the usefulness of self-government in industry, fourthly, the dignity of labour as indicated in its difference from any other commodity in the matter of valuation *i.e.*, wages, fifthly, the supreme necessity, for the student of history and the man of action alike, of disinterestedness, and lastly, a spirit of hopefulness regarding the time when the labourer would come into his own in society,—all these have combined to change the angle of history and the axis of men's thought and action. Socialism has been called the new religion of humanity. It is no better and no worse than any previous religion. It binds men, rouses them to frenzy and fury, it separates men; it has its prophets and its mystic experiences. It transcends reason and appeals to the highest and the lowest of motives. The only sociological difference between Socialism, on the one hand, and any type of religion, on the other, is that the former is concerned with the kingdom on

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earth, and the latter, with the kingdom in heaven. In tracing the beginnings of a new society ushered in by the Industrial Revolution, and the "succession of heroic ambitions and sensational failures" of the English labourers—a body of men not addicted to ideas as such, the Hammonds discover "the influence of the French Revolution and the spirit that it expressed or desired."⁶ The following remarks may as well fit in with the spirit that informs the socialist of the twentieth century. "That spirit had in it the fierce quality of enthusiasm. When men come to think of the world as a universe in which their lives count, in which their individual minds are associated with a great harmony of functions and purposes, their response to this new vision has a kind of mystical force. There is in the atmosphere of the French Revolution as in that of the early Christian Societies, the rapture of confidence and expectation. The word "Citizen" meant to this movement what the word "Christian" had meant to the other; it brought into men's minds a driving power such as could be brought by no mere sense of wrong; men were eager to die for it; they became, (unhappily), scarcely less ready to kill for it. The secret of happiness and virtue, it was a word to send armies to encounter every kind of peril from one end of Europe to the other. It is just this quality in revolution that makes it at once so intoxicating and so terrifying. Minds take sudden light from it, and a power that teaches by flashes is a dangerous master. Enthusiasm turns to fanaticism and under its spell men are better and worse than their fellows. In the French Revolution, politics are at once sublime and brutal, generous and savage, surpassing the most ardent hopes of the age, outrunning its wildest fears.

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'Men are born equal, and equal with equal rights. Free and equal they remain.' The first article of the Declaration of the Rights of man sped on wings of passion from the study to the Assembly, from the Assembly to the streets of Paris, from the streets of Paris to the battle-fields of Europe." That Communism is the new faith that inspires confidence and arouses expectation in men who are as ready to die as to kill for it has been noted by all observers of Russian affairs. The mental attitude of the communist is that of a mystic and a fanatic. But has the spirit of hopefulness in equality liberated by the shock of widespread destruction been given its adequate expression in the new scheme of things? It may be too early to judge. Yet, there is no perceptible relaxation of discipline in the ruling party; the non-communist is still a pariah. The excuse of enemies abroad, the indifference of peasants, the transitional need of strict control over the wavering and the heretic, the urgent need for self-sufficiency and power by liquidating illiteracy of the masses are cold comforts and poor precepts to those who have suffered from inequality and demand the rights of the millennium that has been trumpeted to have dawned.

So long as there is no public opinion to tolerate the liberty of private opinion, even when it is wrong, equality in any form is meaningless. The socialist in demanding economic equality is quite sure that all other forms of equality, like the social and the political, would follow naturally. That is, from the point of view of freedom, the socialist maintains that once the economic needs are satisfied, other aspirations and creative activities of individuals would find natural outlet. Under capitalism, he says, creative efforts are possible for a

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small class of people, *viz.*, the rich, for the rest, they are practically impossible, or only possible under the greatest difficulties. Therefore, the creative efforts either become leisurely activities or partake of the nature of difficulties overcome. So long as economic impediments are not consumed, individual talents do not burn incandescent. Art either degenerates into *fin de siecle*, aristocratic, unreal, unbalanced, or slum art. All inventions are patented for private gain. Either snobbishness or bitterness creeps into all kinds of human activity, and nothing is healthy and spontaneous. In so far as the creative impulses are fettered and atrophied by long repression, there is a disturbance in the balance of the human being and an ethical loss. So the most important demand of the socialist, from the point of view of freedom, is to let the creative impulse of individuals work unhampered. Now, judging from all reports, this creative impulse of individuals is not working itself out smoothly in Soviet Russia. How could it do so when the philosophy and the action of the Soviet government is the superiority of the group or the collective unit over the individual? When the individual has to merge himself in the collective whole, the interpretation of the purpose of which is in the hands of a particular party in power, civic equality is confined only to the members of the party. The fact is that the civic sense was never strong among the Russian people.' It still remains undeveloped, except among the chosen few. A true civic sense is not to be equated to 'an abdication of personality.' And this is just what party-discipline in Russia seems to demand. Such 'abdication' is not a favourable generative condition of the continuous initiative which is the essence of

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free behaviour. 'He alone is free who daily wins his freedom anew.' Even individuals who have energy to survive this process of merging in the collective whole emerge as colourless, uniform quantities, whose value, logically, is one. In short, there appears to be a real conflict between the Socialist's ideals and the methods adopted for their realization in Communist Russia. A policy which insists on emphasising the superiority of the collective group over the individual unit is sure to frustrate individual initiative to a great extent. There can be no equality in uniformity. The value of equality consists in variety. And variety means different abilities which depend upon different equipments and psycho-physical dispositions working out different adjustments with dissimilar stimuli in their respective environments.

II

The above survey should not lead us to the conclusion that inequality has been the monopoly of European societies. Wherever there has been a conquest, there has been a stratification of society. It is primarily dual, the conqueror and the conquered. Later on, society is split up into a number of strata. Rank, based on wealth, prowess, superior knowledge of the mysteries of Nature, and the magical control of elemental forces by propitiation and incantation, has been noticed in all primitive and tribal societies. In the civilised communities of the East, there has always been a marked difference in the sharing of social, political, and economic privileges. In recent times, the internal difference has been accentuated in the case of larger units, (and only partially abolished in the case of the smaller), by new political and economic situations arising out of the domination of the East by the West. It is no longer the Brahmin, or the Mandarin group-oligarchy that perpetuates divisions, but the exponential group of a more powerful foreign civilisation. The exploited units feel that this civilisation is taking advantage of all the engines of exploitation under the garb of humanitarianism, that the 'sacred trust' of the West to civilise the East is a cloak to hide the multitudinous forms of tyranny and inequality which are necessary for the continuance of the foreign political and economic domination. That the cloak is bigger than ever is accountable by the fact that it is meant to cover all the peoples of groups larger than either the plebeians or patricians, the clergy

or the laity, the *Jacquerie* or the proletariat. This explains why the Eastern people of modern times have turned their attention to the removal of political and economical forms of inequality more than to the social.⁸ In any case, it is an additional inequality that should not blind us to the glaring ones inherent in the social system.

Looking beyond the immediate political struggles and preoccupations we find that in the Eastern society of to-day, individuals are, for all practical purposes, enclosed in caste. When the Oriental speaks of destiny, he means status, which is determined by birth. Be it remembered, however, that societies in the East had also their periods of vigorous life and expansion. Then the work of assimilation and adaptation was more important than the natural problem of self-preservation which faced a conquering minority group against a majority of civilised aborigines. When peace followed, social organisation, based on birth, became intensive. This process is possibly common to all societies, but is more marked in the case of peaceful communities of the East living in self-sufficient and highly congenial environments. When society becomes more complex by increasing division of labour and growing admixture of races, functioning is regarded as important as birth in the determination of social constitution. It is a revolutionary change, though it must not be understood to indicate that the era of functional organization of society spells equality for all. Admitting the validity of Nesfield's theory about the functional origin of castes in Northern India, (it is valid for more than 75% of the castes in the United Provinces), all that we know of the measure of economic equality achieved within the caste is that the caste-guild or *Panchayat*,

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where it worked efficiently, sought to remove unfair economic competition from among its members. The means adopted were : first, regulation of prices, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment and marketing; secondly, provision of a certain amount of technical education and skill through apprenticeship, primarily of young members of the family of the craftsman, but to the benefits of which young men of the same caste were morally, *i.e.*, socially entitled; and thirdly, by the organisation of social and religious festivals in which all, without distinction, could and very often did participate. Instances of efficient caste-guilds and of mutual assistance can still be quoted. For obvious reasons, they are getting rarer. But they prove that there was a time when society was organised on the principle of social functioning.

The caste, therefore, is a socio-economic body, in which the social functioning of a member is more important than the merely economic. This has been a feature of almost all Indian communities, even of those which do not recognise caste in the Hindu sense of the term. The overwhelming importance attached to 'Samaj-dharma' has been largely responsible for the stability and consolidation of such communities in spite of their political vicissitudes. Social solidarity, in the past, largely compensated for political atomism. The units of village-communities were incorporated by the caste, and the existence of numerous castes within the village had always been of less significance than that of the caste-feeling that comprehended villages, districts, and even provinces. That historical momentum is not yet exhausted. Still does it work itself through warring communities. The social structure of India has a unity that is more

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important than the diversity of politically conscious creeds. Leaving aside the Muslim minority for the sake of argument, the political importance of the Hindu Mahasava, incorporating all castes and transcending provincial borders, is an instance to the point. It is only a political articulation of the genius of social solidarity that Hindus have possessed. Once we recognise the peculiar genius of Indian culture (in so far as it has been formed by Hinduism) it is easy to notice how the sense of social solidarity has,⁹ so long, retarded economic disruption into classes.

A society based primarily on a particular system of production is apt to be dismembered into conflicting classes. The same could be said of a society based on a particular system of sharing political spoils and privileges. The comparative stability of the Hindu and Chinese societies (based as they are on principles of social obligation, and political or economic rights and duties following therefrom) proves that social disruption can be stayed by an insistence on the social side of group-living. The social side is emphasised by factors other than caste as well. Thus, the joint-family,¹⁰ under the Mitakshara and the Dayabhag, secures to the aged, the disabled, the weak, the widow and other dependents a certain measure of economic support and prevents them from being driven to slums,—the breeding ground of class-consciousness. The same could be said of Muslim and Chinese Societies. Among the former, the family obligation is 'more restrictive, but none the less imperative.' It is barred only by the prohibited degrees of marriage. The family-life of all Oriental communities lays a religious and moral obligation on the able to support the unable and the disabled. It is a socio-religious counter-move to economic in-

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equality. The common fund of the village, the democratic procedure of village and caste-*panchayats*, the division of waste-lands by lot and their distribution by rotation, the strong tradition of co-operation in social and economic life, and the influence of certain religious sects among the lower castes have, to a great extent, mitigated the hardships arising out of the static inequality implicit in the caste.¹¹ That castes are still undergoing the slow processes of fusion, mainly, as a result of the changes in occupation, that 'new endogamous groups are constantly being created, the process of fission is ever in operation, and what is more important still the *novus homo*, like his brethren all the world over, is constantly endeavouring to force his way into a higher grade,' are facts about the present day caste in India which have to be recognised along with those about its rigid restrictions.¹² The significance of what has been stated above on caste consists in the fact that within the caste, there was, at least, in the past, a perceptible measure of economic equality secured by the caste-guild, and no small measure of social equality secured through the sense of social obligation informing all members of the community, rich and poor. Yet the fact remains that the sense of social obligation was itself a function of birth. Let us grant that in good old days the caste-guild was working very smoothly. Yet, we must not forget that occupation was, in the first instance, and still is, to an appreciable extent, a function of birth. This principle of birth, at its best, was based on a crude empirical knowledge of the heritability of certain traits and fostered by the desirability of providing congenial surroundings and instructions to develop them.¹³ The principle of birth did, (as it does), divide society into a few broad

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classes, in each of which, some form of equalisation of opportunities may be said to have prevailed. In other words, in the healthiest period of Oriental society (Indian and Chinese), within the particular group or caste, function was, in practice, as important as birth in the determination of status. But even in the golden age, so far as the *entire system* of caste was concerned, as in the relation of one caste to another, or in the attitude towards a foreigner, the principle of function could not displace the older principle of birth. In the period of decadence, function itself became as stereotyped as birth.

This is the position of the Hindu society to-day. The caste is no longer an equalising agency within its fold. The caste-guild no longer exercises a quasi-monopoly. But the caste feeling is not yet dead. The lack of facilities and high charges of vocational education are upholding it. As the lower castes in India are very poor, and the caste-feeling, instead of dying, is increasing among them, the gulf between work and wages, which would always be small when choices of occupation are free and dependent on acquired skill, is becoming wider.¹⁴ The disagreeable occupations to which some are born are not fetching high wages, as they should, ideally. Nor do the lower castes enjoy the compensatory feeling of being an integral part of the social body. The result is discontent. Occupations thus ossified into caste cannot admit of any principle of free competition for equal wages or chances. The heritability of certain gifts and of the need for their development by a relatively stable environment, which was the primary merit of the caste-system in early times, had been very often misinterpreted by interested parties, like the priests and warriors. At the present moment, this

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crude knowledge, which is supposed to be stored and stereotyped in caste-traditions, offers no hope of the enjoyment of proportional opportunities for the development of different abilities. Now that the Hindu society, for the matter of that any society in the East, excepting the primitive ones, cannot, by any stretch of anthropologic imagination, be said to possess racial homogeneity, the empirical basis of heredity that we may concede to the origin of castes, cannot support any euthenic superstructure that we may desire to erect in the light of our partial knowledge of the science of eugenics. Nor can the present structure bear the stress of democratic, scientific, and individualistic tendencies of modern thought and economic practices of the Western civilisation in which the idea of equality has a peculiar significance of its own. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in recent Indian thought a growing emphasis on the urgent need of doing away with differences determined by birth. The increasing animus among the depressed classes against the higher castes, as well as the urge in the mind of the politically minded intelligentsia to remove the social, political and economic differences between the 'natives' and the 'white' members of the ruling class (who are the glorified Brahmins of modern India with powers of good and evil increased a thousandfold, mainly by the exercise of economic functioning) are different phases of the same movement.

III

The above survey frames the question—what is the abiding value in the idea of equality? In other words, is it a necessary factor in the progress of individuals? If progress is a challenge or a problem, as has been maintained, then, logically speaking, there are certain phenomena which are the terms of the analysis, and others to which the problem is to be reduced as a result of the analysis. They are to be arranged properly in their inter-relations to bring out their relative significance. Ultimately, the problem of progress is the development of personality. But, immediately, its elements are variety, change, directivity and purpose. Variety is supposed to be antagonistic to equality. It is our task to enquire into this supposition. The conditioning phenomena of the social life that postulates all the above elements are: (1) geographic, *i.e.*, “climate, soil, water-supply, other mineral sources, flora, fauna, topography”; (2) technic, *i.e.*, “the material products of human work, which having once been produced are conditions of further activities”; these being inventions and human achievements are more subject to human control than the geographical conditions; (3) psycho-physical, which are either congenital, like age, sex, race, predisposition, temperament, natural endowment, hereditary disease and defect; or acquired, like other diseases and defects, developed strength and skill, habits, etc.; (4) the social, that is, the ideas and sentiments, customs and beliefs, mores and folkways, to which an individual is born. This is the classification of the

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conditioning phenomena given by the late Prof. Hayes.¹⁵

Of the four types of conditioning phenomena, the first and the third are more or less fixed. The technic and social conditions are subject to rational social control. (They are loosely called social forces.) So if the congenital psycho-physical dispositions in a given geographical environment are more or less equally distributed among different individuals or classes in a society, then, the material conditions of progress will naturally be dependent on a certain measure of equality in the possession of material goods. But, unfortunately, a large mass of materials have accumulated to disprove the absolute equality of innate gifts among individual classes and races. All of them are not reliable.¹⁶ Thus, some anthropologists (led by Gobineau, Lapouge and Ammon) have sought to prove the innate superiority of one race, to which they belong, over others, especially over the races inhabiting Africa and Asia. Their chauvinistic conclusions have been amended by more cautious and disciplined statements.¹⁷ Yet, the residuum of fundamental inequality between individuals and certain economic classes in the matter of intelligence remains an open challenge to the idea of equality. The strictly scientific findings of Eugenists¹⁸ are, (1) that innate group-differences exist, but they are small, (2) that differences obtaining between individuals of the same group are greater than those between that group and another, and (3) that such differences correspond roughly, in certain sections of English and American societies, to the differences in rank. Mr. Cyril Burt writes, "The main conclusion that can be drawn from experimental work is, I think, the following: innate group differ-

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ences exist, but they are small.” In this connexion, Carr-Saunders remarks, “If opportunity was equal for all, if social acquirements counted for nothing, and if examination tests were rigorously imposed, we might expect to find greater intellectual differences between the members of professions and other elements of the population than we do find in spite of the fact that such tests sort out emotional as well as intellectual qualities.” The same authority continues, “Whether we consider racial groups large or small, or whether we consider the classes into which members of the same racial group fall, we find the differences between the average of one group compared with another are small. The differences are small relative to the vast differences which exist between members of the same community. Innate differences, therefore, are not distributed at random throughout the population. On the other hand, the distribution of innate qualities approximates much more closely to a random distribution than it does to a segregation of innate qualities according to occupational or social distinctions.”¹⁹ This is the scientific position. Certain statisticians conclude, however, that there is a positive correlation between the distribution of mental gifts and the social distribution of individuals according to rank and position in English and American societies.²⁰ It is also a fact that in spite of increasing educational facilities offered by enlightened states to the labouring classes in the nineteenth century, their contribution to the production of men of first-rate abilities has been proportionately less than that of the middle or higher classes. “Passing from the bottom of a social pyramid to its apex we see a systematic increase of the number of men of genius—an absolute as well as a relative increase.”

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If, as has been found by rigorous analysis, 'the higher social classes are more intelligent than the lower ones,' (even in India, among Panchama, Brahmin and American children in a missionary school in the South in the matter of scoring and increase in the speed of performance after 12—Herrick, *J. of App. Psych.*, 1921), then the right relation between the idea of social and economic equality and progress seems to be that which has been indicated by Karl Pearson in his 'National Life from the Standpoint of Science.'—"Let there be a ladder from class to class and occupation to occupation, but let it not be an easy ladder to climb; great ability (as Faraday's) will get up, and that is all that is socially advantageous. The gradation of the body social is not a historical anomaly; it is largely the result of long-continued selection, economically differentiating the community into classes roughly fitted to certain types of work." A sentence that might have emanated from any President of the Hindu Mahasava, in the Pre-Reform days, for Karl Pearson's other conclusion that the White man 'should go and completely drive out the inferior race' would hardly be endorsed by any Indian in the post-Gandhi period!

Hence the problems of equality centre round the contradiction between the idea of equality generated by group-oppression and the fact of biological inequality. This can be resolved (1) by the provision of proportional opportunities through social agencies, in the first instance; and (2) by the insistence on Personality as the criterion of social justice. It is quite clear that economic inequality cannot be accepted as the only tenet of distributive justice in so far as it ignores the differences in abilities. But it is equally clear that the absolute amount of wealth con-

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centrated in the hands of the Upper Ten, on the one hand, and very thinly distributed among the remainder, on the other, is neither statistically proportionate to the distribution of hereditary abilities, nor supported by any sort of eugenic consideration. A regime based on such inequalities in wealth-distribution is the worst enemy of racial progress on account of the dysgenic effects of economic selection.²¹ It is for this reason that the scientific conclusions of eugenicists are of little *immediate* use either to the sociologist, or the masses.²² Which does not mean that social justice, ultimately, will not be based on Science. But it will be a Science which will take all the relevant facts. One omitted fact has been noted above. Another is that all men feel that they have the same psycho-physical needs and instincts. The demand for equality has always had this instinctive basis. If Science does not consider this, human beings will not go to Science for the corrective principle of distributive justice. They would rather remain in error and wait for Science to be comprehensive and liberal. The present inequalities of income are *not* based on hereditary difference—this is the cardinal fact of modern industrialised societies. The present inequalities in political privileges are not warranted by racial differences—this is the cardinal fact about the present political situation.

One important point should be noted at once. Recent advances in biological knowledge are not unilinear. One line of advance has been towards a greater insistence on the role of germ-plasm, which is supposed to be the seed of all potential growth. But this potentiality is never understood in the deterministic way of metaphysicians. Sexual selection, with its concomitant elimination of undesirable and

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recessive traits by the operation of more intricate Mendelian laws, social selection by war, disease, religion, education, economic betterment, medication, sanitation, and other agencies, have conspired to lift the determination off the face of applied Eugenics. On the other hand, the study of conditioned reflexes by Pavlov and his disciples has yielded very reassuring results. Without committing Sociology to any one school of thought, it is possible to see that the difference between the effects of a heritable trait and an acquired character is chiefly in time. As Morselli has put it, "The totality of mental and physical traits by which various races of men differ from each other is not unchangeable . . . but hundreds and thousands of years are always necessary for such a transformation." A man of genius, like Napoleon, Lenin or Gandhi may 'turn the accomplishment of years into an hour glass.' In any case, what happens in the gamete or in the mechanism of heredity is important from the long-period value of the potentiality of growth, and not from that of actuality, which has an immediate value.²³ When the individual is not growing, and suffering from the fact of his arrested growth, it is small consolation for him to know the innate eugenic causes thereof. Hence, in the supreme question of the development of Personality, greater emphasis is to be laid immediately upon the social environment which is more amenable to control by voluntary agencies than upon the mechanical side of heredity, for the effective control of which state-help is absolutely necessary, but not available. Where it is available, eugenic selection is more important than social selection. The following are some of the reasons for laying greater stress on the agencies of social selection, at the present moment:—(1) We do

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not know the quality, and imperfectly know the quantity of differences which are given, but we do feel that all should be given chances to go ahead. Which chances are to be given to which individuals is subsidiary to the main question that chances should be given to all, so long as there are glaring inequalities in the distribution of opportunities. In other words, the fundamental principles of Democracy, *viz.*, political and economic equality, though not the only principles of social justice, are first in the order of precedence. The innate differences, if they are so obdurate, will not be effaced by the provision of political and economic opportunities for all, and will work themselves out in the long run when Sociocracy will have been established. (2) The existing organs of government, public opinion, religion, and educational institutions are so much under the control of vested interests and dominated by inertia that there is no prospect of a eugenic survey of population on strictly scientific and disinterested motives in the near future. When class and heredity both create vicious circles, it is a wise policy to break through that which offers less resistance. If the other one is impenetrable, enough will have been gained by cutting through one, at least. Any agency of social selection is more controllable than natural selection. (3) The work of the latter may be more sure and permanent in effect than of the former. Natural selection operating through society is a very long drawn out process.²⁴ Men are impatient and will have the millennium in their own time, and will utilise the agency that is more amenable to rational control and susceptible to intelligent adaptation. (4) Men believe that equality is a quality that adheres to each of them at the moment of birth, nay earlier. Conse-

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quently, the desire for social equality is tinged with the feeling of being baulked: To the student of human affairs, the idea of equality as a natural right is not yet dead; to the human being, it cannot die, for it consoles the weak and heartens the dispossessed. Natural rights have entered into the ideology of the intelligentsia in India and China. Tilak's famous phrase about freedom as the birth-right of every Indian has made history. The insistence on equality of *status* (as opposed to *functioning*) by the Congress is no less significant. The spirit of hopefulness which is indicated, and even generated by the use of the term 'Natural right,' connotes a spirit of triumph over biological determinism, *i.e.*, over the limitations imposed by heredity. This new temper, if wisely guided, may work wonders within a period much shorter than that required by natural selection or political bargaining.

So the attitude that I have taken towards equality is that capacities, though various, *are more approximate in the urgent necessity of expression for development* than is generally presumed from a statement based on incomplete data. The modes of expression are various, but the need for expression and development is equally important for all. Just at this moment, scientific vision is obscured by impassable artificial and accidental barriers. These barriers stand in the way of those natural and healthy barriers which will certainly emerge after their abolition. A eugenicist cannot have any toleration for impassable class and caste divisions. During the period of waiting for the eugenicist's millennium, when every individual will meet with just the necessary and adequate dose of stimulus from the proper environment, and when there will be an all-round progress

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of the community, intelligent people might profitably be engaged in making preparations for it by breaking the dissimilarities of social opportunities, stereotyped, either by interested people, or by inertia. In the existing monotonous, close, social climate of groups, no individual can thrive. For some time, individuals may live and manage to eke out a group-living. Group organisations have always been ultimately disastrous to the development of personality. For, if one historical fact is more important than another it is that the inequality that people have been made to feel most and have protested most against, is that imposed by one group over another. Individual tyranny has been tolerated. In Europe, dictators and tyrants have alternated with masterful Popes, pioneering traders, and capitalists. The Asiatic people had seldom objected to an autocratic rule of the benevolent type. No people usually object to leadership and its consequences, up to a limit. But when leadership has been diffused over a group, bolstered up by pretensions, and traced by interested parties to some *innate right of the group based on intrinsic superiority*, there has always been a protest. An explanation of the nature of the protest throws light on the value of the idea of equality. In my opinion, there has always been an unconscious recognition by the individual of the fact that group-tyranny, instead of diluting the injustice of it, is most inimical to the progress and interest of his personality. For it is a fact that a class or caste or race-rule crushes the creative impulses of men. The group formulates a group-mind, a Frankenstein monster, of which the individual is naturally suspicious and afraid.²⁵ Owing to the demand of the group upon the individual to merge his existence in itself, and the false

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recognition and interested interpretations of the purpose of group-life by the masters of the group who hold all power and authority in their hands to enforce these interpretations, the individual cannot bloom into a person. The stimuli offered by the group-masters are not proportionate to the varying capacities of individuals who are sleeping partners to the group-life. The group demands and creates dead levels. Therefore, the rule should be that for the poor in responses, the group should intensify and vary the stimuli without diminishing their ardour for the rich. Otherwise, personality cannot develop. And equality is only possible among persons, *i.e.*, individuals when they rise to their full nature. Herein lies the value of the *idea* of equality. Rightly understood, it is a symbol of personality, it is a *mantram* to exorcise the group-mind. Indirectly, it is a test of social justice. The unconscious interest that the individual takes in his own development is a surer background of social justice than any particular *form* of equality. Thus, in the development of personality, nature and nurture unite. The idea of equality would equally require for its materialisation an insistence on the need of that proportional stimulus of social and technic environment which will cause potential qualities to thrive. That is, a proportionality of social stimulus with reference to the responsiveness of individuals is the equality which is the most important condition-precedent to the development of personality. If responsiveness is found to be nil, even then, something will have been achieved in the way of removing repressions, breaking complexes, and abolishing barriers which obstruct clear vision and spoil earnest endeavour. I believe that in the normal human being there is always a creative impulse which must

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be allowed light, air, and space to blossom into healthy activity. The individual, as he lives to-day in society, is full of mental knots, thorns, and gnarls. The purpose of social justice is to remove these, and equality, even the idea of it, even when its scientific basis is not yet sure and implications not yet applicable, is a very valuable asset of social justice.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL FORCES

I

The love of explanation is an attribute common to all human beings. But the scientist excludes the first and final causes and concerns himself with the antecedent conditioning phenomena, while the non-scientific, *i.e.*, the primitive and religious minds seek to explain in terms of the ultimate causes. Sociology, being a discipline of recent growth, has not yet abjured its animism. It has not yet been fully informed by the scientific method. The result is that in sociological laws the predicate is very often implied in the subject, no causal relationship is either stated or implied in the explanation, and the sociological explanation of social phenomena does not lead to new avenues of thought and experience.¹ In other words, such laws are laws by courtesy. At present, when the generalisations are not animistic, they are tautological under the cover of forbidding figures.

Thus, social phenomena have been sought to be explained in terms of Social Forces, like interests, ideas, sentiments, attitudes, desires, wishes, behaviour-patterns, etc. They are meant to be the termini of the series of causes—the First Causes, in fact. These ultimate explanations offer mystic peacefulness, nay produce ecstasy in the minds of sociologists. If the tortoise supporting the Hindu universe moves, there is an earthquake, if there is lightning, the Spirit of Storm is angry, if men behave in a particular way, they are directed by *forces*, which are manifested in that particular way. In

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other words, as Moliere's character said, "Opium makes a man sleepy *because* it has a sleeping power." Such explanations, however, may arise from the professional vanity of authorship. M. Bergeret, after he became a professor, 'filled the void of Heavens' abysses with seductive forms and thoughts sublime, the existence of which he had vigorously denied before.' When the habit of mind that must needs comprehend the Universe in one scheme gets the upper hand of common sense, we can easily discover some first cause from which the objects studied seem to flow in a line. In our vanity, we seek to know the why before completing our knowledge of the how of social experience. Thus do we soar in metaphysical heights and become untrue to the kindred points of heaven and home. ~~To~~ To make one particular factor of experience the independent variable, and all other factors functions thereof, (as the Scientific Socialists, *i.e.*, the materialistic interpreters of history are prone to do with reference to the economic nexus) is as much a sign of the metaphysical mind as that to be noticed in the Hindu Puranas. The defect of such a method is that any other factor (like religion) may legitimately claim to be the independent variable, with other factors, like the economic, as functions thereof. Unless the independent variables themselves are shown, later on, to be dependent functions, one method, the materialistic, is as good as another, say the religious.² Otherwise, social forces fight between themselves and cancel one another, like primitive gods. In Sociology, exigencies of authorship raise a particular social force on a pedestal where it reigns supreme. Like Providence, (or a marionette-master, shall we say?) the compelling agency works from behind the scenes and moves individuals to select patterns of behaviour.

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The necessities of authorship and science are a mystery to the laity. Supposing for a moment that it is not vanity, but the urgency of a system which is responsible for this mystification, the logic of such explanations does not improve a bit. The uplift of a generalised explanation into a compelling agency, the conversion of a process into a force by a baptism of ink, and the temporal inversion may still remain a personal necessity for the sociologist. It may be even an ethical necessity for him, for placing him in harmonious adjustment with his experience. But if Sociology is to be logical, it will have to reject the personal necessities of the sociologist, it will have to be saved from his love of explanation, from sheer anthropomorphism. There is no denying the fact that such explanations or necessities are highly useful in the intermediate stages of systematisation. But, later on, their nature must be known. Social Forces are Sorellian myths, highly useful as servants, but harmful as masters.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, Physics has been the most well-developed body of knowledge in the world of science. Therefore, the sociologist of the twentieth century, who finds the working hypotheses of an earlier period to be unworkable, wants to model his system on that of Physics. Now the concept of Force was one of the capital concepts of Physics in the latter half of the nineteenth and the first few years of the twentieth centuries. But, now, the concept of Force has been banished from Physics and Astronomy by the theoretical physicist himself.³ Physicists and logicians of scientific method no longer say, in their scientific moments, that the sun 'moves' the earth, or one particle 'moves' another, or a magnet 'moves' the needle. That they do so still in their

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ordinary talk is either for convenience in calculation, or for the sake of habit. It may as well be for resolving or avoiding the tension of being scientific at all moments. Now that the old concepts of natural sciences are being gradually discarded in favour of what may be considered as more complex terms, but, in reality, in favour of terms consisting of simpler and more comprehensive relations,⁴ it is high time that the sociologist in his effort to be up-to-date and scientific should relegate such terms as Social Forces to the limbo of convenient fictions. It is quite another question whether Sociology will or can at all assimilate any concept of natural sciences, especially the new technical ones, or not. The superficial analogies to laws of Physics, given either by Solvay and his disciples, or Winarsky, by Bechtereff or Carver 'disfigure and misinterpret not only the social phenomena but the laws of physics, mechanics, energetics and logic as well.'⁵ The so-called laws of social energetics transgress the basic logical law of the necessity for adequacy in a logical subject and a logical predicate in a logical judgment. The logical inadequacy consists in 'referring the predicates either to too narrow or too broad a subject.' The result is misleading in so far as certain specific parts are supposed to be the monopoly of the objects studied. But the fact is otherwise. There is little usefulness served by denuding social phenomena of their specific features in order to overburden natural physical phenomena with these. As Prof. Sorokin writes, "A number of the representatives of the school—the Mechanistic School, insist on a quantitative study of social phenomena, but not one of them had produced a single quantitative formula or given a co-efficient of correlation between two or more social processes.

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It is true that they copied and put into their articles several formulas of physical mechanics, but also, they themselves do not know how to apply them, nor how to use them in regard to social facts. Since no unit for the measurement of social forces has been found as yet, all these formulas are to be regarded as a mere exercise in the copying of mechanical formulas, nothing more.''" Thus, on the whole, the borrowing of terms is dangerous to all parties. It confuses that which gives and that which takes. The sociologist has not yet collected sufficient number of facts in the same spirit as the physicist has done. The behaviour of individuals, (in spite of the Press, and the School, the factory life under Capitalism, and party discipline under Communism or Fascism,) has not yet been repetitive enough to lend itself to accurate measurements as meekly as any series of physical phenomena. Yet, and this is my point, there is no earthly reason why the clearer analyses of relationship and the courage for rejecting inadequate hypotheses involved in up-to-date explanations of physical phenomena should not give a definite lead to the sociologist in the matter of sociological explanation. Einstein may or may not have made Newton a back number, but Einstein's explanation fits in with a greater number of cases and seeks to explain that greater number in terms of certain more fundamental, *i.e.*, more simple and elementary forms of relationship than are denoted in Newton's explanations. Similarly, when statistical averages and correlation co-efficients based upon factual studies and actual experiments take the place of the so-called sociological laws, then, if sociology will not yet have been a science in the sense of Physics, students of human affairs will have been rid of one harmful

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category at least.

It is not that the harmfulness of borrowing terms and ideas from natural sciences has not been sensed by sociologists. They have themselves tried to rob Social Force of its mystery by calling it a tendency that is observable in and through events as they unfold. They have studied institutions, those incarnations of tendencies in different local habitations and names. The objective study of tendencies and institutions has supplied a concrete basis to Sociology. It has pointed out antecedent and conditioning relations, and even noted regular relationships implying the existence of at least one known causal relationship. In other words, it has succeeded in establishing empirical laws, (if not causal laws,) which are 'the explicit statement of generalised causal explanations.' It has made the sociologist very industrious. It has laid stress on the inductive method. It has paved the way for fruitful correlations. Yet, it is a very pertinent question to ask whether there has been a real change in the angle of vision of the sociologist when he defines a tendency or describes an institution in preference to speculating on Social Force. The interpretation of social phenomena by *tendencies* is as mystical as anything else, in so far as such an interpretation regards history either as natural history or an arena for the unfolding of a Crocean spirit.' As noted above, the love of systematising for its own sake, the assumption of primary importance by the secondary necessity of classification in order to understand the significance of events, the common habits of rationalising the dear predilections and sympathies of the sociologist and of considering his 'geese' as 'swans,' conspire with the lure of origins and a superficial

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teleology to evolve a particular order and succession of events. This order is, of course, temporal. Temporal sequence is commonly supposed to be compelling. When a chronological sequence can be noted or established, the order of events suddenly acquires momentum. Any event that does not fall in line with the sequence is either dismissed as an aberration or an exception which can be used to prove the rule. An unrelated event is a pariah, an untouchable to the classificatory habit of mind. No sociologist worth his salt will seek to endorse it, recognise it, or comprehend it. When an exceptional fact does not prove the rule, it becomes immoral. The sociologist confines himself within the pale of related events where the prediscovers order dictates succession, affords explanation, and indicates progression. The greater the number of events and the greater the temporal extension, the greater is the chance of identifying a mere succession with a law of inner development, an unfolding of the hidden force. For when the number of events increase and succession extends, probability hardens into a certitude, a generalisation becomes a tendency, and a tendency ascends the pedestal of a mysterious Force—She who must be obeyed. So we see that it is the same mental operation as that of the primitive who shakes in fear of the bull-roarer. Is there any qualitative difference between the concept of Social Force and that of Social Tendencies? The same *ethical* habit of thinking, the same anthropomorphism, the same love of mystery, the same vanity is to be noticed here as there. For aught I know, even a predominant tendency, much less to talk of one tendency in history, is at best a methodological necessity; and even that has to be corrected by

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making it a function of other variables. Some starting point is necessary for study, but to confuse it with a force and the only force that starts the whole operation is sheer nonsense.

Logically, even when the study of institutions is of a high scientific order, its conclusions are not so. Here, the first step is to collect and collate facts. But facts, especially facts about the behaviour of human beings, are never considered as ends by themselves. Men including sociologists are so highly practical and moral! A certain sociologist observes marriage customs among primitive tribes. If he is humble, he may select only one tribe and limit his observations to one trait, say chastity, or jealousy, or incest. He arrives at certain conclusions which are true for the tribe. But another sociologist is ambitious. He applies those modest conclusions to modern Society. The application need not be deliberate; still the incessant talk about the virtues, say of monogamy or of incest tabus, as based on the premise of linear evolution of the present day marriage institution from primitive peoples, goes on murmuring for ever, and ponderous books on ideal family relationship are written in which polygyny is praised or condemned, and incest declared natural or unnatural, and therefore, moral, or immoral and criminal. Psycho-analysts take shelter under these conclusions, and in the name of instincts or the collective unconscious, moralise the individual by resolving his complexes, releasing his repressions, and making him know that he is normal and moral, *i.e.*, the heir-apparent to the primitive in a line of continuous succession and spiritual benefit.⁸ We do not like to show up the defects of this method of calling a historical tendency a Social Force by taking any

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instance in detail. Factually, historical studies are of high importance, but to deduce a concept of Social Force therefrom and then describe the history over again as a manifestation of the Social Force is to put a double value on a single act. So, between the concepts of Social Force, Social Tendencies, and Social Institutions, there is as much to choose as between a transcendental God, an immanent God, and Ritualism. Each satisfies a mood, a necessity at a particular stage. But a sociologist must negate his moods and know that all stages are important. The same negation of self as is prescribed by the scientist is the only remedy for the sociologist. The self of the sociologist assumes protean shapes—ethical, religious, historical, evolutionary, pseudo-scientific, and methodological. One should be very wary of these 'cultural compulsives.'

II

So far from the point of view of method as generally adopted by sociologists. But it may as well be that the method of study is all wrong, and yet, there may be a *Social Force* or a *Social Tendency*. Judging from the persistence of a particular trait, the amount of resistance and opposition an individual has to meet if he wants to modify it to suit his convenience, and the tremendous work it can do in the matter of cohesion and impulsion, it is only common sense to consider it as a force or a source of crude energy. The behaviour of the trait may be said to involve the process of its expenditure into useful energy (Ostwald). Thus, for all practical purposes, Religion or Public Opinion is a social force. Once Social Force is understood thus, it is pertinent to ask the following questions. What is the meaning of the term 'persistence'?* Is there anything like an organic memory of events?* If so, does it act as the co-ordinating, directive principle of the kaleidoscopic patterns of behaviours? Is there any unifying active principle in the diversity of behaviour? Or, is this persistence, this unity, this capacity for doing work or evoking resistance that the sociologist discovers in any Social Force, only a corollary to the notorious misconception of Time as necessity that compels succession?

We have already objected to physical analogy and the borrowing of terms from natural sciences by Sociology. But we have also mentioned that the modern developments of Physics can give Sociology a lead in the matter of a more adequate and comprehensive explanation, as well as in the matter of simpler

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relations involved in the facts of movement and persistence. The courage of the physicist in rejecting older hypotheses and being disinterested is also worthy of emulation. Besides, as the true point of view even in the psychological approach to human behaviour is psycho-somatic,¹⁰ the physico-chemical reactions of the human body acting in and through natural environments compel us to take account of modern explanations of physical phenomena. This, it must be admitted, is not 'a mere exercise in copying the latest formulæ of physics.' In any case, the answers to the questions framed above depend upon the development of explanations in modern scientific knowledge. Later on, we shall note how far even these explanations fail to explain all the ramifications of human behaviour. For, as the eminent chemist, Prof. Ostwald says, "Energetics can give to social sciences several fundamental principles, but it cannot give all the principles needed by social sciences."¹¹ Amending the above statement, we can say that modern Physics can give to Social Sciences a model of several fundamental accounts of relations, but it cannot give all the accounts of relations involved in Social Sciences.

So far as I have been able to understand the modern account of physical explanation, there is no such thing as 'persistence of a core apart from the movements of events in succession,' *i.e.*, 'from next to next.'¹² One could discover a law of succession no doubt. But there is no mysterious quality about this law. In fact, it is nothing more or less than a fact of relationship which does lead and offer clues to the calculation and prediction of succeeding events. If we examine what was once called a causal unity in a group of events, we find it to be really this association

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of events, the close connection of which is a matter of succession in space and time. Generalising from a number of such successions one could come to a law of development, which is neither a compelling agency acting from behind the scenes from a distance, nor a correlating factor that relates events distant in space and time. The only type of unity that the modern scientist can conceive is better expressed in Mr. Russell's own words: "This is the sort of picture we must have in our minds when we try to conceive the physical world. We must think of a string of events, connected together by some causal connexions, and having enough unity to deserve a single name. We then begin to imagine that the single name denotes a single 'thing,' and if the events concerned are not all in the same place, we say that the 'thing' has 'moved.' But this is only a convenient shorthand. In the cinema we seem to see a man falling off a sky-scraper, catching hold of telegraph wires, and reaching the ground none the worse. We know that, in fact, there are a number of different photographs, and the appearance of a single 'thing' moving is deceptive. In this respect, the real world resembles the 'cinema.' " This looks like a twentieth century version of 'All the world's a stage.' The notion of force is thus rejected by the theoretical physicist from his explanation of succession or persistence. "When it is said, as it often is, that 'force' belongs to the world of experience, we must be careful to understand what can be meant. In the first place, it may be meant that calculations which employ the notion of force work out right in practice. This, broadly speaking, is admitted. No one would suggest that the engineer should alter his methods, or should give up working

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out stresses and strains—the engineer is concerned with the question whether his bridge will stand; the fact of experience is that it stands (or does not stand), and the stresses and strains are only a way of explaining what sort of bridge will stand.”

This long quotation is full of lessons for the sociologist. It breathes courage into his heart to reject old explanations and accept new ones—though they are tentative. Moreover, when the sociologist conquers his inertia and musters courage to appreciate the new explanation offered by Physics (not merely borrow its terms or copy its formulæ), he will not cease to work out, as a social engineer, the operations known as social stresses and strains. Only, he will not believe in their reality as such. The suspension of belief in the reality of Religion, Tradition, or Public Opinion as Social Forces may not be compatible with actions hitherto taken on the belief in their reality. The strain involved in this mental conflict between belief and non-belief may break up any social system that the sociologist may be called upon to defend. In which case, a division of the subject into Theoretical, and Practical, Applied, or Technical Sociology is eminently desirable. The present division is not what we mean. The pity of the present situation is that the social engineer is either oblivious of new ideas, or dismisses them as novel and impracticable. If an electrician were to remain long in that condition by ignoring or condemning recent knowledge about the nature of electrical phenomena, he would be disqualified from undertaking important works. Yet, human affairs are more momentous than anything else, and even the theoretical sociologist is hugging the nineteenth century notions of Social Forces as something real. The result has been disastrous to human

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welfare. The amount of false propaganda that people in power start and the practical sociologists maintain to consolidate their own position is an instance of the social engineer's blind faith in the reality of Social Forces. Patriotism is a Force, the administrator operates the Force to make citizens kill one another, and the sociologist writes on the role of conflict in an 'objective' manner. Religion is a Force, the priests manipulate it for preaching communal hatred, and the sociologist writes voluminous treatises on Religion as a Force affecting group-life. Public Opinion is another Force, the Press-capitalists exploit it for nefarious purposes, the sociologist writes on the influence of Public Opinion upon the actions of the Public. I am sure that if the social engineer had received less support from the theoretical sociologist, the vigour of war-enthusiasm, communal or class-hatred would have abated to a considerable extent. It is the task of the theoretical sociologist to make the people in power agnostic. If he fails to do so, he betrays the cause of intellect.¹³

There is one point, however, in Mr. Russell's analysis at which a theoretical sociologist naturally halts. I mean the cinematic point of view. Yet, if there is no way out of it, as Watson's sociologist disciple may say, no sacrifice is too great for science, not even the faith in some unity towards which the diversity of phenomena studied in science gravitates. Mechanical analogy is untrue, but the fear of being called mechanical is a childish fear. Yet, childish fear is a feeling to which all are susceptible. Hence it is that the modern sociologist is seeking new affiliations. Mr. Russell's account is frankly associationistic. The perception of movement, for the Associationist, is a summation of

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sensations, but the summation cannot explain the continuity of the movement. The real trouble with the associationistic explanation is that it postulates different centres for the production of specific sensation-quality. But this postulate has been experimentally proved to be wrong.¹⁴

It is just possible that the new move is prompted by a perception of the difference between a physical and a psychological event, a genuine desire to appreciate the complexity of human motives, and an appreciation of the difficulty in measuring them by any unit of force. It may as well be that the sociologist has come to hear of a hitherto unanalysed nucleus of the atom, and of a certain substratum of personality¹⁵ to which the dissociated parts resolve or ultimately conform. It may be that he has empirically come to realise the difference between psychological unity which may be a fact, and a mere causal unity (as in physical explanation) which is always a fiction. It is quite likely that he has been affected by theories of the Gestalt School in Psychology, or of engrams in Biology. In a hurry to avoid the blame of being called mechanical or materialistic, he has accepted the idea of a persistent psychological unity, or what comes to the same thing, of a single or a group of subjective drives, (like instincts, impulses, ideas, emotions, residues, interests, needs, wishes, libido, and the like) operating like force in Physics, but under different names.

One more important reason for the change in the angle of vision may be indicated. The latter part of the Nineteenth Century was in the grip of theories of Evolution. Thinkers vied with one another in applying the so-called laws of Evolution to all possible domains of knowledge, even in the minutest

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details. Mechanics began to be displaced by Biology from the heart of the people. Society was compared to an organism, and the individual could alone be understood in relation to the society of which he formed a part. The insistence on the body as a physiological organism, and the fact of interdependence implied in the idea of organism itself, led to important results in theoretical and applied sciences, the significance of which is not yet fully comprehended. The body of the individual (and naturally the mind, another organic unity, by analogy, if not by objective study) was considered to be merely a *function* of the physical and psychological environment, of all that is implied by the term society. But with the accumulation of new facts and by stricter analyses it was found out that the body (the mind as well) is like the *karta* of the Hindu Joint-family, a trustee of the sacred cell-property to hand it down to posterity.¹⁶ The environment assumed less importance. Lamarck became out of date, Weisman became fashionable. The sociologist turned his attention from his geographical studies and associationistic psychology to the study of race and vitalistic psychology.¹⁷ It was at this juncture that the cult of racial superiority was started, and terms from Psychology began to be borrowed. For obvious reasons, the terms were those of vitalism. That was the bank which offered the largest credit to the borrower. Vitalism was based on Lamarckian evolutionary biology. Sociology was an upstart science as yet. Vitalism was the first and the inevitable reaction to the mechanical point of view; and it sought to interpret life as a going concern without looking deeply into its foundations. So did Sociology. It had just discovered that human beings, in their manifold

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activities of living, should form the subject-matter of Sociology, and consequently, Psychology would be its natural ally, instead of Physics. The sociological counterpart of Life-Force became 'Interests' in the hands of Profs. Small and Ratzenhofer. The interests are 'the last term in the analysis of social phenomena.' 'They are lodged in the individual,' and 'Social Forces are personal influences passing from person to person and producing activities that give content to the association.'¹⁸ Small's reduction of the life-process, individual or social, to 'interests' as 'unsatisfied conditions of living demanding fulfilment' *i.e.*, fulfilment and adjustment, and indicating 'the predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realise the indicated condition' is too well-known a piece of sociological analysis to need a summary. Prof. Small, with such affiliations, could only understand interests thus. Primarily an individualist, he retained his own and strengthened his followers' faith in the 'presence,' the 'action,' the 'real content' of Social Forces. In the prevalent state of knowledge, he could not do otherwise. But knowledge has increased since then, and Vitalism has been found out.¹⁹ Believing as we do in similarities in the processes of evolution of physical and mental phenomena in the early stages, their life-long interdependence and interpenetration, as well as in their noted difference in the later stages on account of the development of tools, language, and brain, *i.e.*, knowing as we do the consequent partial failure of the psycho-physical parallelism, it is impossible for us to be sure about the absolute validity of either the mechanical or the purely vitalistic point of view. If the only legitimate point of view in Psychology is psycho-somatic, then the task of the Applied Sociologist becomes reduced

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to the following of a particular method on the merits of a particular event in the matter of explaining its sociological significance. If Sociology must needs draw upon Psychology, in fact, it will have to, in any case, then will the dynamic element in the life of the community have to be understood as neither purely physical and organic, on the one hand, nor purely psychological, on the other.

It is quite clear that the greatest amount of illumination on the subject is to be expected from Psychology, and specially, from the psychology of the individual who lives in association with other individuals having more or less the same general physical and mental equipments, on the whole, but widely differing between themselves in mental tone and colour. The insistence on the individual cannot be made too often. Whether we look at experience as psychological activities of the individual, or from the point of view of the purpose of biological or social activities (which is the liberation of the individual from the thralldom of Nature and Society), we come to the conclusion that the study of Individual Psychology is more fruitful for our purpose than what is called Social Psychology. Even the study of traditions and group-behaviours, which are considered to be the special field of Social Psychology,²⁰ is incomplete without the knowledge of their connections with the mental functionings of the individual. Logically, however, the consideration of the individual as the original repository, or the embodiment of tendencies towards action, of instincts, impulses, interests, wishes, etc., is as unmaintainable as that of the individual as the end-all of Nature's behaviour. In one case, the individual resembles the pack on a horse from which any article that the pedlar has put in can

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be trotted out with flourish, and in the other, the pack-horse itself which can be led by the nose to any place desired by the sociologist. Therefore, the best thing is to take the individual actions functionally, not as the function of a constant, *viz.*, the environment or the body (the behaviouristic attitude), not even as a constant quantity and the environment including the body as function thereof (anthropomorphic attitude), but as the process of interactions between changing variables that influence one another. This means that Individual *functional* Psychology includes the study of interactions of individual minds, and never ignores the biological foundations, or parallelisms of animal organisations, wherever such exist. Where parallelisms fail, as in the matter of the individual human being's resistance to a clear-cut differentiation into a number of types, in the matter of using tools by the individual human being, his larger interests and his capacity for communication of meaning through language, the points of departure are to be noted as his peculiarities which start him on the human career. If society means the physical and the social environments, and their mutual actions through individuals, then the sociologist cannot but accept the psycho-somatic point of view in Psychology in the matter of interpreting the changing social phenomena. This point of view is mine and Dr. Bentley's,* and I make no apology for depending upon his account so closely.

* 'The Field of Psychology' by Dr. Bentley is a highly critical, up-to-date, and rigorously scientific treatise in so far as its reasoning and conclusions are based upon experimental observations. Besides, it is not an ambitious book that wants to comprehend all knowledge under the term Psychology.

III

From what we know of the mental processes of the individual, we can say, at the first instance, that specific responses are assembled into patterns by needs. As there is no unit of behaviour that we can lay our finger on, this assemblage assumes importance. If there are no needs, past or present, strong or weak, the individual, be he a Pavlov's dog, a Watson's child, or a Kohler's ape, will not respond to any conditioning. Of course, the stimulus has to be repeated—the number and degree of the repetition depending upon the character of the need, its urgency or otherwise, and the nervous organisation, its complexity or attunement (*stimmung*). As a result of the repetition, the response often dispenses with one stimulus, as in conditioned reflexes or responses. Still, the conditioned response is related to the need, though indirectly, by association. Now that the nucleus of a primary pattern is created it gathers other patterns created in a similar way by slightly different needs. This weaving of patterns is done by what is known as 'selection and association by the dominant need.' Such is the simplest account of the preliminary organisation of experience.²¹ A more detailed account is necessary.²²

There are certain organisations which take place, primarily, though not solely, under the influence of a stimulus from outside. There are quite a large number of organisations which are built up, primarily, though not solely, under central control of the brain. There cannot be any clear-cut division between one type of organisation and another. In one case, the

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receptors influence the organisation more than the brain, in the other case, the brain is more important than the receptors. In between these types, there are various shades of organisation of experience where the respective contributions of the central nervous system, on the one hand, and of the external stimuli through the receptors, on the other, to the organisation of experience are not grossly unequal in importance. This classification is supported by the findings of experimental psychology. If we further subdivide the first type of organisation, that which is termed primarily under stimulus of the environment, we find that one type is primarily qualitative in its plan, as the effect of hearing a note or a chord, another is temporal, as the effect of hearing a melody, and yet another is extensive, as that of looking at a picture or a map. The characteristic features of stimuli are mode, intensity, extent, and temporal course. One mode of the stimulus leads to the fusion-type of organisation, a type in which the individual part is submerged in the unity. The visual and tactual stimuli do not operate in this way, but in musical experience there are numerous instances of the qualitative-fusion type of organisation. The second attribute of the stimuli, intensity, is responsible for the degree of organisation by making some factor more important than others. The way in which stimuli are arranged in space determines the extensive type of organisation, as that created by looking at a picture. Once experience is thus organised, the different arrangements offer settings to different meanings. A particular extension in space supplies one type of meaning, as of the picture. As soon as the meaning-stage arrives, the central nervous system becomes the hero, and the stimuli recede into the back-

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ground. This is the significance of the statement that the individual creates meaning. The temporal factor in ~~this setting works~~ rather mysteriously; possibly for the reason that in experimental psychology it is rather difficult to have a space-time stimulus, and the two stimuli are separated for purposes of convenience. In reality, as it has been known recently, the two are inseparable, at least in the majority of cases. "All that we can say is that there is some kind of unity in a tonal group which is most possibly responsible for the unique type of fusional experience it generates. Experiments on the effects of music show that within limits, the longer the periodic recurrence of stimulus continues, the closer is the integration and the greater the individuality and the meaning of the rhythmic object." In other words, if the notes and chords are struck at sufficiently distant intervals and the periodic recurrence of intervals broken, then the character of the melody changes fundamentally. The melodic air thus can be taken as a unity as well as a series of different notes and chords running a temporal course, in one case, 'a temporal interpenetration,' and in the other, 'a temporal disjunction.' In the matter of hearing and smelling, the organisation is not of the spatial-extensive type, but of the qualitative-fusion type, mainly because of the situation of the receptors in comparatively inaccessible places. In the matter of vision and touch, however, the organs are spread 'in a mosaic form over the retina and the skin.' For this there is a closer correspondence between stimuli and arrangement of experience. The relation between stimuli and responses is not, however, identical with the relation that exists in the primary form of organisation, whichever it might be, fusionary, ligatory or interpenetrative. There are

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certain movements the perception of which cannot be explained in terms of the stimulus-response formula of the orthodox behaviourist. The receptors play their part, but the part played by the brain is equally important, if not more so. One part of the response is initiated by the brain and is worked out through muscles and tendons, yet another part is 'by way of sensimaginal processes centrally aroused.' There is quite a large number of such experiences, even of the primary kind, where 'the central contribution is, in fact, double.'

So far about the organisation of experience through sensations. The tendinous strain noticed above becomes more prominent in another class of organisation—of the affective type. The role of affects in the organisation of behaviour-patterns is not easy to detect, though 'their presence or absence adds to, detracts from, or otherwise fundamentally changes the nature of experience.' For the time being, they may be left at the capacity for suffusion. These affects determine values. The affects, as such, do not organise themselves into experience, but utilise, suffuse, or colour sensations and images to form different incorporations. The third type of qualitative organisation relates to images. In so far as it does not primarily depend upon the relation between stimuli and responses, it is better to call it a secondary incorporation. The importance of the central initiative and control is of course greater here than anywhere.

Generally, the qualitative, temporal, and extensive types of incorporations coalesce to form the perception of movement. At other times, they fuse into a unity. Besides these, there are loose confederations forming 'one ligated mass of experience.' In the matter of the above primary type, it is well to remember that

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the brain is seldom idle. Even in the most rudimentary process of incorporation (say the physical, which can be explained by the stimulus-response formula), 'the kinæsthetic factor involved in the tendinous pull is to a great extent dependent on central initiative and control.' The tendinous pull is not to be understood in terms of mechanical physiology, as a *mere* accumulation of the residues of bodily movements. In the second type of qualitative organisation, an analysis of affective trends shows the contribution of the centre. In the secondary incorporations, it is only natural that the contribution of the centre is greater and more manifest through willing, memorial train, purpose and meaning. "The brain is the seat of all trends."²³ The secondary incorporations are real incorporations, but they are one removed from the external stimuli, from the simple stimulus-receptor correspondence. They do not cease to be potent for this removal, none the less. The difference is in the matter of references. The total image may serve as the stage for memorial and imaginal processes, and for general reference as opposed to particular reference denoting an object. With these differences, the secondary incorporations are charged with meaning. Images may be formed into a constellation, a ligation, or a unity. In some cases of image-formation, 'the brain may on its own account offer surrogates for external stimuli.' But it must be noted that the 'strength of the integration of surrogate stimuli is reduced as in the decline of memorial meaning.' If the nature of memory and imagination is properly understood, *i.e.*, not as so many faculties, but as psycho-somatic functioning, then the importance of the decline in the strength of such integrations in the matter of mental development is clear. It has been

noted that there is little experimental support for separating imagination from memory. We only find 'a large number of functional gradations exhibiting many differences of location, stability, richness, associative support, temporal setting, bodily reference, affective colouring and so on.' In a perceptual train, the control is exercised by an outside agency, but in the memorial and imaginal train, the central predisposition takes the place of the outside agency. The disposition and functional tendencies carry the trains of associative tendencies of memory and imagination. Even when imagination is of a highly abstract nature, it is of great functional importance in so far as it 'removes the organism from the biographical current of events, freeing it from the limitations of times and places.'

When sense-images have been added to sensations, a new type of organisation is formed which has all the peculiarities of the primary with this difference that the brain makes a larger contribution, and the peculiarities of the secondary with this difference that it does not depend immediately upon the fulfilment of certain conditions within the cortex. In the formation of this new type, the receptor organs and the central nervous system have more or less an equal share. But this newness of integration arising after the decline in the strength of fusion, ligation, or constellation is not real, excepting in cases of real thinking, where the process is one of elaboration of topics. The novelty may be due to 'a resuscitation of the residues of thousands and thousands of antecedent functions,' so long kept in check 'by the limitations of the organism and by the amalgamation and the mutual inhibition of different residues.' The following are some of the important conditions of

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secondary and tertiary forms of integration. The first set of conditions relates to the original integration, when the functioning starts. These conditions of impression assemble the neural events in one functional and mental unity by repetition. Repetition is responsible for economy in the expenditure of nervous energy, and for a gradual consolidation and increasing clearness of meaning and retention, though it certainly leads to a deterioration in the quality of experience. The strength of impression depends, among other factors, on the length of the series, rhythm, and attention. 'Clearness, intimate segregation of processes, and the forward-running determination, all of which are aspects of sustained attention, are, when taken together, an important condition of associative integrity.' Meaning (which is not the same thing as sense indicated, say, in nonsense) is another very important condition of the formation of impression, in so far as it lends a wholeness to the different units by significance. The second set of conditions relates to the time-interval between two impressions. This interval is responsible for the facilitation of more consolidated organisation. Opinions differ about the capacity of time-interval for strengthening the central functional residues in such a way that they may persevere, revive, or preserve the bonds of incorporations intact. Experimental evidence shows the opposite effect, *viz.*, obliviscence, which certainly means a weakening of bonds, but may also mean some neural change. The secondary associations, more or less like overtones to the fundamental notes, tend to disappear after a certain interval. The interval is, however, important for explaining retro-active inhibitions, fusion or confusion, and reorganisation. So repetition and interval both

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'tend to reduce, obscure and eliminate, as well as to consolidate, the mental factors.' 'The mind suffers the same kind of eclipse' but the functional effects of these two conditions, *viz.*, repetition and interval, are certainly different. "Under repetition the bodily residues of function are somehow made cumulative and the limits for memory and understanding are extended; but with the passage of time the mental loss is symptomatic of a general functional decline. Where we say that we 'commit to memory,' we should better say that we 'commit to body.' The fact that repetition and the memorial interval alike impoverish mind but lead to opposite functional effects illustrates in a striking way the want of parallelism between experience, on the one side, and the total functional capabilities of the organism, on the other. What is primarily required of mind in matters of functional limit is meaning far more than raw quality, and more even than the organisation of qualities." The third set of conditions relates to the immediate incentives to reorganisations. In so far as stimuli to the mixed type of incorporations are concerned, it must be noted that they are fused with those functional residues of the brain present in thinking, imagination, and comprehension. The external stimuli are no substitutes for 'the sensory cues' located in the central nervous system, as the Behaviourists in their preoccupation with behaviours suppose. Even when the receptor organs are excited they function under the guidance and control of these central cues. 'The general temper of the organism' or mood furnishes another incentive to re-productive association. The third type of incentives is of course supplied by the brain. The Associationist had laid great stress on this type of

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incentives. Rejecting the idea of memory, imagination, thinking, habit, etc., simply as so many states of mind, and accepting the functional interpretation, we cannot but conclude that, somatically, the functional residues in the central nervous system form functional trends which, when very strong, leave the brain comparatively free of outside agencies; and that, psychologically, the brain organises behaviour patterns by lending them meaning and general reference. 'Although we know but little of the functions of the brain, we do have plenty of evidence that a total neural function leaves behind a total disposition or trend which tends . . . to complete itself in the old way once it is renewed. To be sure, time, conflict, and confusion are constantly setting a term to this complete renewal; but the tendency towards it is, apparently, what we discover in our associative and determining tendencies and in our topical and habitational trends.' On the reference side of mental processes Ach finds an anticipation of the coming stimulus corresponding to the determining tendency on the physical side. Muller rejects the idea of anticipation and formulates a directive idea, an idea of a goal working on a mental disposition. This important goal-idea "commands attention, it possesses 'interest,' and interest serves to lend it a stronger perseveration and a greater associative effectiveness." We do not agree either with Ach or Muller in postulating such mysterious tendencies, but it must be admitted that both lay stress on the importance of the meaning-side of the question ignored by the Behaviourist. The predicament as in emotions, the meaning-series as in perception, the topic and the novel-problem as in comprehension and thinking, all assemble relevant experience in certain groups; and

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when the groups are in line with the functional trends, they lead to performance, action or behaviour.

A few remarks about the limitations of the Behaviouristic method in the interpretation of social phenomena, specially with regard to the study of the nature of Social Forces, will not be out of place here. The work of Paylov and Sherrington is really great from the point of view of method as well as that of result. Their studies of 'conditioning,' strictly limited to the observation and measurement of objective phenomena by objective methods, have opened new vistas in psychology. And their interpretations are extremely cautious and never step beyond what is warranted by facts. They frankly do not consider the subjective phenomena which cannot be scientifically tackled, and confine themselves to those that can be. After reading their works nobody can conclude that all human behaviour is going to be explained in terms of stimulus-response or conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. Nobody is expected by them to deny the existence of the whole realm of subjective phenomena which have not yet been measured. The fact is that their studies are few in number; the more complex combinations, the subtle inter-relations of conditioning, their strength and periodicity have not been measured and studied as yet. Leaving the highly technical works of Pavlov and Sherrington aside, there are numerous writers who would apply the well-known formulæ to every conceivable phenomenon and claim to have explained everything by them. They go beyond explanation. They can produce geniuses if children are left in their hands from a very early stage. Those social psychologists who swear by the behaviouristic explanation do not philosophise, of course, but they do introduce

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subjective forces like desires, wishes, volitions, sentiments into the 'chain of trans-subjective phenomena'.²⁴ In other words, they surreptitiously introduce what they had been compelled to take away by the fashion of being scientific. Without the keys of terms well-known to us it is impossible to understand their hieroglyphs.²⁵ Even when the language of such pseudo-behaviourists has the appearance of extreme caution it is easy to detect the terminology of the introspective method.²⁶ Even in the use of such terms as attitude, desire, symbolic stimuli, psycho-social pattern of behaviour, one can detect 'introspection,' which alone can charge them with meaning. Otherwise, these terms are redundant and tautological. And this is the main charge against such pseudo-scientific interpretations. "Meaning is generally indescribable in the terminology of strict behaviourism, because meaning is not a trans-subjective or overt phenomenon which may be observed in a change of muscles, or glands or nervous system. A 'behaviourist net' cannot catch 'meaning' at all, as a unit of weight cannot be used to measure space."²⁷ But, as we know, the reference side is as important to truth as the physical. So, in any case, cautious experiments, few as they are in number and limited as they are in scope, do not supply the sociologist with as many formulæ as he would want in order to explain the infinitely greater complexity, subtler movement and more potential directions of human beings. (The rasher explanations explain more than what is wanted.) The trends seated in the cortex, the selectiveness of the central nervous system, no less than the trains, fusions, ligations of experience by meaning, especially in the secondary and tertiary types of incorporations of experience, are,

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at least, as important a series of phenomena in the determination of the nature and the reason for such changes which have been so long mysteriously explained by Social Forces as is another simpler series which can be interpreted by the stimulus-response formula. The affective unity and suffusion, the apprehensive integrity, the cortical integration, selection, guidance and control, the emotional unity around predicaments, the elaboration of a problem, the architectural or formal unity of certain experiences, the sensimaginal forwardness, the memorial and imaginal trends, and the functional residues are a vast field of observation badly or only extensively cultivated by the behaviourist. Yet, these are facts about the dynamic nature of human experience. How is this dynamic nature explained by the behaviourist? Generally, he ignores it, for his vision is cross-sectional. But when his vision is wider, the explanation is by a mystic factor, *viz.*, purpose. All behaviour, according to the behaviourist, is purposive; each pattern is ruled by a dominant interest; each interest is, in final analysis, created by a bodily need. The next question is—if all behaviour is purposive, when and how is the selection of patterns made? The answer is—one selection takes place in the afferent course of the impulse, and another in the reception-centres of the cerebral cortex, as a result of which operation, certain stimuli '*somehow* over-ride others'. When a reflex is continued, we can assume that a selection has taken place. Once this preliminary sorting has taken place, the reception-apparatus recognises certain patterns as 'a lock recognises its key.' A secondary selection of the incoming impulses is made by the sensory co-ordination centres. The higher association-areas select from out of the products

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of the lower co-ordination centres. Once this is done, a general reference ensues. The repetition of certain co-ordinations leads to retention. Hence memory is selective. No behaviourist, be it noted, would take either the stimulus or the response as an independent factor, with the result that the causal relation is not recognised. This is of course understandable. But is it not tantamount to a mere statement of the fact that there is selection under a dominant interest which is a more or less set complex of stimulus-response? Is it not equating explanation with a statement? Barring possibly the reflex-centres, all the other responsive centres, like the receptors, the sensory co-ordination centres and higher association-areas, are concerned with the totality of a situation. If that is so, then the analysis of mental process has a limit, and there can be no logical objection to the main point of view of the Gestalt school which starts from the total situation, though objections may be raised to some of its explanations and accounts. If Behaviourism fails to be a complete account of all the mental processes, common sense would dictate us to arrive at a compromise between behaviouristic and structural interpretations—the former for ordinary actions, and the latter for actions of the higher association areas. This compromise is *entirely tentative* on account of our lack of knowledge of the activities of the brain on which so much of human behaviour depends.²⁸

It is quite clear from the above review that the predisposition of the organism, be it hereditary, functional, neural or cerebral, is not considered by the behaviourist to be at all important. The fact is that organic predisposition (if not organic memory) vitiates the 'one to one correlation between stimulus and response.' Then, the brain cannot be considered

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to be merely a sieve, it is 'the seat of functional trends.' Repetition does not always 'lengthen the memorial train; more often than not, it leads to mental impoverishment, a decay in the strength of impression and the incorporations of experience.' It is also a fact, verified by experiments, that motor-outlets are blocked, emotional outbursts 'destroy,' instead of 'completing the action-determination.' In the matter of reference, the position is that 'the selected and co-ordinated movement or movement-train resulting from specific central determination, completes the executive function; but it is the determination and not primarily the resulting movement which informs the action with meaning.' Finally, we cannot hold, in the light of experiments, that all functionings (as for example memory or perception) would always be charged with meaning or lead to action.

IV

So, from our point of view, it is easy to detect not only the defects of behaviouristic interpretations but of many other schools as well. Some initial push behind mental activities is posited by all. McDougall calls it *instincts*, and Shand, *sentiments*, Small calls it *interests*. Freud, Jung, Adler play on the variations of the *libido*, Id, Sex, Ego, etc., Holt and Thomas' term is *wish* or *desire*. Park's term is *attitude*.²⁹ All these terms have certain common features. They do not exactly signify what was once known as 'subjective' phenomena, but they represent 'subjective-objective' operations or tendencies to action. These representations of tendencies to action are all lodged in individuals, or operate through them, as Ward first recognised. As they are communicable, they are *social* Forces. This is the common argument. The most important similarity in the uses of such terms consists in the emphasis on the active, *i.e.*, the dynamic, as opposed to the content-side of mental operations. Naturally, the biological and motor aspects, *i.e.*, the considerations of life as a going concern, (chiefly understood in terms of the human body acting as an instrument in the hands of Nature to work out its purpose,) assume prominence in these interpretations. Such diverse schools of thought as those of McDougall and Freud, Park and Small are brought together by the common fallacies of (i) considering the name for the thing itself, and (ii) of biological teleology, which first considers one activity of nature as the only activity and then describes it as a deep design working itself out. In

other words, the interpretation in terms of design, the key-formula to which is only in their hands, draws them together. A touch of nature makes the whole world akin. A few examples will be given. Park³⁰ defines *attitude* as 'the tendency of the person to reach positively or negatively to the total situation.' Accordingly, 'attitudes may be defined as the mobilisation of the will of the person.' 'Attitudes are mobilisations and organisation of the wishes with reference to definite situations.' Then again, 'The clearest way to think of attitudes is as behaviour patterns or units of behaviour.' We know, however, that wishes may be the same but attitudes may be different, (for a total situation may arise out of interpenetration of two or more wishes) just as wishes may be different and attitudes similar. Wishes may be positive but attitudes may be negative. Besides, if attitudes are primary facts, how can they be split up into wishes? And wishes are more than one. Holt³¹ analyses *wishes* from the point of view of 'organisation around the pivotal outer object,' and concludes that wishes are the same thing as 'accumulated specific responses.' 'An exact definition of the 'wish' is that it is a course of action which some mechanism is set to carry out, whether it does so or does not. All emotions, as well as the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, are separable from the wishes, and this precludes any thought of a merely hedonistic psychology. The wish is any purpose or project from a course of action, whether it is being merely entertained by the mind or is being actually executed—a distinction which is really of little importance. We shall do well if we consider this to be, as in fact it is, dependent on a motor attitude of the physical body, which goes over into overt action

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and conduct when the wish is carried into execution.' 'This so-called wish becomes the unit of psychology, replacing the older unit commonly called 'sensation,' which latter, it is to be noted, was a content of consciousness unit, whereas the wish is a more dynamic affair.' Again, 'it is a course of action with regard to the environment which the machinery of the body is capable of carrying out. This capacity resides clearly in the parts of which the body consists and in the way in which these are put together, not so much in the matter of which the body is composed, as in the forms which this matter assumes when organised.' W. I. Thomas' classification of wishes into the desire for security, for new experience, recognition and response has been highly useful in studying emigrants and Polish peasants, but his analysis of wishes is unsatisfactory. In one place, wish is equated to desire, and at another, to value. The positive or negative character of wishes is determined by their arrangement, and 'the individual's attitude towards the totality of his attitudes constitutes his conscious personality.' Prof. Small, as has been noted above, prefers to call interests as the final term in social analysis. They stand behind desires even. One more quotation from him will not be out of place in this connexion with personality. The interests are 'affinities, latent in persons, pressing for satisfaction, whether the persons are conscious of them either generally or specifically, or not; they are indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realising their personality.' 'Interests are merely specifications in the make-up of the personal units.'³²

/ Enough quotation has been given to show the nature of Social Forces as understood by eminent

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sociologists of recent times. Desires, attitudes, interests are put into the human being to be brought out to explain any conduct. They are terms only. Even as terms, they confuse content with the process. Interpreted functionally, interest, or wish, or desire is a liberation of human energy, a specific response. As Ogden has said, 'Interest is not something additional to or behind activity, but just the activity itself.'³³ If an interest be an unconscious motive as well as a conscious end of behaviour at one and the same time, then it is nothing more and nothing less than the liberation of human energy, which, of course, is not uniform. Pieron would agree with this conclusion. He understands interest as 'the manifestation of the intervention of affective phenomena and tendencies, and varies as one or other of these tendencies predominates. An action may arouse in me keen interest, but this will suddenly disappear when the uneasiness of expectation polarises all my mental activity towards the passing moment.' In short, these explanations of Social Forces can alone be understood in terms of behaviour, stimuli and responses; in fact, they are camouflaged behaviourism. Naturally, the defects of behaviouristic explanation are present here, but not the merits thereof.

For aught we know, the same defects of logical inadequacy, arising out of insufficiency or over-sufficiency, appear in psycho-analytic interpretations of social behaviour. The dynamic terminology of psycho-analysts does not exonerate them from the defect of mechanical explanations. To posit a reservoir of energy, the libido, and then describe its purposive action in the liberation process, *i.e.*, for preservation of race (Freud), individual self-adjustments (Jung), or compensation for actual or alleged inferiority

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(Adler) does not throw more light on the problem than Small's interests, Park's attitude, Thomas' wishes. One may extend the net and include Gault's explanation by complexes and drives, Tarde's imitation, Sidis' suggestion, and even Gidding's³⁴ intelligence 'appearing between conflict and social engineering in the course of the telic process.' Such classificatory analyses are only of secondary importance so far as the subject is concerned.

The instinctivist school, as represented by McDougall and Shand, is no more enlightening on the subject. McDougall's theory of sentiments as Social Forces suffers from the common defects of such classification and definition, except in one important point, where he admits the mixture of instinctive dispositions.³⁵ His classification of sentiments into the concrete particular, appearing in the child, the concrete general appearing next, and the abstract sentiments appearing last, are 'too good for human nature's daily food.' The repeated excitation of a 'concrete particular sentiment' need not always develop into 'the concrete general sentiment,' the nervous energy may disperse as well, in fact does disperse in the course of repetition taking the concreteness away. An emotion, pace Mr. Shand, may mean only a register of some experience and nothing more. Repeated registrations of an emotion may lead to its persistence, form into a convention or habit without a corresponding increase in the nervous energy that is involved in action-determination. It may harden into an attitude, it may disappear. If attitude is a unit of behaviour, or a behaviour pattern, then the logical conclusion of McDougall and Shand's position would be to lean on behaviourism ultimately. Then, McDougall calls the growth of sentiment as the organisation of the

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affective and conative life. He rightly believes in emotional dispositions. There are affective tendencies which must be understood along with other operations of the association areas and other functions of the brain. These affective tendencies are *not* to be separated from cortical functionings. The chemical actions operating through the vascular tracts are equally to be considered in connection with the study of emotional dispositions. Besides, it is not clear whether the latter are functionings of the whole organism with reactive powers of their own, directing or being directed by the association-areas, or not. Is there any correspondence between the co-ordination of the nervous system and the biological unity of the organism? If so, what is the degree or strength of correspondence or connexion between the two? Is the unity of the nervous system or of the organism nothing but the unity of the affective tendency or the emotional disposition? Again, should we separate thinking from the latter? These are only some of the important questions which are left unsolved by Mr. McDougall and his school in the analysis of Social Forces.

Another serious defect of the instinctivist school consists in the unauthentic classification of instincts.³⁶ There is always the need for some classification, but any classification to suit the needs of a particular system will not do. Such a classification suggests a hierarchy, an *order* of instincts or emotions which is dictated by non-scientific predilections. The lowest and the primary instincts or emotions are the bodily ones, *i.e.*, those prompted by the bodily needs, the highest among them are the non-physical ones (the so-called instinct of workmanship, for example), which control by symbols the other urges, making

them lose their immediacy and urgency in the processes of absorption, co-ordination, inhibition, canalisation, projection, rationalisation, sublimation, or, negatively, by dissipation. The only sense of the terms 'higher and lower' involved in the use of the word hierarchy is of course in terms of the enrichment of meaning, comprehensiveness, generality, and sometimes the piquancy of reference. The increasing cortical domination through symbolic meaning is a fact, as much a fact as the urgency of immediate needs of the body which may be said to supply the energy for the movement in behaviour. In the organisation of a large number of incorporations of the secondary and mixed types, the contributions of the body and the mind are intermingled. One fact is as important as another, if references are the same; if they are different, the question of values comes in. This reference-side of the problem does not receive adequate treatment in the hands of the instinctivist, though such a treatment can be expected of him in the light of his habit of classification and ordering. As a natural corollary to this defect, the question of selection in patterns of behaviour is answered unsatisfactorily. If selection is a physiological business, then McDougall's theory will have to be based on Jennings's trial and error method. Yerkes' 'ideative behaviour' and 'associative registration of experience' 'do bring about an economy in the trial and error method' again, but they do not follow from McDougall's analysis. There is no sign of even the role and play of intelligence (Claparde's 'technique of attempts at reaction') by which a representative adaptation or some sort of prevision may take the place of trial and error method. And finally, McDougall's analysis of the modification of instincts by

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emotions in the creation of sentiments is incomplete. It will not do to consider the emotional dispositions as the storehouse of the energy for Social Forces. They are liberations of energy round a predicament modifiable by the incorporations of experience effected by the co-ordination centres of the association-areas of the brain. Without accepting Pieron's³⁷ arguments for distinguishing the 'palæo-mental affective' tendencies from the 'neo-mental intellectual' trends in the matter of determination of the means of action and explanation of the processes of selection and direction of behaviour-patterns, it is perfectly legitimate to assert that intellect has a very important role to play in such matters, in so far as the affective trends are inextricably mingled with other cortical operations. The question of identity between the biological unity and the psychological unity does not arise here.

Before we close, the abiding element of truth in a suggestive and popular interpretation, *viz.*, that of Fouillee³⁸ by 'ideas' should be discovered. His use of the term 'idea' is so vague and so apt to be confused with popular misconceptions that, like any other such psychological formula, it either explains too much or too little. He assumes, at one moment, a mind that is blank, at another, a mind that is an arena of conflict. He explains the action of the diving rod, table-turning, thought-reading, hypnosis, auto-suggestion, fixed-idea or monomania, language with its catch-words and formulas, and all moral and social changes by the driving force of ideas. Much water has run down the bridge since the days of Fouillee. A recognition of the existence of such facts as the state of consciousness of a problem (Aufgabe), and a state of awareness (Bewusstheit), a kind of 'imageless presentations of a knowledge-content', a clearer understanding of the

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connection between idea and action, the numerous instances of inhibition blocking the motor-outlets, 'the exhaustion or at least the transformation of neural currents,' the emotional outbursts 'destroying, instead of completing the action determination' make us very suspicious of Fouillee's dynamogeny. If ideas spring from the brain, as they are supposed to be, then the brain is a 'half-way station between stimulation and movement,' for which, however, there is no strong support from experiments. Logically, too, ideas have a reference-aspect as distinguished from the vital, indicatory and motor aspects. In spite of all this, Fouillee has been responsible for the fruitful idea of perseveration and perseverative tendencies which reinforce mental residues from time to time. It may be noted here that this idea is the kernel of organic memory.³⁹ The cerebral engrams spontaneously bring about imaginal processes that develop into memory 'under favourable circumstances.' It is clear that once the memorial process is initiated it will go on by virtue of the energy supplied by the body and the meaning supplied by co-ordination and other factors. Even then, the theory of perseveration or organic memory has to depend on congenial situation to start the memorial operations. Organic memory, in fact, is the reinforcement and facilitation (by repetition of experiences giving greater and easier evocative power) of the passage of the nervous impulse along certain paths, the greater facilitation in evocative power being favoured by congenial situation.

V

We have already remarked briefly on the errors of those who study facts, deduce a concept therefrom, give it a name and call it a Social Force, and then identify the facts studied as the manifestation of the same Social Force. So, from the logical point of view of Theoretical Sociology, the concept of Social Force is false. For the Applied Sociologist and the social engineer, the concept may or may not be useful. Even then, in the absence of any unit, the calculations are sure to be wrong and vitiated. Force, if the word is to be used at all, is to be used neither as a series of stimuli, nor as a series of responses, but in the sense of dynamic relationships between them; which relationships are directed by the predisposition of the responding organism, the affective trends, and the meaning or reference of the organisation. In this sense, there is no need for classifying forces as subjective or objective, individual or social, biological and environmental, for both sides of the question are included in the fact of dynamic relationship. Therefore, the individual is not to be taken as either a storehouse or a centre of the field of forces where the lines intersect. About the other idea of Force, *viz.*, causal compulsion, it may be said that causal relationship does not enter into quite a large number of incorporations of stimuli and responses. 'The relationship is not so constant and uniform as to be reducible to an action.'

Yet, there is a kind of uniformity in the physiologic process, though not exactly leading to an identical uniformity in the psychological counterpart. The affective tendencies, the tendinous pulls and other

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physiological trends are important co-ordinating and directing agencies. Even in thinking, *i.e.*, in the mental processes using symbols, there is not always the causal compulsion, the play of tendencies having their origin in the affective 'judgments of value' being apparent. 'Affective processes and associative processes are closely intermingled, and in the higher emotions, very complex intellectual data mingle with affective impressions.' 'In any case, whether we seek to reduce them to something else, the directive tendencies of activities and of organic behaviour are data which cannot be neglected in the study of mental functioning.' What the reflex does for a short time in a particular way by particular mechanisms, the affective tendencies do for a much longer time in a more generalised way through the association-area of the brain; which means a stabler and more persistent total activity. By repetition, the activity is codified into habit. Memory⁴⁰ or retention, the totality of the situation of present experience, the affective tendencies and the organic state, all favour or oppose movement along habitual tracts. Naturally, heredity, (not the hide-bound deterministic heredity, but the heredity of science that works very slowly, silently, and inevitably through racial, cellular, and possibly, temperamental factors, that is susceptible to slow change, and that differs in sociological effects from acquired characters chiefly from the point of view of time) is a highly important factor here. If all these favour movement along certain cerebral tracts, the responses become automatic. This is how the spontaneousness of *a social force* is to be appreciated. The spontaneity or automatic nature of habits means not only the expenditure of energy but its preservation to oppose the formation of new habits

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and experiences. This conflict between old habits and new experiences shows the nature of judgment or valuation.

So, if the essential thing in social analysis is the factorial description of an event, then Social Force has been analysed. The factors are, (1) perseveration, (2) affective dispositions, trends and many types of associative incorporations, (3) meaning, and (4) the most important of all, the interplay of all the above factors. An orthodox sociologist would hold, however, that the role of society in the make-up of the above factors is very important, and therefore, if not for anything else, the concept of Social Force is logically tenable. Thus, in the first place, it may be held that in so far as social life means the psychological environment of the individual, it influences his cortical activities. But there is a deplorable lack of physiological evidence to prove any corresponding changes in the cortical structure of the individual from the beginning of civilised social life. If purely psychological evidences are to be trusted, it may be said that such changes have set the stage of social life. It is clear that the social environment must pass through the brain in some form or other in order that it may produce a momentum. And here, it is the environment that has changed. The brain remaining what it is, no wonder that the affective trends remain what they were; which possibly accounts for the persistence of so many of Prof. Small's interests, McDougall's instincts and sentiments, Holt and Thomas' wishes, Fouillee's ideas, or Park's attitudes. Secondly, it may be held that as there have been important changes in the nature of social life, social affects and sentiments, as are evident from the fundamental differences in the mentality of the primitive

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and the civilised man, a proper understanding of these social changes would show the necessity of formulating the concept of Social Force. But we know that Prof. Levy-Bruhl's theory is untenable in the light of new facts collected by Rivers and Malinowsky.⁴¹ Levy-Bruhl's law of contradiction is a generalisation from an imperfect understanding of the connotations of certain words. Thus the word 'TOA' does not signify only the dead, but the dying and the living old as well. Similarly, his law of participation, by which the part acquires the property of the whole by mere participation, is not a generalisation suited to the supposed pre-logical state of mind, but perfectly applicable to many attitudes characteristic of modern civilised life as well. Prof. Lowie's query, 'Are we civilised?' has more than often an answer in the negative. Another argument for the logicity of the concept of Social Force may be advanced by those who believe that what is true of the biological world is also true of the social world, *i.e.*, the individual repeats the mental make-up and tendencies of the race. They may take their stand on Piaget's findings⁴² of the child's world and his language, and point out that human beings in their childhood have no sense of significant relationship existing between ideas and ideas, or things and things, and place them side by side (law of syncretism); and that they are apt to generalise from one example (law of transduction); but that, later on, they develop the sense of intricate relationship and become scientifically careful about generalisation from one particular, chiefly through living in association. Therefore it may be concluded that as society forces this change, there is Social Force. If we analyse this argument⁴³ we will find that the a-logicity of the child (who is supposed to correspond to the

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pre-social being) is an exaggeration arising from 'the over-valuation of the verbal expression as a measure of thinking,' and from 'an exaggerated view of the logicity of adult thought.'⁴⁴ It may as well be that Prof. Piaget committed the same mistakes as Prof. Levy-Bruhl did in trying to fix a large number of ideas with different shades in one term of common parlance. It may also be that the ego-centricity is a remnant of the bad training of parents and nurses. Besides, an adult is very often childish in Prof. Piaget's sense. If Prof. Burt's statement that there is 'no evidence of any specific process of thought that could not be performed by a child of seven' is true, and true it is, then the main structure of the last argument falls to the ground.

Therefore, there is no necessity for postulating the concept of 'Social' Force even from the psycho-social point of view, *i.e.*, even when psychological changes undergone by an individual are too prominent and supposed to be due to society. But the individual is always living in association with other individuals, and as such he has been studied.⁴⁵ Thus the social factor may be said to be already involved in each term, in each factor, and in each activity of the cortex. The word 'social' in the term Social Force does not mean a new factor which disturbs the analysis. This discussion does not mean that social interests, social sentiments and attitudes are not to be treated as facts. They are facts to be recognised by the social engineer; but for the Theoretical Sociologist, they are elements which go to make up the different factors in the movement initiated by the cortex.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CONTROL

I

Usually, the problems of social control are raised by interested people to be solved by themselves in their own interests. Hence the shelving of the real issue, which is the development of Personality, behind an elaborate technique of control. In the 'Brave New World,' social suggestion and conditioning may be perfected, yet the problems remain unsolved. Control presupposes (1) the necessity for order, (2) a particular controlling authority which has its own scheme of order implicitly believed in by itself, and (3) an active accommodation, or passive and indifferent acceptance by the majority of the section controlled. By 'social' control is meant a clear and immediate identification of the interests of the controlling section with the good of society as a whole. The interests are to be manifest in action and not in manifestoes alone. The identification may be forced by power, gathered by prestige, or accepted by accommodation.¹ When it is forced, the necessity for order seems to be permanent; when it is earned by prestige, the necessity is as long as the prestige continues; when it is generated by active accommodation, the necessity is subservient to the principle of growth. The controlling authority, either the militarist or the priestly class, the capitalist or the communist, each has a scheme for ordering, the main virtue of which seems to be the perpetuation of its own power. The extent to which the scheme enlists support depends (1) upon the help of the experts who frame it, the advertisers who push it, and the priests and the paid intellectuals who bless

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it, and (2) on the forced or a lazy absence of any alternative scheme before the people who are controlled. The faith in the impeccability of the scheme is based upon self-interest of the group in power, and bolstered up by traditional religion, conservative scholarship, and a servile Press. The faith first spreads through secondary service to people who are just outside the inner circle and expect to come in.² Then it diffuses among people who are outside it and left to pursue the smooth tenor of existence undisturbed. The faith in *the* order as the natural system of the universe, in whichever way it may be generated, by reward or punishment, imposition or diffusion, flourishes in an intellectually rarefied atmosphere of suggestibility and imitation.³ More often than not, the radiation of the faith is a function of illiteracy, callousness, and an absence of *civic sense*. It is only when the order is being perpetually modified by the needs of individual development that there is a chance for faith being substituted by civic sense. By which is meant an active participation by each individual in the common or public life, an exercise of the right to take continuous initiative in its furtherance and enrichment. This is the sine qua non of active accommodation.⁴ There is no question of loyalty or disloyalty to any group, big or small, involved here. In other words, the end of social control is the development of civic sense. As active participation in the 'public world' is inconceivable without a clear comprehension of the personal values of what Hogben calls the private world;⁵ and in so far as it is personality that creates values, distinguishes right from wrong, selects the essential from the non-essential, lends meaning to ideas and events, and establishes a hierarchy of values, the

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problem of social control is ultimately one of an exercise of the sovereignty of personality. This sovereignty need not be monistic, like that of Austin's, in another sphere; it need not be historical, like that of Savigny; it need not be pluralistic, like that of Maitland and Cole; yet it may be all these and something more. That extra-element is *probably* a spiritual one.⁶ In any case, the pertinent question is loyalty to personality, an indifference to the culture of which leaves the problem of social control unsolved and perpetuates any scheme for social control that happens to be there without reference to the party controlled.

For an Indian sociologist, there are two schemes of social control imaginable. One is of class, of the Western type, and the other is of caste, of the Hindu type.⁷ Both have become rigid. In the former case, deliberate attempt is being made to change the existing order and substitute a new by correcting the defects of the previous. But the thesis-antithesis hypothesis⁸ is so mechanical as to follow Newton's third law of motion,—the reaction is equal and opposite to the action. The oppressed minority may have been transformed into a relatively prosperous majority, but the tyrannous control may continue as ever. The present Russian experiment has shown the possibilities and limitations of class-control in the fierce clarity of extravagance. The distant ideal of maximum personality envisaged by Marx and Gorki is no nearer. In the other case, the rigidity of the caste-system and its reaction, *viz.*, the new political affiliations of the Depressed classes while retaining untouchability within their own fold, show the ugly implications of caste-control.⁹ Be it said, however, by way of contrast that the Russian experiment is by deli-

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berate control, whereas the new social changes in India are mainly unconscious. When the Indian is ashamed of being an unwilling instrument in the hands of what is falsely called Social Force, but what may, in practice, be the prompting of interested parties, he jumps at any instance of social planning that appears to him to be deliberate, conscious, and rational, without caring to study its real nature. Hence the peculiar fascination of the Russian communistic experiment for an Indian intellectual. But can we really transfuse the other principle into the body-social of India? In other words, talking in terms of the fundamental issue of social control, is the Hindu idea of personality (which is the same thing as the Indian idea, in so far as the social conditions for the development of personality at present are more or less the same for the Hindu and the Muslim alike) likely to get a chance of being realised through the principles of social control by which Communism seeks to condition the development of Personality in Russia, nay in every class-ridden society? Communism is the finest example of socially directed intelligence and disinterested social endeavour, and of effective social discipline recorded in European history.¹⁰ Therefore, the challenge of Communism to India has to be accepted seriously. India, pace the present movement, is steadily treading the path of the West. She has to face Europe and assimilate her gifts. Therefore, a study of social control means a study of the future of Communism in India, on the one hand, and the conditioning of personality in Hindu culture on the other. The argument followed is simple. There are particular patterns of social, economic, ethical and religious behaviours laid down and suggested by Indian culture which can be easily fitted into the dynamic of a Hindu person; if

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the communistic practice of social ordering disturbs those patterns which are the traditional or the natural make-up of the average Indian, then there will be opposition, and Communism will be not only impracticable, but undesirable. Therefore, the argument of this essay falls into two parts—(a) the practicability of Communism, and (b) its desirability as an end, from the point of view of personality as conditioned by Indian culture, and the Indian society, specially, of the present day.

II

Communism is a theory. It is a plan of action. It represents an ideal. As a theory, it means a collective ownership by the democratic state of the means of production, distribution and exchange for equal consumption. Production is by proportional ability. The ownership being democratic, *i.e.*, representative of all except the mere parasites, the distribution and the consumption become established on the principle of equal need. As an immediate plan of action, it means a revolutionary transference of power from the hands of the capitalists and their creatures into the hands of the workers as a whole, organised in functional corporations.¹¹ The revolution need not be dramatic, even a 'revolutionary situation'¹² does equally well. During and some time after the transference, a rigid control by a strong disciplined minority over themselves, the wavering, the indifferentists and the recalcitrants is to be exercised. As an immediate ideal, it means the organisation of a class-conscious proletariat through perpetual conflict, in thought and action, with the people in power. As a distant ideal, it should prepare for a total abolition of all classes. What will emerge later, Communism is not directly concerned with, though a few communists may be. In other words, it seeks to substitute the positive ideals of a deliberate, scientific, social planning for the bourgeois ideals of letting alone, individualism and religiosity. It starts with the kingdom on earth (as opposed to the Kingdom in Heaven) as the sole concern of man.¹³ It lays stress on the collective whole¹⁴, as opposed to the stray,

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anarchic individual. It asserts the collective will to power, as opposed to benevolent despotism. It stresses the scientific attitude and discards the trial and error method of instinct. It abjures mysticism and embraces rationalism.

In Russia, where Communism has been practised on a large scale for more than a decade, the implications of the theory and the ideal are manifest. There, in actual practice, a strong disciplined and determined minority have wrested all power into their hands. They have been compelled to come to terms with refractory situations.¹⁵ The sovereignty of the workers has been translated into a bureaucratic control. The faith in the Kingdom in Heaven, in the mystic wholeness of the elect, and in saints and symbols, has been displaced, but by an equally blind belief in heroes of the Kingdom on Earth, in the superior, independent, nay the transcendent quality of the Collective Mind. This Collective Mind is, of course, equated to the mind of the party in power that maintains itself through rigid control and an extremely clever propaganda about the pontifical infallibility of its secular executive, and by some extremely useful service to the country.

It may as well be that a new Communism is being forged in Russia that will be, in time to come, as different from the Communism of the old Manifesto as the British Commonwealth of Nations after the Statute of Westminster is from the old British Empire. But this probability does not affect our argument. Genetically, (and essentially,) the Russian Communists are Marxists in their insistence on (a) the materialistic, economic interpretation of history, (b) on the immediate achievement of power by a class-conscious industrial proletariat, (c) the notion of surplus-value

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and the socially necessary amount of collective labour as the main determinants of profits, wages and prices, (d) increasing industrialisation, even of agriculture, by large-scale use of machinery driven by electricity acting as a substitute for human beings, and thus bettering the standard of living and creating more leisure for all, (e) organisations based on class-functioning, and (f) the most important of all, on scientific, *i.e.*, rational social control and conditioning. I do not think that in these basic matters, the Communist party in Russia has faltered. Even if there has been any modification, as in (c), its extent is not yet very clear. In any case, the policy of rigorous discipline and social planning has suited the Russian genius to a nicety. If one trait in the Russian character is more insidiously recessive than another, it is the lack of civic sense as understood in Anglo-Saxon countries. A loose type of co-operative habit is poles asunder from the new type of corporate life created and demanded by the industrial order.¹⁶ The social controlling of the Russian village-life, (and Russia is still mainly rural) has yielded before the new social planning of urban life with its federation of discrete functional group-units. The village-life is at the mercy of urban centres.¹⁷ The primitive homogeneity of social life has not offered any opposition to the new principle of social control. This fact explains, more than the tales of horror do, the success of Communism in a country like Russia.

It has been noted, however, that deliberate social control, as such, is nothing new to the world, except in its historical modifications, nor to Communism, except in its practice, which is, however, saying a great deal for its originality. Communism, not the name, but the practice of its essential theory of common control, is old

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and respectable in the sense that capitalist countries have been practising it without their knowing it.¹⁸ But trouble brews and defensive social mechanisms are reared whenever the need for a conscious policy of social control is talked about. The Rationalisation schemes in industrial countries are attempts at setting the capitalist's own house in order against the menace of Communism, just as much as Loyola's movement was against the Protestant ideal of individualism. The opposition of nearly all sections of labourers to this new move will probably end in the adoption by the communist of the technique of Scientific Management or its modern variant, Rationalisation; it will not certainly mean the assimilation of the communist's ideal by the capitalist organisation. On the other hand, there is a very important element of truth implied in the opposition to any idea of applying the communistic principles of social control to any and every country. If we remember Engel's statement about the possibility of Communism in England,¹⁹ and the original Collectivist's indebtedness to the historical school of Sismondi in the matter of the relativity of economic doctrines in the light of different historical conditions,²⁰ we cannot subscribe to the naive faith of Lenin, nor of his disciples of the Third International in the unitary explanation of history. What has been possible in Russia may be possible in countries where there is no alternative scheme of social control and no definite direction of events. But in countries which have them, there is little likelihood of the success of the Russian experiment, if applied. I believe, India has a different principle of social conditioning, and Indian history is not simply the history of an annexe to a European power.

For a doctrinaire, nothing is more inevitable

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than Communism in India. The Indian peasants and labourers are extremely poor and live in miserable conditions. The capitalists and landlords proper are few in number, the exploited are crores. A kind of communistic tradition is not unknown in the village communities which are run more or less on the lines of the Russian mir. The native princes and capitalists are rolling in riches, and the foreign government can seldom go against the behests of foreign capital. The grip of religion is very strong, and the political and economic control by foreign interests is unpopular. Yet, India has chosen the way to Dandi, and hopes that the genius of her history will give the lie to the logic of doctrines, as that of English history has done to the predictions of Karl Marx and Engels. English Socialism is little more than moderate Fabianism; even Middleton Murry's impassioned statement of English Communism, 'the true communism,' amounts simply to the establishment of decent minimum wages to all men, whether in or out of work, together with the immediate balancing of the Budget by an increase of direct taxation; and Indian Communism offers a nominal allegiance to the Third International and amounts to little more than a plea for a better organised Trade Unionism. The surrender of the Youth League to Mahatma Gandhi, and the help rendered to the Civil Disobedience movement by the Girni Karmagar Union and the merchant princes of Bombay alike, are sad commentaries on the inevitability of Communism in India. They triumphantly assert the supremacy of historical traditions in the evolution of any new type of social order. A prophet who builds on superficial analogies is likely to be a false prophet in the near future. The most useful occupation for him is a study of the vital differences.

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In the absence of statistics, we are not in a position to arrive at a correct estimate of the distribution of national income and property in India. There is an undoubted accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few, and a wide diffusion of ownership of property, which is insufficient for bare existence, among a large section of the people.²⁰ There is wide-spread poverty and chronic under-employment among the vast majority. The inequality in the distribution of wealth is great, though not possibly so great as in England or America.²¹ The iniquity is undeniable, apart from the insufficiency of national production. But people are not conscious of it. And it is the consciousness of disparity rather than the disparity itself that makes for Communism or Socialism. Thus it is that strikes occur most in a period of rising wages.²² Along with other factors, organisation creates this consciousness. Such organisation, in spite of what has been done in this direction, is not particularly strong, except in a few centres.²³ In Ahmedabad, the local influence of Gandhiji, and in Bombay, a comparatively high standard of wages are responsible for the strength of the Labour Movement. In fact, quite a number of other factors, chiefly non-economic, stand in the way of a quickly developing class-consciousness among the Indian proletariat. These factors have not been invented by the capitalist or by the foreign government, they have been determined by India's past.

The vital difference of Indian history from that of any industrial country, say England, Germany or America, is in its socio-religious continuity. India had a political evolution, though only in a special sense.²⁴ As Sir Henry Maine pointed out, the Indian monarch was never an Austinian sovereign. His absolutism was hedged in, on all sides, by customs

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that could not be over-ridden by royal orders, by *Samaj-Dharma*, by *Srutis* and *Smritis*, and very effectively by local, autonomous, self-governing units, like the village and caste-*panchayets*, *srenis*, *pugas*, *samuhas*, etc. These bodies were the ultimate repository of power, and the monarch was the supreme trustee and the agent of the *Samaj Dharma*. He was the final executive, the immediate ones being the local bodies. The maintenance of *Samaj Dharma* was his principal aim. But the *Dharma* required interpreters. The interpretations, resting with the priests, a highly efficient body, would slowly change the traditions without offence. In such a situation, the fundamental unity achieved was socio-religious. Therefore, no sectional or interest-group could either divide society into warring units or bring it to a standstill. The trade-guild was based on caste-principles; the caste-assembly cut across the administration of the local village-system. The caste disappeared at the top where the king ruled a wise and tolerant man. All caste-restrictions would dissolve in the faith in the Vedas. When such a faith was lacking, they would melt in the new democratic faith of a Nanak or a Kavir, a Chaitanya or a Dadu.²⁵

The significance of the persistence of a body of traditions like these is that an Indian cannot, because he has not, split himself into different interests which demand social control and co-ordination by a more or less centralised authority from outside. Indian society is not dissectible into an economic, a political or a religious grouping, and within each, one producing, another consuming section, and within each section, one exploiting, another exploited class.²⁶ The interest-groups of India are not sectional. The cross-section is by *Samaj-Dharma* which divulges the nature

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of Social Control and the true functioning of Indian society. Even the unit of the trade-guild is the family of the craftsman, whose apprentices are the members of the family, failing whom, the members of the same caste. Among the Muslims, the caste-feeling is not as strong as among the Hindus. Yet, and this is a point which is very conveniently ignored by interested people, the family-occupation among the Muslims is almost religiously continued with due regard to family-obligations which 'are no less imperative, only more restrictive' than those of a Hindu joint family.²⁷ The Muslim in the village discharges the same social obligations and enjoys the same rights as the Hindu does. For aught I know, the corporate feeling demanded by religion is stronger among the Muslim than among the Hindu. So, the stratification of society into conflicting interest-groups that demand the particular type of social control we find in communist Russia and may expect in other industrialised countries, has no parallel here. This is a very important reason why the success of Communism in India is unlikely. The labourers of the weaving section in Indian cotton-mills are usually weavers by caste, and the Hindu-Muslim riots are not happy instances of a growing class-consciousness.

An important consequence of the socio-religious homogeneity of interests is that the relation between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, the priest and his clients has been more human in India than could be possible in any industrialised country. The main industry of India, *viz.*, agriculture has helped in this process. The men in power have always felt a sense of deep obligation towards men in their control. The *Samaj Dharma*

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has enabled both parties to avoid cynicism in their relations. If duty is to be related to right to form a social sense, then the Indian masters can not be cursed with bell, book and candle. It is this solicitude, this exchange of rights and obligations under the ægis of an all-embracing *Samaj-Dharma* that has stood so long in the way of a stratification of society into classes by distinct interests and made for a humanisation of social control. It is only when this humanism decays into an abstraction that dissolution begins. If this rendering of Indian social history is accurate, one has to acknowledge its forceful sanity. That is to say, before Communism can be introduced, national memory will have to be smudged, and new habits acquired. There is practically nothing in the traditions on which the new habits of living under an impersonal class-control can take root.

The doctrinaire argues—let us forget the past and build anew. It is possible to forget one's past in two ways. First, as in aphasia, which is a *temporary* aberration from normality. What has been wisely said by Murry with reference to Russia is doubly true about India. 'Whatever naive Communists may believe, a nation can not simply omit a necessary stage in human development without paying for it. It has to pass through the ethical equivalent of that economic stage.'²⁸ Besides, when the Bourbons come back it is found that they have neither learnt nor forgotten; what is more, they take special care that they are not forgotten. This is the danger of a temporary forgetfulness, of a convenient hopping over a historical step. The other way is by living in the present for the future. This life is an intense, all-consuming fire. It presupposes a super-human will to create. Is such a will present among

the generation that alone can follow the doctrinaires? So far as my own experience goes, will-power is conspicuous by its absence among the young generation. Noble sentiments have displaced it. Our schools, colleges, and universities have failed to turn out a perceptible number of young men and women who can erase the pages of Indian history and write something new on them. Probably, our educational institutions are not constituted that way. It is not my task to apportion praise or blame. I do not mean that our youths are inherently incapable of willing to create. The only other schools for training are the Congress and the Labour Unions. Quite a number of people have made great sacrifices for the country. Some of the leaders are honest workers. Yet their whole training has been motivated by the nationalist sentiment. The sacrifice which Indian nationalism has elicited is mainly one of career. The lure of government-service has disappeared to some extent, the fear of imprisonment has gone to a great extent. That is, no doubt, something very useful for a bourgeois nationalism, but nothing very helpful for the immediate advent of Communism. Nationalism is the deadliest enemy of Communism, the first commandment of which is, 'Workmen of all countries, unite.'* The distrust of the Labour Party in Great Britain entertained by nearly all sections of Indians, and the Hindu-Muslim riots among the labourers of the mill-areas are the straws that indicate the direction of the wind. Besides, sentimentalism, even about sacrifice, exhausts itself in no time. Emotions can only diffuse, they do not generate a steady flame. The willed enthusiasm of the Russian communist for the Five Years' Plan, as noticed in the hard glint of his eyes, in the erect head, firm cheeks, and steady gait, is not

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here.²⁹ Communism can not come on stooping shoulders. Communists are made of sterner stuff, more positive ideals, more constructive programmes, and more disciplined and Draconian control. The cheeks of the young in India are not firm, mothers' kisses, fathers' fondlings, priests' blessings have rounded them. The whole weight of family affection has narrowed their chest. And an impatient hurry for the millenium has unsteadied their gait.

Even in Russia, Communism did not come out of nothing. Lenin and Trotsky had their predecessors. They came on the wave of certain tendencies, though they rode the wave bravely and truly. Where are the economic tendencies, which, according to the communists, create leaders by being articulated through them? Where are the leaders? The labour-movement in India was crude before the War, and had no momentum. The post-war developments³⁰ were concerned with the growth of All-India organisations, on the model of other All-India nationalist organisations. There was an epidemic of strikes by mushroom unions. When the epidemic subsided, there was a restoration of healthy activity. The trade-unions began to flourish, but they were more concerned with the immediate betterment of the conditions of employment³¹ than with the abolition of the wages-system as such and the revolutionary transfer of power for Industrial Democracy, which are the clear aims of Communism. At that time, the country was passing through a period of political struggle initiated by Mahatma Gandhi. Like all anti-intellectuals, the non-co-operators counted on urges of national self-respect, natural rights, and religion. Unfortunately, these leave organisation, rational control, constructive programmes, and such like things to be solved at a later

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date. The labour-leaders have all been nationalists, first and last, with a few exceptions of limited influence. A confusion of economic, *i.e.*, primary, with political, *i.e.*, secondary interests is not a happy augury for Communism, nor are the nationalist-cum-religious leaders the best instruments for bringing about the communistic order of society. There is a world of difference in the significance of achieving Swaraj within a prescribed date by trusting in the spoken word of a great leader and even a very partial achievement of the Piatiletka. A few years ago, the Workers' and the Peasants' Party was formed.³² But it was never strong, nor did its ideals ever percolate to the masses. It has received some advertisement in recent years. In any case, it is certainly too much to say that there is any clear-cut unified programme before the alleged communist leaders. When this is true of the leaders, what will be said for the labourers? The labourers are not conscious of the difference between the ideals of Trade Unionism and Communism.* And Communism is certainly an endeavour on the conscious plane of rational, (probably logical) conduct. On the other hand, it may also be that anarchism is not dead, and that Liberalism is not yet a spent force. But it is certainly true that their ideals are not exactly popular. Such ideals, living or dead, do not inevitably lead towards Communism. A more positive and revolutionary set of ideals must appear on the conscious plane before Communism can arrive. The Congress is under the grip

*The All-India Trade Union Federation held in Madras in the third week of July, 1932, has, as the result of a pact, cut off all connexion with the Third International. It seeks affiliation to the Second. It adopts non-violent tactics for bringing in the Socialist State.

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of capitalism, the only virtue of which latter is its national character. The Congress has failed to solve the communal problem by boldly rejecting the claims of religion to get mixed up with politics. When Gandhiji walks to the Viceregal Lodge, he walks sandwiched between capitalists. That picture, which appeared in the *Hindusthan Times*, is like a finger-print on the wall. And Gandhiji is the Congress. Gandhiji is not a communist, he is a deeply religious man. Religion and capitalistic support of nationalism do not help to usher in Communism. British capitalists know this simple truth. They were willing to come to terms with Gandhiji, before the new nexus of fear developed. The Indian capitalists too, want to postpone the evil day, and support Gandhiji actively or passively.³³

To summarise, so long as the socio-religious unity of India stands in the way of a classification of Indian society by economic interests, Nationalism holds the young generation in its grip, the Labour movement subserves the political movement, and the Congress is against a further mechanisation of the economic life of the country, and, specially, so long as religion holds its sway over the minds of the people, there is no immediate future for Communism, and what it means for social control, in India. The Government of India is run by the same nationality as that of the most powerful section of the capitalists whose interests have run counter to those of Indian capitalists but temporarily. When things will get adjusted, they may combine, and then the revolutionary transference of power followed by rational planning of a class-less democratic society will be almost a physical impossibility. This Holy Alliance may last the life-time of the next generation, unless war intervenes, a band of geniuses arise, the

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race of Bombay capitalists dies out, and Great Britain takes to *Sannyas*. These are accidents. Can Communism depend on them? Far better it were to discount these remote possibilities and search among secure historical foundations for principles of social control.³⁴

III

So far from the point of view of the possibility of importing here the communistic type of social control as we find in Russia. When we discuss the *desirability* from what may be called the theoretical point of view, the policy of social control adumbrated by the Indian communist (if there be really any) stands in the way of realising the purpose of such control, *viz.*, the development of Personality. Bureaucratic administration, without which Communism is talking in the air, grows by what it feeds upon.³⁵ Once in power, it cannot tolerate any other scheme of social ordering, it develops a kind of religious faith in its infallibility, and demands a passive acceptance of its tenets and ideals. Being either based upon the original force released by a revolutionary transference of authority, or the prestige of success, it makes a virtue of non-resistance and a vice of free thinking for the controlled majority. Bureaucracy can stand everything except the creative impulse of the individual, *i.e.*, thought and action on his own initiative and in accordance with his own pattern. In such a case, expertism is substituted for the creative impulse, means perpetuated pervert the end, and there is a serious ethical loss. The greatest tragedy of India has been this ethical loss. Any scheme that will not reduce it is unwelcome. Already in India has spirit departed the letter, the means been confused with the end, and ordering killed its own purpose. Is it desirable to add a fresh burden upon the weak shoulders of the Indian, even if we concede that the tendencies and movements do positively in-

dicating a great future for Communism in India? The most precious gift of Indian culture, *viz.*, the maintenance of spiritual isolation in and through an intense social life, is jeopardised by Communism. We can not abdicate the supreme interest of Personality even in favour of social disinterestedness which is the only solid ethical gain involved in communistic control.³⁶ We gain by sacrifice—but that is of the non-essential. The essential thing is that deep uniqueness which unites with another in the process of its development. Let us see how Indian society (which is one) has laid down conditions for this development.

The Indian Society, as it is to-day, is not a congenial environment for the development of Personality. Yet it is a fact that individuals in Hindu, as well as in Muslim India, could and did develop into 'persons.'³⁷ Probably, the Hindu idea of personality, in its essentials, is not markedly different from that of certain European or American idealistic philosophers. It means the achievement of harmony by making *persona*, *i.e.*, the mask of externals truly conform to the nature of Being or Reality. The difference has been in the culture rather than in the content of the idea. The Hindu sages laid stress on self-culture and intuition, chiefly, by association with Gurus, in preference to control or ratiocination.³⁸ Naturally, those masters who had directly realised their Being could alone, by their personal experience, assist the individual in his development. No experiments on the basis of measurement, which mark all laboratory-studies of personalities, were and could be undertaken. There was no question of abnormality. None the less, the observations and conclusions, in so far as they were drawn from direct and immediate contact and experience, were realistic in the best sense of the

term. The result of this emphasis on direct contact on every side, with the Guru, the Absolute, and the World, were (1) a surer discovery and realisation of the cardinal principle of harmony, *viz.*, oneness with the Absolute, and (2) the prescription of a course of action by the Master in the initial stages of the spiritual life to which the social life was also meant to lead. The voice of the Indian Sage thus became unfaltering, and the life of the individual in society was duly regulated with reference to a life dedicated to spirit. The principle of *Unity* involved in Personality was not lost in the wood of dissociated multiplicity, an obsessive preoccupation with which is the main feature of Personality-studies in modern Psychology. The element of nature, *as fulfilment*, was duly emphasised, and the usual fallacy of imposing conclusions from exaggerations upon the perfectly normal was avoided.

Yet this principle of *Unity* was based on gradations in progressive stages of individual and social life in the light of different equipments and achievements of the inquirer and changing circumstances of society. Every step in the development of the individual was known, and there was a curriculum for every step. The various schools of culture prevalent in society might be said to correspond to or repeat the different stages of individual development. The socialised ritualism of the common humanity, the Personal Absolutism of the Vaishnavite, the mixed Absolutism of the Ramanuja School, the eclectic Shakti-cult of the Tantrik, and the unalloyed Absolutism of the Sankarite catered for various needs, abilities, and stages of individual progress. It is a well-known fact of Indian History that when the country was being torn into bits by conflicting sects

and interests, a Kavir, a Tukaram, a Nanak, a Dadu, a Chaitanya would arise and popularly interpret the highest wisdom attained by direct realisation in terms of a Personal God. It was by a personal and direct relationship with Him that all individuals could become 'persons.' All castes, high and low, all sections, Hindus and Muslims, would thus coalesce in the common love of a humanised Divinity. One could love Him as a mother loves her child, as a mistress loves her paramour, as a friend loves his friend, as a servant loves his master, and thus, one could become one with Him.³⁹ The intellectual community who could not feel like insulting the Infinite by reducing it to human proportions declared for an uncompromising Monism,—'That alone exists, nothing else does.' Judging from outside, Vedantism was a negation of the idea of Personality. Yet, strictly speaking, 'I am He' and 'He is myself' is the most aggressive assertion of Personality that can be imagined. Other schools of philosophy negated the idea of Personal God. One, the Samkhya, proclaimed that God was unproved. The 'Purush' was limited by the Prakriti, the principle of Nature, in essential matters. In the 'atomistic' philosophy, the idea of Personality had little place. In reality, however, the scope for the development of Personality was not so limited. For no school exhausted itself in postulating its own creed. Each was grounded on the direct experience of the individual. When the most uncompromising among the various schools proclaimed 'That alone exists, nothing else does,' in one breadth, in another, it proudly said, 'I am He, He is I.' The Hindu philosopher was not simply a philosopher, he was a sage. His only concern was self-realisation, and nothing else, not even the establishment of a

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system into which the individual inquirer was to be fitted. His only advertisement was his personality. He had no panacea for the evils of the world. He only knew the method by which he had solved them himself. Naturally, if anybody was sincerely interested in his method he was welcome to it. But the disciple must go through the milling prescribed by the Master. The disciple's *Samskaras* being different, the course was different and graded. This system of culture by direct realisation, with the assistance of the 'guru,' has been the key-note of the Hindu culture of Personality. All other differences in procedure are subservient to this. It is easy to notice the implications of this principle. It is different from the communistic theory of equal needs, and the communistic policy of a collective guidance by an impersonal authority. It does not discard expert assistance, it only discards the non-human relationship. It does not postpone the development of Personality till all classes are abolished. It asks the individuals to begin straight away, from childhood, through discipleship and family-life, and end in *Vanaprastha* or *Sannyas*. Its defects are no less apparent.

The graded system of Personality-culture is to be noted in the social life of the Hindu as well. The Hindu Society has been scaffolded by the caste-system.* On the side of *nature*, as distinguished from nurture, the caste system imposed certain restrictions on marriage. Be it noted that in the expansive period of Hindu Society, these restrictions were not exceedingly hard and fast. Such social restrictions, in the garb of religious prohibitions and sanctions, fulfilled very effectively Karl Pearson's scientific, *i.e.*, the eugenic criterion of a healthy national life. Pearson's 'nation' is to be equated to the *Samaj* of the

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Hindu.⁴⁰ From the point of view of nurture or environment, the caste-system provided certain economic and social advantages to the members thereof, through the caste-guild and the *caste-panchayat*. Without committing ourselves to any particular theory of the origins of caste, it is legitimate to hold that functions or occupations played a more important part in the later development of the caste-system than the earlier principles of birth and race, religion and conquest. The caste-system was responsible for the sense of unity or social solidarity which carried the Hindus through successive political vicissitudes. The caste-*panchayats* exercised social control over defaulting individuals and stood the Hindus in good stead during the Hindu period of expansion, as well as during the different periods of foreign rule, which, be it noted, could last only by following a policy of decentralised local self-government. The social integument was sufficiently strong. The caste-guild furnished the congenial environment for acquiring skill in the production of articles of a very high standard by a system of apprenticeship; it regulated wages, fixed prices, preserved good conditions of employment, ensured a social production and a social consumption, provided a kind of group-insurance, set free the creative impulse of craftsmen, and made for leisure and healthy amusements by undertaking the management of social and religious festivities and pageants. The most important thing to be noticed in this connexion is that the caste was not a completely closed system. Occupations were changeable, and there were upward and downward currents of mobility. Caste would break and be reformed, and individuals would rise or descend in the social scale.⁴¹ Of course, such movements were not

common. But they did and do take place, even to-day.⁴² These are historical facts and prove that social values were rightly assessed by the Hindu sociologist. His sanction was always socio-religious. Yet, the *Samajdharma*, the social binder, could be subordinated to the *Swadharma*—the individual binder—in order that the individual might be ‘*Swarat*,’ a king in his own kingdom. In fact, the family-life or *Garhasthyadharma* (the family was the smallest unit of the Hindu Society) was only a stage in the life of the Hindu to be followed by a renunciation of the world and a retirement into the forest for meditation and self-realisation by constant communion with the Absolute. The last was the most important stage, and all other stages were preparatory to it. It was from the forest that the sages controlled the society by a proper hierarchy of values related to the Absolute.

The Buddhist epoch came and destroyed the natural hierarchy, asking all seekers of truth to omit a natural step and withdraw early from social life. The monastic organisation crossed the Hindu social world like a shadow. The Hindu order, based as it was on the limitations of human nature, took revenge on the unnatural omission by assimilating and modifying in the process many elements of Buddhist Culture. The Islamic epoch came next, and by conversion, rewards, and inter-marriages made the caste-system adjust itself to new conditions. It still continued to be elastic in the outer ring, but the core began to harden. Then the British rule came, with a different type of civilisation, economic and industrial, individualistic and materialistic. The caste had to make fresh adjustments. But it could not assimilate either the Victorian individualism or industrialism. That is why the

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caste-guild and the caste-panch may be surviving to-day, here and there, but they do not hold the pioneering type of individuals who are the products of the British rule. The caste-system was never meant to foster the values of such a type. No wonder that the caste-system is condemned by all English-educated people as a hindrance to the development of Personality. It is also an interesting fact to note that the highest castes, among whom ability might be said to be inherited to some extent, were the first to serve the British Government and take advantage of English education. The caste-system in the existing circumstances is a bar to the development of such personal values as have been called into being by contact with the English people, with their individualistic predilections and preoccupations with success in this world of money and machines.

A further tragedy is that the values which have been called into being in recent times under the British rule have not been given adequate opportunities for being harmonised through any specific agency. The British administration in India has not offered anything, say citizenship, for the caste-system it has helped most to destroy. Citizenship is a great harmoniser of values in Great Britain, but it is an intellectual abstraction in India. It is unreal, in so far as it is historically unconnected with and forced on the life of the people. Even material success is not possible for the mass when the doors of vocational schools and colleges are not yet open, in fact, virtually closed to them by prohibitive expenses, when the dependence of a swelling population much above the optimum on a crude type of agriculture is on the increase, when occupations still remain undiversified,

when trade and industries are unorganised and subordinated to interests of foreign capital and business-organisation. For the middle class, the tragedy is deeper. Among the educated of that stratum, a sceptical spirit is rampant. The sceptical attitude, as we find it in India, is critical of external control without being creative of any new principle of self or social control. It is certainly the enemy of bondage to the caste and the foreign yoke alike. Either the sceptical attitude or habits of bondage must go. The present intellectual situation of the world will not allow the former to subside; and Imperialism is a force to reckon with. Hence, there is a conflict, a tension in the life of every educated Indian at the present moment. He has no spiritual moorings, his social life is a heartless conformity to decadent and useless standards, and unbound by any living principle. His relation with the world is impersonal, like that of a somnambulist, not detached, as is advised by the sages. He has no active principle of self-control, and therefore, rejects authority theoretically, but without establishing one for himself. In other words, his social, political, and economic impediments are not consumed to make his personality incandescent. The tension will have to be released in the near future. The primary impediment to the Research Magnificent, *viz.*, *tamas*, the inertia begotten of fear, is being eliminated by the present movement. This is desirable. Yet, from my point of view, *viz.*, the development of personality, movements like these are of secondary importance, secondary in the sense of *mala prohibita*. If they help in the development of the individual, they are welcome. But if they only succeed in establishing a type of control that will obstruct the realisation of the end by creating new impediments, they are to be condemned.

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In the present movement, there is just a possibility of a blunder being taken as a crime, a solecism as a sin, and an honest departure as a devilry.⁴³ The national movement may also foster a false religious attitude. Symbols and saints are multiplying. Therefore, the need for pointing out the cardinal principles of social control is supreme at this juncture.

It seems that we are in a fix. We cannot accept the communistic brand of social planning, nor can we repair the cracking caste-system for any secure shelter. What is to be done? There is always the need for social control, so long as the individual does not develop into a person. In other words, the first principle of control is to prepare for its own demise.* In the meanwhile, the controlling authority must be constituted of such people whose primary interest is the development of their respective personalities under changing material and social conditions, but around an abiding principle. Self-culture or *Swaraj* for being '*swarat*,' followed by a strictly objective and disinterested attitude towards other individuals as ends by themselves, would form the second principle of control. An application of the above two principles means the generation of a new and active civic sense. This civic sense is not to be equated to the almost primitive corporate living of the Russian Mir or the Indian village-community. It is not the social service that is demanded of the Russian and the Indian by the authority of the Church or the State. It is neither a conformity to nor an acceptance of an outside standard. It is deeper than the civic sense of Western Europe which aims at more and more comfortable living, but at a living which hinders spiritual impregnation. It is the continuous initiative, the constant urge to create dynamic social conditions

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which, primarily, correspond to the growing needs of individuals living in association, but are to be finally determined by the supreme necessity of providing that isolation in which alone an individual collects himself to be a 'person.' The individual will work through a group. Yet, he must not forget that there is the same insistent need for safeguarding the values of personality within that small group which he is to utilise for framing the conditions of his growth in larger spheres. So, an uncompromising opposition to a mystic collective whole, in whichever shape it may appear, (as exigencies of state or parties, and particularly as a transcendent group-mind), is the most important implication of the civic sense. These principles do not spell the ruin of all control. They transfer control from outside to inside, which is not being done or demanded by the Russian communist, at present. The socially directed intelligence and completely disinterested behaviour, which are supposed to be the two chief contributions of Russian communism to the theory and practice of social control,⁴⁴ presuppose the association of such qualities with 'persons,' as distinguished from individuals.⁴⁵ Who but 'persons' have the will to direct intelligence for the good of other individuals in society? Who but 'persons' can look objectively at other individuals as creative potentialities, as possessing equal rights for development, as ends by themselves, and not merely as objects of control? Who but 'persons' have the sense of an abiding unity that establishes the identification of interests required of the controlling authority? He alone can serve others who has served his supreme Self. This is not selfish individualism, but the Personality-culture of the Indian sage who asks a man to find himself before doing good to others.

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The following pages are a concession to the academic curiosity which needs must peep into the green-room or the workshop of an author's mind. The scholarly distrust of creation has to be removed by occasional liftings of the screen. Yet, the whole process of illumination is never complete, and there is the inevitable disorder of a workshop. Besides, the workshop of the meanest author is more like Rembrandt's Classroom of Anatomy than Velasquez's House of Vulcan, a dialogue of light and shade rather than a monologue of light. Frankly speaking, all references cannot be remembered. Probably, they should not be. In any case, the author's indebtedness is more than what can be indicated in notes and references. On the other hand, the net result is that of one mind's functioning. This compelling sense of proprietorship makes amends for any lack of originality suggested in the ungentlemanly, yet scholarly display of references. It may as well be that this exhibitionism is a consequence of modern habits of competition among the new *Smarta*-Brahmins of Universities.

PROGRESS AND PERSONALITY

1. "The Sociology of Conflict"—A. W. SMALL (Simmel's *Soziologie*) in the *Am. J. of Sociology*, IX. It is only on the basis of inner experiences that a form can be interpreted. Thus he (Simmel) says: " 'What 'Conflict' is, is a question of pure inner experience.' Conflict and any other form in their purity, as Simmel's formulation of the task of Sociology requires us to take them, cannot be described as objectively manifested processes, but have to be interpreted as states of mind through reflection upon inner experiences, according to the thesis that 'the mind is the image of Society, and Society is the image of the Mind' "—T. Abel's *Systematic Sociology*

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in Germany (1929), p. 32. See also, N. J. Spykman—The Social Theory of G. Simmel. Novicow who built up his system on the four types of struggle for existence wrote that 'progress itself is nothing but an acceleration of adaptation.' Keyserling in his essay on "True Problem of Progress" (The World in the Making) lays stress on the meaning-side of the problem. C. Cooley (The Social Process, p. 284) does the same thing, but he writes, 'It need not be a person, . . . any organised form of life will do.' The rôle of tension in individual life is brought out by nearly all modern psycho-analysts, chiefly by Rivers, Adler, and W. Healy. We prefer to use the term 'tension' as it is more specific than 'conflict.' For general reading on the Theory of Conflict, Small's General Sociology, Carver's Essays in Social Justice, Gumpłowicz in the Am. Ac. of Pol. & Soc. Science, 1899—(here the individual is subordinated to the group), House—The Range of Social Theory, Part III, Ch. XXVII, Sorokin—Cont. Soc. Theories, 314-317, 327-328, 542, Park and Burgess—Introduction to the Science of Sociology Ch. IX, Ross—Principles of Sociology, Chs. XIII, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX.

2. Darwinism is distinguished from other theories of Evolution. Darwinists go farther than Darwin in the matter of struggle for existence. Darwin was conscious of the limitations of his generalisation. We have only to remember how the biological analogy was ridden to death by Spencer, Schaffle, Bluntschli, Lilienfeld, Comte, Tarde, Gumpłowicz and others to find out the defects of the organic analogy. (Bristol—Social Adaptation, Ch. VII, Development of the Concept of Society as an Organism.) Dean Inge calls this analogy a superstition. In the chapter on the Idea of Progress in his Outspoken Essays, (The Romanes Lecture, 1920) he writes, "To become a popular religion, it is only necessary for a superstition to enslave a philosophy. The superstition of progress had the singular good fortune to enslave at least three philosophies—those of Hegel, of Comte, and of Darwin." *Vide* J. B. Bury,

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Hertzler, Weatherly, Todd, Park and Burgess for the history of the idea of Progress. For criticism of the analogy, *vide* L. T. Hobhouse—Social Evolution and Political Theory, and in Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge, (Essays), (Blackie), the chapter by Taylor, J. S. Mackenzie—Outlines of Social Philosophy, Rivers—Psychology and Politics. The literature on the subject is voluminous. J. Huxley—Essays of a Biologist, Chs. I (Progress) and II, Biology and Sociology (3-101) are admirable essays.

3. Dynamic Sociology (Vol. I, p. 468). He developed his Theory of Progress in his Dynamic Sociology, in his Pure Sociology, and in the article on 'Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics' Am. J. of Soc., Vol. XVIII, 737-54. Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, 174-77, and Bogardus—A History of Social Thought, Ch. XVII, for Ward's evolutionism, meliorism and social telesis.

4. HOBHOUSE—Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 39. (29-39).

5. DEWEY—Progress. Int. J. of Ethics XXVI, 312-18. Park & Burgess, p. 964. Int. to the Science of Sociology.

6. HUXLEY & WELLS—Science of Life, pp. 424-428. Bk. 4, Ch. 8, Secs. 1-4. J. Huxley—Essays in Popular Science, p. 186, Ch. on Evolution and Purpose, Essays of a Biologist, *ibid.* Bergson's Creative Evolution—The Meaning of Evolution, Ch. III. (264-284). J. B. S. Haldane—The Causes of Evolution. 163-166 for criticism of Shaw and Bergson. "Degeneration is a far commoner phenomenon than progress. . . . Certainly the study of evolution does not point to a general tendency of a species to progress. The animal and plant community as a whole does show such a tendency, but this is because every now and then an evolutionary advance is rewarded by a large increase in numbers, rather than because such advances are common. But if we consider any given evolutionary level we generally find one or two lines leading up to it, and a dozen leading down." J. B. S.

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Haldane—The Causes of Evolution, 152-153. Hertzler, Ch. IV, secs. 3 & 4—Evolution as such is not Progress, Evolution may be progressive and regressive.

7. PARK & BURGESS—p. 962. "It is, however, a concept of appreciation rather than one of description." This is better than Dr. Bury's conception of the Idea of Progress as a fact and 'belief in it as an act of faith,' or as an idea not dependent on human will, and accepted because it is true, not because it is useful. Even a superstition or a myth is a fact. Park & Burgess, p. 955. Even 'progress in the concrete has reference to recognised Social Values.' *Vide* Bougle's Evolution of Values, p. 34-35. Sorokin—C. S. T. 44 ff & 739. "And we must remember that when we speak of progress in evolution we are already leaving the relatively firm ground of scientific objectivity for the shifting morass of human values."—*Ibid.* . . .

8. W. LEWIS.—Time and the Western Man is a severe indictment of the Time-philosophers. J. A. Gunn's—The Problem of Time (Ch. VI. Time in Contemporary Metaphysics) is a scholarly book.

9. The chapter on the nature of Time in Gunn's book. Mary Sturt's Psychology of Time is based on experimental data. The idea was *probably* emphasised first by Durkheim, but he took it as a creation of the Social Mind by collective representation. James' Psychology, Vol. I, Ch. XV.

10. WILLCOX—'A Statistician's Idea of Progress,' International J. of Ethics XVIII. Bowley—The Measurement of Social Phenomena—Ch. IX. Niceforo's 'Numerical Indices of Civilisation and Progress' quotations in Havelock Ellis' Dance of Life, Ch. VII.

11. HERTZLER—Social Progress, a Theoretical Survey and Analysis, specially Ch. V.

12. About limitations of the statistical method, any book on statistics will do. King's Elements of Statistical Method, Ch. I. Social Statistics, Elmer. Sorokin 42-45, Giddings' Scientific Study of Human Society. Ref. to Le.

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Play is from Gide and Rist's 'A History of Economic Doctrines,' 493 Footnote. Stebbing—A Modern Intr. to Logic, 357 ff.

13. Sorokin's Social Mobility, Ch. XII. Scott-Nearing—The Younger Generation of Am. Genius (Scientific Monthly, 1916). In India during the last hundred years, quite a number of first rate people have been born. Yet the figures for mere literacy are hopelessly low. Ogburn—Social Change, pp. 90-102.

14. For Social Adaptation and Progress, see Bristol's Social Adaptation. For Biological Adaptation, see Huxley and Wells, 399 ff, 558, Book 4, Ch. 8, for natural selection and adaptation, Conklin's Heredity and Environment, Ch. IV, on their relative importance. Adamson—The Individual and Environment, Introduction. J. B. S. Haldane—The Causes of Evolution—pp. 142-143.

15. HUXLEY & WELLS.—P. 399 ff. p. 382 ff. Mutation is nearly always deleterious. J. B. S. Haldane—The Causes of Evolution, pp. 109-110. "Even under the extreme conditions of Muller's X-ray experiments, when mutation was a hundred and fifty times more frequent than in the normal, a disadvantage of one in two thousand would have kept any of the new recessive types quite rare. Thus until it has been shown that anywhere in nature conditions produce a mutation-rate considerably higher than this, we cannot regard mutation as a cause likely by itself to cause large changes in species. But I am not suggesting for a moment that selection alone can have any effect at all. The material on which selection acts must be supplied by mutation. Neither of these processes alone can furnish a basis for prolonged evolution" A wise selector may produce Shakespeare and Carnera combined but not angels,—but "for the moral character or for the wings he would have to await or produce suitable mutations."

16. HUNTINGTON'S Pulse of Asia, Civilisation and Climate, Huxley & Wells, *ibid.* J. B. S. Haldane—The Causes of Evolution (What is fitness?).

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17. Natural Selection is a Conservative Force. H. & W. 400-401.

18. J. HUXLEY—*Essays in Popular Science* (Phoenix Lib.) p. 186.

19. SOROKIN—*Contemp. Soc. Theories*, 237-38, 239-42, 304-307, 329-35. Sorokin—*Social Mobility*, Chs. XX-XII, VII & IX. Sumner—*Folkways*, Ch. V.—*Societal Selection*.

20. BERNARD—*Int. to Social Psychology*, 78, 79, 65, 66. Hayes—*Sociology* (1930) 108. 543-544, Ogburn—*Social Change*, 90 ff.

21. BERNARD—*Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. VI. He lays great stress on the environment.

22. ELLWOOD'S *Cultural Evolution*, Ch. I and Chapter on the Evolution of Language, Bernard—147-156. Hayes—576. Sumner—*Folkways*, Sec. 135-141 (Tools, Arts, Language, Money).

23. SHERRINGTON—*Integrative action of the Nervous System*. Pieron's—*Thought and Brain*, Bernard p. 62-68, 256, 273-275.

24. The study of Social Pathology is a definite branch of Sociology. The methodology involved is indicated by Rivers in his *Psychology and Politics*, Parmelee—*Poverty and Social Progress*, Smith's *Social Pathology* &c. Hocking—*Man and the State*, 202, "Hence psychology is peculiarly interested in errors and illusions. It might almost be called the Science of human fallibility."

25. J. HUXLEY'S *Essays in Popular Science*—Ch. 'Evolution and Purpose,' p. 186-187. In J. H's—'What dare I think?' the 'assurance of a power that makes for righteousness' is given. 'Science and Religion'—(Gerald Howe, 1931). J. S. Haldane—*The Sciences and Philosophy*, the whole book, particularly the lecture on the Fate of Mechanistic Biology and Vitalistic Biology.

25. Cf p. 25, first line. The numbering is duplicated. R. K. Mukherji—*Introductions to—*

(a) Over-population in Jaunpur—B. N. Misra.

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(b) The Pressure of Population, (Its effects on Rural Economy in Gorakhpur Dt.)—J. K. Mathur, Studies of the Dept. of Ec. & Soc., Lucknow University, published by the U. P. Government as bulletins No. 59 & 50.

26. The recrudescence of faith in Eddington and Jeans; for example, in Eddington's Swarthmore lecture, a sentence like this may be seen. "But I think it may be said that Quakerism in dispensing with creeds holds out a hand to the scientist"—Science and the Unseen World, 54. As a corrective, B. Russell's Scientific Outlook, Chs. IV and V are recommended.

27. E. W. HOBSON—The Ideal Aim of Physical Science (Cam. U. Press). Eddington—The Nature of the Physical World, Ch. III. Gunn—The Problem of Time, Ch. V—Physicists and Time Measurement. Whitehead—Concept of Nature—Ch. III, p. 173 for Space-Time Manifold. The literature on the subject is growing.

28. EDDINGTON believes in Reality as mind-stuff without attaching more significance to it than that of a convenient construct to space-time. Russell—An Outline of Philosophy, Ch. X. Max Planck—The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics, p. 14-15.

29. MARY STURT—Psychology of Time, Ch. III.

30. WHITEHEAD's Concept of Nature, p. 73. Specious present is discussed in p. 131 of Whitehead's Science and the Modern World, Ch. VI, (Cheap Edition). "But the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible"—James' Psyc. 631.

31. BERGSON—Time and Free-Will, page 139, see also 125-126. Bergson in p. 231 ff. talks about two different selves, (1) the fundamental, to be arrived at by deep introspection, such moments being rare, and (2) the spatial and social representation; only the former is free. "I do not mean, here, to split up the personality. . . It is the same self which perceives distinct states at first, and which, by afterwards concentrating its attention, will see

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these states melt into one another like the crystals of a snow-flake when touched for some time with the finger." 'By separating our conscious states we promote Social life, but raise problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and living self.' It seems that an intuitive grasp of the homogeneity of Time and even Space prepares the way for Social life.

32. TAGORE—Philosophy of Leisure.—A lecture.

33. C. K. OGDEN—A. B. C. of Psychology. Richards—Principles of Literary Criticism, Ch. VII.

34. PAUL VALERY—Da Vinci.

35. MIDDLETON MURRY—The Necessity of Communism, 26-27.

36. D. P. MUKERJI—Personality and the Social Sciences, Ch. II.

37. M. PRINCE—Dissociation of Personality (Introduction). See also ref. to Bergson in note 31. "One does not cease to be a person, or lose one's personality, because of these phenomena; nor is there any reason to suppose that a patient exhibiting them even in a marked degree does so. It is because the empirical consciousness is substituted for the self, to whom the consciousness belongs, that these extreme cases are still spoken of as dual or multiple 'personalities' "—"Even so, the real person betrays his presence," Rev. T. Hanna, whose case was studied by Sidis and Goodheart, "reported that the two alternating individualities arose and confronted one another in his mind, each making the claim to be his personal self. He went on to say 'I tried alternately to throw away each. . . . I decided to take both lives as mine . . . I do not know how to unify them' Surely this 'I' is the profound self choosing to accept both conative systems with their severally attached constellations of memory as its own. The systems are not personalities, but the alternating possessions of a person; and they cease to alternate and become synthesised when the morbid condition disappears"—Aveling's Personality and Will, 217-218.

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I think Aveling is right when he suspects associationistic preconceptions in such terms as 'multiple' and 'co-conscious' personality. The meaning of personality is not simply an aggregate of character-traits, nor is it to be associated with abnormal states of consciousness alone. It is something unique, yet perfectly normal.

38. EDDINGTON—Science and the Unseen World, p. 50.

MURPHY—Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, app. Contemporary German Psychology, for Stern's Personalistic Psychology, pp. 422 ff.

"In defining 'person,' *unitas multiplex*, purposiveness and singularity are named as chief characteristics. The 'person' is viewed as a 'purposive individual unity' striving towards certain ends." *Vide* also Murchison—A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Tagore emphasised a similar point of view in his talk with Einstein reported in the Viswa-Bharati Quarterly. WILLIAM BROWN—Mind and Personality, Science and Personality (individual distinguished from the person), 234. For Personality as treated by Freud, Adler, Jung and Kempf, and written primarily from the psycho-analytic point of view by a doctor, see Gordon—Personality (the last chapter on the Spiritual Aspect). D. P. Mukerji—Personality and the Social Sciences. For science as a means of individual adjustment to society from the educational point of view, see Adamson—The Individual and Environment, Ch. III. Campbell—Problems of Personality. Whitehead—Science and the Modern World, Ch. XIII—Requisites for Social Progress. Hertzler—Ch. X for Science as an agent of Progress, Sec. 9. Crutcher—Personality and Reason. L. L. Bernard—Scientific Method and Progress—Am. J. of Soc., Vol. 31, pp. 1—38.

EQUALITY AND PERSONALITY.

1. WILLOUGHBY—Social Justice, p. 38; The Nature of the State, 98 ff. See the quotation from Pulszky—Theory of Law and Civil Society.

RITCHIE—Natural Rights, pp. 34 ff.

2. The agricultural type of civilization usually leads to a loose type of corporate living, as in Russia, India and China, and a form of hierarchy, social, economic and political, *vide* Sorokin—C. S. T., p. 417 ff., Sec.—Demographic Factors correlated with Equalitarian Ideology and Movements. For statistical and logical discussion of the relation between occupation and vertical mobility, see Sorokin—Social Mobility, Chapters XVII to XIX. In spite of the wealth of his argument, it is a fact that the increasing density of population and its heterogeneity lead to a mobility of occupations which presses towards democracy. Which is probably better for mankind; the rigidity of status in agricultural occupations, or the superficial economical equality in industrial areas (really as hide-bound by the wage-system as the former is by caste) is beside the point. Sorokin—Principles of Rural and Urban Sociology, Chapters XIX, XX. For Materials—Sorokin—Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology, Vol. II, Ch. XI (Econ.) and Ch. XVI (Pol.).

3. Journal of Political Economy—Dec., 1928, February, 1929. Recent German Literature—(Sombart and Weber) by J. Parsons, Max Weber's Essay 'The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism' primarily through rational conduct of life. Max Weber—General Economic History, Part IV, Chapters 29 and 30. Henri See—Origins of Modern Capitalism, for a different view. Sombart's article on Capitalism in the En. of Social Sciences. R. H. Tawney—Religion and the Rise of Modern Capitalism.

4. Any book on Economic History will bear out this generalisation. A very readable account is P. Mantoux—The Industrial Revolution in the XVIII Cen., Part III,

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Chapters I and III. (Fay, Toynbee, Mrs. Knowles, Traill, the Hammonds, Cheyney, Usher, Meredith, Bonar, Lipman, for English Ec. History). Dawson—Evolution of Modern Germany, Ch. XVI. G. Cohn—The Increase of Population in Germany, Ec. J., March, 1910. Chapman—The Economic Development of France and Germany (Third Edition), 75 ff. for changes among the French Industrial Wages Earners between 1815-48.

5. The literature on this subject is overwhelming. Karl Marx's *Capital* (Everyman's Liberty, 2 Vols.) with an Introduction by G. D. H. Cole is a reliable edition. The best little book on Marx's 'Capital' is by Master Lindsay. G. Plekhanov's *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* is a classic. Bernadotte Croce's *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* and Loria's monograph are typical of the Italian School of Criticism. Joseph's *Karl Marx's Theory of Value* is a devastating piece of logic. Gide and Rist, Sorokin, Yves-Guiot are one-sided. O. Ruhle's new book is popular. Lenin's pamphlets are propagandist, otherwise very acute. Sorokin—C. S. T., Ch. X. Willoughby—*Social Justice*, Ch. V. Max Beer—*Life and Teaching of Karl Marx*. Bonar—*Philosophy and Political Economy*, Book V, Ch. I. (Karl Marx, Engels and Lassalle).

6. The Hammonds—*Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 258, Part III. *The Social Consequences*, Ch. XV.

7. J. de V. Loder—*Bolshevism in Perspective*, particularly the concluding chapter. For comments on the 'Abdication of the Sovereignty of Personality,' see the *Adelphi*, February, 1931. See Dobb—*Soviet Russia and the World*, Ch. VI, on the Question of Liberty. The Soviets insist more on opportunities than upon rights.

8. Which does not mean that Social reforms are not taking place. The stress is on the word 'more.' Yet, the interesting fact is that certain Swarajist leaders were against the Sharda Act.

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9. DR. RADHA KAMAL MUKERJI—Comparative Economics, Vols. I and II, and Civics.

10. DR. RADHA KAMAL MUKERJI—The Foundations of Indian Economics.

11. DR. RADHA KAMAL MUKERJI—Democracies of the East.

12. GAIT—Census Report for India, Vol. I, 1911.

BLUNT—Census Report for U. P., Vol. I, 1911.

DR. R. K. MUKERJI—Foundations (Dynamic Element in the Caste-system).

Every decade, the Census Reporter is faced with numerous applications by the lower castes to be enumerated among the higher. The claims of the Kayasths of Bengal to be recognized as Dvijas and the propaganda of the Jat Pat Torak Society of the U. P. are only two instances among many. The ways in which the claimed privileges are enjoyed are generally suicidal, e.g., no widow remarriage, etc.

13. HAYES—Sociology (New Edition), p. 303, Sec. Biology and Caste, 473-474.

14. The caste-feeling is increasing only in one sense—that indicated in note (12). For general principles of wages governing social stratification, read Taussig—Principles of Economics, Vol. II, Ch. 47. For detailed statistical account, Sorokin—Social Mobility, particularly, Chs. VI, XVII, XVIII for occupational stratification and vertical mobility in Western Societies. A superficial observation, even a purely statistical account would go against the above statement. But the fact is that there is a rush for primary education, as proved by the move of the lower castes to open special schools for them. The rush is not great, but just sufficient to make for an increased disagreeableness of inferior, but none the less useful, occupations.

15. HAYES—Sociology, 15 ff. Introduction to Sociology, p. 24 ff.

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16. STODDARD, H. CHAMBERLAIN, for example, including McDougall (National Welfare and National Decay).

17. SOROKIN—Social Mobility, Chs. X, XI, XII. Contemporary Sociological Theories, pp. 222—308.

HANKINS—The Racial Basis of Civilisation, Chs. II and III.

18. CARR-SAUNDERS—Eugenics, 134 ff, 138, 163 ff.

POPENOE AND JOHNSON—Applied Eugenics, III and IV.

20. SOROKIN—Social Mobility, Ch. XII.

CARR-SAUNDERS—Ch. VI, *ibid.*

21. HAYES—Sociology, p. 121 ff.

POPENOE & JOHNSON—The concluding chapters.

LA POUGE—Social Selection—(Summarised in Sorokin, C. S. T., 241). "A regime based on wealth is the worst enemy of racial progress." Dean Inge and others lay stress on differential fertility and death-rate among different classes. The greater fertility of the lower classes, among whom the proportion of the unfit, particularly the feeble-minded, may be said to be proportionately greater, is an undisputed fact, in spite of the evidences brought before the World Population Conference, 1929, of the gradual extension of birth-control among all sections of people of the continent. For a stimulating account of the whole problem read Bushee—Principles of Sociology, 326-413, particularly Ch. XXIV.

22. H. S. JENNINGS—Biological Basis of Human Nature, Ch. X. What can we hope from Eugenics?

J. B. S. HALDANE—The Causes of Evolution.

"For small values of N (individuals mating at random) selection is at once effective. But in large tribes the initial stages of the evolution of altruism (the social sense of the sociologist, and Giddings' consciousness of kind) depend not on selection, but on random survival, i.e., what in physics is called fluctuation. This is quite possible

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when N is small, very unlikely when it is large. If any genes are common in mankind which promote conduct biologically disadvantageous to the individual in all types of society, but yet advantageous to society, they must have spread when man was divided into small endogamous groups. As many eugenisists have pointed out, selection in large societies operates in the reverse direction." Yet the present day society is no longer the endogamous group. The appendix is pessimistic reading for the enthusiast in Eugenics.

23. There is perfect unanimity of opinion among Eugenists that heredity determines potentiality and environment controls its actuality. With the exception of McDougall's (Lamarckian) experiments, referred to by J. B. S. Haldane (136), there is hardly any authority who holds the view that environmental factors govern the potentiality of growth. As such no reference is needed. Bushee, p. 382 ff.

24. The appendix to J. B. S. Haldane (The Mathematical Theory of Natural Selection) teaches us to possess our souls in patience. Popenoe and Johnson—Ch. VI. The elimination of one recessive trait by natural selection takes a few thousand years.

25. D. P. MUKERJI—Personality and the Social Sciences, Chapter on Group Mind, (Literature on the subject is given there). Ginsberg and Allport agree with me in my views on Group-Mind. Laski's Liberty in the Modern State, the whole book (18-19), (25-28), (196-197), (204-205), is a ringing vindication of the claims of personality. "The ultimate isolation of the individual personality is the basis from which any adequate theory of politics must start." A sentence like this breathes the same ardour as MacIver's (Elements of Social Science)—"The great Law of Social Evolution is the Evolution of Personality which is the 'synthesis of sociality and individuality.'

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL FORCES.

1. This is Wundt's definition of a scientific law quoted in Hayes' Introduction to Sociology, p. 21. For a comparative study of sociological and physical laws, *vide* Sorokin—C. S. T., 13-19, 40-46, 527-533, 674-675, for Carey, Pareto, Marx and Weber's methodology respectively. Also Hayes' Introduction, Ch. II. The German School is very strong in methodology, *vide* Abel—Systematic Sociology in Germany.

MORRIS COHEN—Reason and Nature, Book III, Secs. 2 and 3.

2. SOROKIN, *ibid.*,—690, 534, 547.

3. B. RUSSELL—An Outline of Philosophy, Ch. XI, Causal Laws in Physics.

EDDINGTON—The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 124, 224-27, 239, for physical force, for social 360.

4. J. B. S. HALDANE—The Causes of Evolution, 156 ff. In calling the extremer forms of the doctrines of emergence as particularly hostile to true scientific progress, Haldane writes, 'Nevertheless, science is committed to the attempt to unify human experience by explaining the complex in terms of the simple. This may be a vain endeavour, but I do not at present see any evidence of its vanity.' In describing the researches into the nature of the atom from J. J. Thomson to G. P. Thomson, Haldane concludes, "The electron and the proton were shown to be more complex than they at first appeared though by no means so complex as the hydrogen atom. I regard this as the model of scientific explanation." When the layman finds scientific explanation to be difficult, he is justified in complaining against its abstruseness and removal from his reality. Which does not mean that the relationships uncovered by the scientist are not more comprehensive or simpler than his understanding of them. Ignorance alone is scrappy and complex, and there is no virtue in poetising

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it. L. S. Stebbing—A Modern Introduction to Logic, Ch. XX. See also Morris Cohen—Reason and Nature, Ch. 3.

5. SOROKIN—Con. S. T., p. 29. } Ch. I.
6. SOROKIN—Con. S. T., p. 36. }

7. MORRIS R. COHEN—Book III, Sec. 3 (D), Ch. II.
L. S. Stebbing—*ibid.*, Ch. XIX.

SOROKIN—728-741, *ibid.*

GOLDENWEISER—In the History and Prospects of Social Sciences, pp. 221-232.

SPENGLER—The Decline of the West. Introduction, Ch. I and the table at the end of the book.

CROCE—Theory of History of Historiography, Preface to the first Italian Edition, whole of Part I, and App. III. He calls it the Fourth Part of his Philosophy of Spirit.

PARK & BURGESS—Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Ch. VII, 438-441.

HOUSE—The Range of Social Theory, 196-197.

8. FREUD—The Ego and the Id. (1923).

FREUD in his analysis of the super-Ego thinks that man is more moral than he is aware of. Flugel writes (Theories of Psycho-Analysis in An Outline of Modern Knowledge) that "Our troubles—both individual and social—are due much more to the excessive, than to the deficient, morality of Man," p. 386. Here is a paradox for the Freudian, i.e., everybody. Psychic determinism is one of the basic postulates of modern psycho-analytical theories.

9. V. F. CALVERTON—Introduction to the Making of Man—An Outline of Anthropology. "It is not what has been called the truth of their doctrine which makes them so powerful, but their adaptability to other interests, class interests in the main, which they subserve." "The cultural compulsive represents the group interest in its psycho-

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logical form." Thus Westermarck's theories were a cultural compulsive of the Middle Class. Benda in his 'Betrayal of the Intellectual' gives numerous such examples. The cultural compulsives are particularly strong in India, for obvious reasons, at the present moment.

*PERSISTENCE—One meaning is given by Lankes as perseveration, in the Br. Journal of Psychology, 1915. The self of a person 'can modify and directly counteract' the native tendencies of the nervous system. Aveling—Personality and Will—156-157, as a temperamental factor. Another meaning is offered by the Purposivist, see Woodworth—Contemporary Schools of Psychology, Ch. VI.

Another meaning—"I say therefore: I do not know whether there is a persistent entity, but I do know that my experiences can be explained without assuming that there is. Therefore, it can be no part of legitimate science to assert or deny the persistent entity; if it does either, it goes beyond the warrant of experience."—B. R.—An Outline of Philosophy, 125-126.

*E. RIGNANO—Biological Memory—*vide* Introduction by Prof. E. W. McBride who raises certain difficulties against the mnemonic point of view (Ch. XI). Read Chs. VIII, IX and XIV, where evolution of life is stated to be a continuous progress, and not a simple transformation. It is the biological memory that is held to be responsible for intelligence, affective tendencies and social life, in fact for harmony. The biological memory solves many a moral problem in Ch. XIV. In the Nature of Life, Rignano changes his emphasis to Purpose, and becomes a full-fledged Purposivist, however.

10. BENTLEY—The Field of Psychology, p. 16, pp. 189-202, Ch. VIII.

11. Quoted in Sorokin—p. 20.

12. B. RUSSELL—An Outline of Philosophy, 125-126.

13. BENDA—The Betrayal of the Intellectual, trans. as The Great Betrayal.

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14. KALI PRASAD—A study of Emotion in the Light of Gestalt Theory—a paper read before the Indian Philosophical Congress, Dacca Session. For criticism of the Hormic Theory which takes the analogy of forces too literally, see K. P's. paper. A Gestalt Approach to the Concept of the Unconscious—Patna Session. "The Association Psychology is really dead now,"—H. Dreisch. The experiments are the classic ones of Wertheimer and his disciples. Read Murphy—432-33.

15. MURPHY—p. 390. Mitchell's view is 'that there never is really more than one personality, namely, the inclusive one, which, however, difficult it may be to reach, includes all the materials, so to speak, of which the rest are made.' Morton Prince in the Introduction to his classic work also refers to one element to which the other parts are reduced. Aveling—Personality and Will—218. For Stern's view of the person as a unity in multiplicity,—Murphy 422 ff.

16. The analogy of the family is borne out by such a statement as that of Hogben—The Nature of Living Matter—p. 78. "The modern theory of the gene is a statistical construction consistently developed by a logical interpretation similar to that adopted in elaborating the great generalisations of physical science." Transmission in a joint family (Hindu) is governed by the principle of 'spiritual benefit.' Cf. Dr. Bauer's statement in Human Heredity, p. 24, "The transmission of hereditary characters from parent or parents (as the case may be) to offspring depends upon the fact that the latter have, wholly or partly, the same idioplasm as the parent, or in the case of sexual reproduction the parents."—Idioplasm is Naegebi's term to denote 'that part of a cell upon which (in some manner which remains to be elucidated) its specific qualities depend.'

17. See F. H. HANKINS—The Racial Basis of Civilisation, for the literature on the subject. Gobineau, Lapouge, Ammon did a large part of sociological speculation (Sorkin—C. S. T., Ch. V) at this time. Their school is not yet

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exhausted. H. Chamberlain in his two volumes of *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, published in Germany just before the War, proclaimed the triumph of Germanism. L. Stoddard and E. Huntington, specially in 'The Character of Races' may be said to belong to the school. The cult of Aryanism was strong till the other day. See also S. J. Holmes—*The Trend of the Race*, Popenoe and Johnson—*Applied Eugenics*. Particularly, *Human Heredity*—(Bauer, Fischer & Lenz), Section II, Ch. VI, 2, Section V, Ch. XV.

For the Psychological school, see M. M. Davis—*Psychological Interpretations of Society*. The names of Tarde, Ward, Ratzenhofer, Sumner, Small, Fouillee, Giddings, De Roberty are sufficient to indicate the importance of the Psychological school in Sociology at this time. The term 'vitalistic' is used to denote the habit of explaining social phenomena by certain physio-psychological drives which are supposed to act from behind the screens. These drives are the precursors of Life-force, etc. Read Small's *Origins of Sociology* and Lichtenberger's *Development of Social Theory*. Sorokin, Bogardus and House's books deal with the subject fully. F. N. House has written a series of articles in the *Am. J. of Sociology* on the concept of Social Forces in American Sociology (to be referred to later on). Park and Burgess—*Introduction*—Section on Social Forces.

18. Cf. SMALL—*General Sociology*, 532-36, 425-36. "They do not get to be social forces until they get into persons,—Persons are thus transmitters of physical forces; but all properly designated social forces are essentially personal." Again "There are no social forces which are not at the same time forces lodged in individuals, deriving their energy from individuals and operating in and through individuals." Yet, no difference is made between 'individual' and 'person'; and 'interests' become the mystic motive power or the 'substance' of 'force.'

19. Hogben—*The Nature of Living Matter*.

J. B. S. HALDANE—*The Causes of Evolution*, for acute criticism of Vitalism and particularly its modern variants,

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Emergent Evolution of Lloyd Morgan, and Holism of General Smuts. Vitalism sprinkles the dry-as-dust philosophy with rose-water.

20. L. L. BERNARD—Introduction to Social Psychology, Ch. II (*vide* McDougall, Allport, Dr. Mukerji and Dr. Sen Gupta, Ross, Ellwood and Ginsberg's books for the scope and method of Social Psychology). Dr. Ginsberg's 'The Psychology of Society' is a book to which I am indebted for a critical analysis of the different theories of Group-Mind.

21. OGDEN—A. B. C. of Psychology and The Meaning of Psychology. The first is an excellent introduction to the subject.

22. The detailed account, as mentioned in the footnote—p. 91 of the book, follows Dr. Bentley.

23. Pieron—Thought and the Brain.

24, 25, 26, 27. SOROKIN—C. S. T. 617-627.

28. This position is that of Russell in ~~his~~ Outline. Read Spearman's Creative Mind. Watson may produce a Joachim, but he cannot explain a composition by his over-simple formula. In certain higher activities of the brain, as in music, the concept of wholeness is extremely useful. Yet, Gestalt experiments are so few in number.

29. PARK—Introduction to the Science of Sociology p. 438 ff. Principles of Human Behaviour—pp. 18-34. quoted above.

30. PARK—Introduction—p. 438.

31. E. HOLT.—The Freudian Wish and its place in Ethics, pp. 3-50.

PARK—497, Introduction.

32. A W. SMALL—General Sociology, 425-436.

33. OGDEN—A. B. C. of Psychology.

34. F. H. GIDDINGS—A printing mistake here, the apostrophe should come after 'S.' *Scientific Study of Human Society* (and also his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*). Intelligence appears as an impulse in the direction of telic achievement. 4.5% of population

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are responsible for progress, later on 9%, after the telic forces are set going. A very useful classification of the different theories is given in Sprowls—*Social Psychology Interpreted*, Ch. IV. See F. N. House—*The Range of Social Theory*, Ch. XV.

35. W. McDougall—*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chs. V and VI.

36. For criticism of Instinctivism, any book of *Social Psychology* with a behaviouristic bias will do. A short review is given in Dr. Thouless' elementary book on *Social Psychology*.

37. Pieron's *Thought and the Brain*.

38. Fouillee—*Education from a National Standpoint*, quoted in Park and Burgess. His idea is fully worked out in 'Morale des idees-forces.'

39. Reference is to Semon's *Theory of Engrams* and Rignano's *Biological Memory*.

40. PIERON—*Thought and the Brain*, p. 14.

BENTLEY—Ch. X, 392.

41. LEVY-BRUHL'S *Theory—How Natives Think, and Primitive Mentality*, particularly Ch. II—*The Law of Participation*, and Ch. III, *the Functioning of pre-logical mentality*. For criticism, Rivers—*Psychology and Ethnology*, Chs. III and IV.

MURPHY—*Primitive Man*, Ch. IX, 91-92, Ch. X, III-III4.

42. PIAGET—*The Language and Thought of the Child, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*.

43. If it is a development from the prelogical to the logical stage, the motive power must have been from outside, therefore, from Society. Dr. Murkey in 'The Symbolic Process' traces the symbolic integration in the mind of the child to the social environment.

44. *British Journal of Psychology*, April, 1930. Victoria Hazlitt's article.

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THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CONTROL.

1. HAYES—Introduction to the Study of Sociology, Chs. XVII and XVIII.

PARK & BURGESS—Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Ch. X. For Assimilation, see Ch. XI.

BERNARD—Introduction to Social Psychology, Chs. XXXIV, and XXXIII (pp. 520-527).

ROSS—Principles, Ch. XX.

2. The first circle is that of the party. The next is formed by those who are won over by a sharing of power and privilege. These culture-circles are formed by the relative degree of urgency of interests. Among primitive communities, as Wissler has shown in his concept of Cultural regions (Man and Culture), among the plebs of Rome, as well as among the English educated people of India, the people just in the outer fringe are the best agencies for the propagation of the faith, provided they are not allowed to feel the inequality in any shape.

For patronage and corruption see Ross' Principles XXV.

3. HAYES—Introduction. Section IV.

ROSS—In his Social Control, the pioneer work in this field, in Social Psychology, in his Principles and Outlines lays particular emphasis on these factors. No wonder he is usually called the Tarde of America. Public discussion is an enemy to such a faith. Hence, possibly, public halls in Russia are controlled.

4. Active accommodation as opposed to Passive accommodation, Carver—Essays in Social Justice.

5. HOGBEN—The Nature of Living Matter, X, XI, XII.

6. Who knows, alas! Who knows? Logically, it is perfectly possible to agree with Wittgenstein that the explanation of a thing lies outside the thing. *Vide* the author's Personality and the Social Sciences, Ch. II. One

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can maintain the spirituality of personality without believing in intuition &c.

7. I use the word Hindu with a great deal of hesitation. It will disappear within a few years from political parlance. Yet, the facts enumerated in the last three Census Reports, at least, and particularly in the Ch. X of that excellent book, the Caste-system of Northern India by E. A. H. Blunt, I.C.S., are sufficient proofs of the caste-basis of a perceptible portion of the structure of Muslim society in Northern India. In Bengal, quite a large majority of the Mohammedans are descendants of converts from Hinduism, and those too of a not too distant generation.

8. The dialectic method is opposed to the historical. See note (34). Formal logic is opposed to the logic of events.

9. The note on Depressed Classes submitted by Mr. Blunt to the Lothian Committee offers the best definition of Untouchability. Blunt—333-336—The Caste-system of Northern India. The present insurgence of the Depressed Classes against the upper classes is an instance to the point. The Depressed Classes are nationalists, but love of the country has unfortunately yielded before hatred of caste-control. The new compromise is hopeful.

10. 'Origin of Economic Planning'—Survey, Feb., 1, 1932. Ethics of Communism and Capitalism—Smith in the International Journal of Ethics, Jan., 1932. I should have added, 'on a large scale.' Middleton Murry in his Necessity of Communism makes much use of disinterestedness. Possibly, he means the absence of any profit-seeking motive. The Lord Krishna advised an individual, Arjuna, to be disinterested in his attitude towards life and action. As all action is social, no purely logical ends are served by asking to be 'socially' disinterested. The meaning of disinterestedness is to look at men and things as ends by themselves. This is the highest objectivity. Lippmann in his 'A Preface to Morals' identifies the essence of Religion with disinterestedness. This is a wise book.

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11. LASKI in his Communism makes the revolutionary transference of power the sole criterion of the difference between Socialism and Communism. The technique of revolution was not made clear by Karl Marx before the rise of the Paris Commune and its failure—*vide* the Critique of the Gotha Programme. The Communist believes in organisation of labourers in functional groups. This makes him different from a mere State Socialist. Functional units are not the only ones to be organised, the territorial ones have to be looked after. The Syndicalist, the Guild-Socialist and the Communist are all functionalists, but the claims of the natural region, the habitat of the interest-groups, are also recognised, though only in the second instance. *Vide* Brailsford—How Soviets Work; and also Soviet Russia in the Second Decade, a joint survey of the Technical Staff of the First American Trade Union Delegation, Chapter V; the Nature of the Russian Government—Jerome Davis, particularly the Diagram of the Soviet Elective System (p. 117) and the Plan of the Provincial Government, p. 127; and Chapter VII—The Trade Union Movement.

13. KEYNES' Essays in the Nation, incorporated in his Essays in Persuasion. The main appeal of Socialism is that the Kingdom of God is here. This is the new religion. The two leading intellectuals of England, Middleton Murry (in his Necessity of Communism) and T. S. Eliot (in his Broadcast Talk) are equally alive to this aspect of Communism.

14. RENE FULLOP-MULLER in his 'Mind and Face of Bolshevism' shows the nature of this Collective Whole, and mentions how the cult of the Collective has become the Social Philosophy of Soviet Russia. Instances of Group-oppression show the connotations of the above theory. Yet self-criticism has gone to such a length that Maxim Gorky, among Russia's leading intellectuals, and certain Communist leaders have cried halt. For a different view see Dobb—Soviet Russia and the World, Chapter VI.

15. The N. E. P., the foreign concession (in spite of handicaps), private trade, and the whole agricultural policy,

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are compromises, not with capitalism, be it noted, but with different levels of culture in Communist Russia. Dobb had pointed out in his *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution* that the N. E. P. was not really a compromise with Communism, but only a reversion to the previous policy of Lenin before the War. The War at home and abroad, necessitated War Communism. Lenin was a Realist of the first order. So is probably Stalin. *Vide* his famous article 'Success has made us giddy.' It is probably not too much to say that that article saved the Collectivisation Plan. Decrees of November follow those of September in the higher logic of events. See Dobb's latest book—*Soviet Russia and the World*, 1932.

16. This is a point which is apt to be lost sight of by the romantic ruralist. The co-operative habits of rural life are the remnants of tribal organisation, when they are not, they come from mere association. What we understand by co-operation is something deliberate, though it depends upon voluntary effort and self-sacrifice for its success.

17. The Scissors' Crisis showed the economic dependence of the villages upon the cities. The Industrial proletariat still has the upper hand. Stalin has changed this policy. A very recent decree allows the agriculturist (not the Kulaks, of course) to produce at his own initiative. The vigour of the control over prices of food-stuff has abated. Politically, the representation of the town and city-soviets preponderates in power and influence, if not in numbers, over that of village Soviets. Culturally, the city and the town are centres of radiation of Communist ideas.

18. BERNARD SHAW—*The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism*, Ch. V, particularly.

Origins of Economic Planning—Survey, Feb. 1, 1932.

19. Collectivism is connected with historicism, *vide* Boucke Engels' Preface to the Eng. Trans. of *Das Kapital* for peaceful evolution in England.

20. *Vide* GIDE & RIST—*A History of Economic Doctrines*, 173-198.

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BOUCKE—History of Economic Thought, and Critique of Economics, Haney—History of Economic Thought for Sismondi's Theories (New Principles).

20. P. 133, this is a printing mistake in numbering. P. Pillai, in his Economic Conditions in India confirms this, but traces it to the inefficiency in National Production. The Moral and Material Progress Reports and the Indian Year Books alike show that the acreage per capita, (smallest in Bengal and largest in Bombay) is not sufficient to support the Indian peasant at the minimum level. The wide diffusion by fragmentation, though not without one or two advantages, is caused by indebtedness and mortgage, on the one hand, and by laws of succession and partition on the other. Over and above that there has been an increasing dependence (at least of the rent receivers) on land during the last 30 years. And agriculture is the main industry, out of a bare 50 of possible avenues of employment. The efficiency is low as compared to the Javanese or the Egyptian, though it is possible to explain it, as Dr. R. K. Das has done in more than one book of his.

21. This comparison is borne out by local studies of villages as of Mr. Jack of Faridpur in Bengal, of Dr. Lucas of Kavirpur in the Punjab, of Dr. G. Slater of a Madras village, Dr. Mann of a Deccan village, Mr. Horne of a Bihar village, Dr. Radha Kamal Mukerji of Berhampur in Bengal, of students of the Lucknow University of villages in the United Provinces, particularly of Oudh—on the one hand, and Drs. Dalton, Stamp and Bowley of England, and Dr. King and Mr. Scott-Nearing of the U. S. A. on the other.

22. There was an epidemic of strikes in India, a few years after the War, when wages were rising high. See Mr. Row and Mr. Dobb's books on Wages for causes and criticism. K. B. Madhava—Analysis of Trade Disputes, Calcutta Session (1927) of the Indian Economic Conference, ignores wages for insufficient data.

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23. The only strong organisations are the All-India ones—like those of Railway, Postal, Seamen and Textile Workers. After the War, the Unions were of mushroom growth. They were more or less in the nature of strike-committees. Now they are getting settled. Yet they are not strong. *Vide* the Moral and Material Progress Report, year by year. No one book on the trade union movement in India is satisfactory. Dr. R. K. Das is not up-to-date. The report on the working of the Trade Union Act is not historical, for obvious reasons. *Vide* R. K. Das's Labour Movement in India.

24. It is a false reading of Indian History to consider that she has had no political evolution. The special sense in which the evolution may be said to have taken place is indicated in Dr. Radha Kumud Mukerji's 'Local Government in Ancient India.' That there was a large measure of freedom in social, economic and administrative affairs secured to the autonomous bodies by customs and traditions and left uninterfered with by the Central authority whenever such would arise in a Chandragupta, Asoka, Chandra Gupta II or a Harsha is an undisputed fact of history. This local autonomy, vigilantly maintained, was heterogeneous in its interests and continued right up to the times of the British in more or less unbroken succession. But it should not be confused with devolution or decentralisation which supposes a well-established and permanent central authority of the State.

25. Here the sociological significance of these saints is referred to. Nanak, Kavir, Chaitannya and Dadu were great social reformers. Not only did they break the barriers of caste, but they were responsible for occasional syntheses of faith. Nearly all these great men, and many more besides, had Muslims as their disciples. Their mysticism was independent of the Vedic authority. Mysticism is usually personal, and the personality that it liberates by direct communion goes against authoritarianism, at least, in the beginning. Some of the best articles on Kavir and Dadu are in Bengali, by Babu Kshiti Mohan Sen who has

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edited them. Most of them have been published in the *Prabashi*, Calcutta.

The best book is still probably the late Akhay K. Dutt's 'Bharatvarshiya Upasak Sampradaya, in Bengali.

26. Dr. Radha Kamal Mukerji in his *Comparative Economics* (both volumes) and *Democracies of the East* draws attention to the contrast between the society as envisaged by the Socialist (particularly the Guild Socialist) and the Indian social structure. Read also Dr. Coomerswamy—*The Dance of Shiva*, the first chapter, D. P. Mukerji's—*Personality and the Social Sciences*, Ch. VII, *Caste and Class*.

27. *Village Government in British India*—John Mathai, Chapter III. *Poor Relief*, p. 67. The language used is "Under the Muhammadan law, the duty of maintenance, though extensive enough, is less imperative and more restricted than under the Hindu law."

28. MIDDLETON MURRY—*The Necessity of Communism*, p. 135, and note (23). Opposite view is that of Dobb—*Soviet Russia and the World*, pp. 101 and 102. See note (34).

"The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, Unite."—The last sentence of the Communist Manifesto, with a preface by F. Engels. *The Essentials of Marx*—(Vanguard Press), pp. 25-65. This explains the Communist's opposition to the War. The unholy haste with which the Socialists of nearly all countries supported their National Governments in the War was responsible for the bitter disillusionment of the younger generation in the post-war period, which led to a recrudescence of certain extreme forms of Socialism. It seems that this feeling is subsiding of late. The Third International's declared policy is anti-nationalistic.

29. HINDUS—*Humanity Uprooted*, Chapters XII and XIII. Tagore, in his *Letters from Russia*, bears out

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this impression created by Hindus. Every impartial observer testifies to the air of confidence which the Russian Youth breathes, even when the surroundings are sordid.

30. Consult note 23 and Indian Year Books—Sections on Labour and Trade Union Movement.

31. By an analysis of causes of Strikes (given in the Indian Year Books, Moral and Material Progress Reports, and Professor Madhava's article) one comes to the conclusion that the main reason of strikes has been an attempt to improve conditions of employment, particularly in Wages. 48.5 for wages, and 22.36 for personnel. The *Bombay Labour Gazette* publishes Yearly (and Half-Yearly) accounts of strikes in the Bombay Presidency.

32. The allegation is that it was a Communist Organisation. It is now dissolved. The only information that we can get is from newspaper reports of the Meerut Conspiracy Case. The Moral and Material Progress Reports cannot give all the information that is in the hands of the Government. The matter is subjudice.

33. The sympathy of the Indian Capitalists in Bombay and Ahmedabad for the Congress Movement is well-known. How far it is disinterested and spontaneous is not quite clear. The Hartals may not signify anything deep. It is in August, 1932, that Sir P. Thakurdas has openly expressed his concern for trade interests which are being jeopardised by constant closings of the market. He has, be it said, not spared the new Ordinances promulgated by the Government of India for combating the Congress movement, either. He is also keenly alive to the economic consequences of the riots in Bombay. The passive assistance, by secret contributions, has been stopped by Government orders, but other forms may still be there. This looks like a realisation of Karl Marx's prophecy, that the native bourgeoisie will displace the foreign in the intermediate stage. It is high time that a true Socialist, if there be any in India, should bear in mind Lenin's warning.

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34. READ DOBB—Soviet Russia and the World, Ch. V.—The Historical Setting. The attitude of the Communist towards history is not quite clear. As is well-known, the pre-Marxist was a Utopian. Utopianism is, more often than not, a flight from history. Karl Marx was a historicist, but in the Hegelian sense. His economic interpretation of history did not make him an economist, it only made him a historian of economic thoughts and practices. (G. D. H. Cole—Introduction to Karl Marx's Capital, Everyman's Library). Marx's indebtedness to Hegel and Feurbach should point out the inadequacy of the term 'Economic.' 'Materialistic' would be better. In spite of this, Karl Marx's prophecies about the possibilities or otherwise of a socialist revolution in England and Russia were not fulfilled. Which only proves that the logic of events is superior to that of a prophet or a doctrinaire. Since Karl Marx, with the exception of Bernstein, few Marxists have imbibed the spirit of history. In the hands of the Russian Communist (Trotsky, Lenin and Bukharin) history has degenerated into 'pure dialectic.' It stands to reason, and to reason only, that those who would want events to approximate to a 'norm' should ignore the historical foundations which make events what they are. The Soviet Republic is a norm, rather than an actuality. No wonder that the norm is making terms with actualities. *Vide* M. Murry, p. 38 ff. for Eliot's criticism of Marxian interpretation as 'simply incompatible with desiring anything.' *Vide* Lindsay, Ch. II. For the historical setting of these 'compromises'—M. Dobb—Soviet Russia and the World, Ch. V, pp. 101-102. Dobb holds the contrary view. "It is a common view in the West"—probably the view referred to is that of Middleton Murry in his Necessity of Communism, note (23), p. 135 ('Whatever naive Communists may believe, a nation cannot simply omit a necessary stage in human development without paying for it. It has to pass through the ethical equivalent of that economic stage') "that the Bolsheviks are people who, not content with doing first things first, sought to skip a number of intervening stages

and introduce a Communist system by the force of arms overnight. Nothing, in fact, can be further removed from truth. The Bolsheviks may hold a theory of history which is radically different from that which is taught in academic schools; but the very essence of Marxism is its emphasis on historical relativity and the supremacy of the historical process."

35. For the opposite view, A. M. Bartholdy's Lecture—Bureaucracy in a Nation's Lean Years; the German experience in *The New Social Science*, edited by L. D. White, The U. of Chic. Press.

But Russia has beaten Germany in her own game. The number of Committees in Russia is an Iliad, one committee is appointed to supervise another and so on. The cost of administration may be low as compared with other countries, still up till 1927 at least, it was high as compared with other items in the Budget itself. There were orders for economy. Perhaps it is wrong to call it bureaucracy, for the idea of common good is ever present in the minds of these people. State-Socialism is apt to be bureaucratic.

36. MIDDLETON MURRY—The Necessity of Communism, p. 116, 'What has made Marxian Economics the prodigious force it is? The dynamic of disinterestedness; not the dynamic of interest.' Lippmann is, of course, not a Marxist.

37. Persons, and not individuals. "The Concept of the Person"—E. E. Eubank, *Sociology and Social Research*. (March-April, 1928). 'Individual and Person'—Lloyd Morgan, *The American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1929. Lloyd Morgan—*Mind at the Crossways*, p. 229. D. P. Mukerji's 'Personality and the Social Sciences.' Murry—*Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*, pp. 422-426 for Stern's 'Conception of the Person.'

38. I do not mean that there is no control or no ratiocination. But a real Guru emphasises self-control. The ratiocination may be said to precede the selection of the Guru. In any case, it is not logomachy. The disciple

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argues, no doubt, but in all reverence. His questionings are answered by the Guru. Accordingly, the instructions are not the same for each. They are graded in the light of a personal knowledge of the intellectual level of the disciple by the master.

39. This is the stage *Sajujya* well-known in Vaishnava Philosophy.

*Page 146—Mr. Blunt makes a difference between sub-caste and caste. See his Census Report, U. P. 1911, the chapter on caste, and 'The Caste-System of Northern India,' Chapters II, IV and VI for the System of Caste Government, Chapter XIV, for Caste in relation to Religion.

40. KARL PEARSON—'National Life from the Stand-point of Science.'

41. For the evolution of Caste, see Chapter II of Blunt—Caste-System of Northern India.

42. BLUNT—U. P. Census Report 1911, pp. 349-352, 357-358, ". There is ample proof that that the caste-system is not rigid, but mutable, and that its evolution is still proceeding; new castes and sub-castes come into existence, old customs fall into abeyance," p. 208. The Caste-System of Northern India, Chapter XI.

43. The attitude of the public towards the Liberals as a whole is an instance to the point. No honest criticism of the Congress movement could be openly expressed, just as no honest criticism of the Government action is possible without inviting unpleasant suspicion.

*Page 151—For principles of Social control, see Ross' Social Control. Ross—Principles of Sociology, Chapters XXXIV and XXXV. Park and Burgess—Chapter XII. Hayes—Sociology, Part IV, Chapter XXIX, p. 654, particularly the section—'not law but personality is the Ultimate Basis of Social Order.' Bernard—Introduction to Social Psychology, Chapters X, XXXV and XXXVI.

44. SMITH's article (Int. J. of Ethics, January, 1932), referred to above, and M. Murry's Necessity of Communism.

45. See Note (37).

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As readers of these pages may find it convenient to have in one place a list of the books referred to there, I append it. I need hardly say that the mention of a particular book does not mean my agreement or disagreement with its point of view.

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THE END

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